Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 43, Number 1, Winter 1999

Mohammed Ayoob On India's Nukes

CULTURE WARS IN THE MILITARY

America's "Multicultural" Military
Don M. Snider

Cultures of Victory and Defeat
Williamson Murray

The Brave New World of Persons-at-Arms
John Hillen

Four Uncertain Trumpets of Change
Andrew J. Bacevich

The Bankrupt Russian Bear
Henry E. Hale

What's To Become of the Russian Pacific?
Felix Chang

Germans In Search of a Weltanschauung
Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Foreign Policy Research Institute / JAI Press Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization devoted to research, publication, and education on international affairs. It brings the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests abroad.

Current research projects examine new directions in U.S. relations with Russia, China, and Japan. Other projects focus on American military policy, Gulf security, Indian-Pakistani relations, nuclear crime, and sources of instability in Latin America.

FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education promotes international and civic literacy. Its Wachman Fund activities include the *Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs*, the *Cynthia P. Robinson Memorial Lectures on International Affairs*, the *Bobby Hall Luxenberg Memorial Lecture on Japan*, and the *Perlmutter Lectures on Ethnic Conflict*—all for scholars and the interested public; *Global Classroom* and *History Academy*, for secondary-school teachers; and the *Internship Program*, for students contemplating a career in international affairs.

The Institute also publishes the following bulletins: *FPRI Wire*, a two-page commentary on world affairs; *Watch on the West*, on issues concerning America and the West; *Peacefacts*, on the Middle East peace process; *CubaWatch*, on developments in Cuba and their implications for the United States; and *Footnotes*, for educators. One other FPRI bulletin, *E-Notes*, is available exclusively by E-mail or fax.

To inquire about membership, write or call the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684, Tel: (215) 732-3774, ext. 105, Fax: (215) 732-4401, E-mail: FPRI@aol.com. All contributions to FPRI are tax-deductible.

President
Harvey Sicherman
Vice President
Alan H. Luxenberg

Board of Trustees
John H. Ball
Chairman
Bruce H. Hooper
Marvin Wachman
Vice Chairmen
Charles B. Grace
Treasurer
S. Michael Alexander
W.W. Keen Butcher
John Gilray Christy
Robert A. Fox
Susan H. Goldberg
Alexander M. Haig Jr.
N. Peter Hamilton
Kenneth D. Hill
Bobbie Hillman
Tatnall Lea Hillman
Graham Humes
Herbert M. Johnson
John F. Lehman
David Lucterhand
Martin Meyerson
Stephen S. Moody
Ronald J. Naples
Frank N. Piasecki
Meyer P. Potamkin
Samuel J. Savitz
Harvey Sicherman
Robert Strausz-Hupé
John M. Templeton Jr.
William H. Wurster
Dov S. Zakheim

Board of Advisors
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower
Samuel P. Huntington
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz
James R. Thompson
Richard Thornburgh
Murray Weidenbaum

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 43, Number 1, Winter 1999

LIBRARY OF
HAVERFORD COLLEGE
JAN 25 1999
HAVERFORD, PA



"U.S. Marines . . . 'Soldiers of the Sea,'" recruiting poster, ca. 1915, by Joseph Leyendecker. Courtesy of the U.S. Navy Art Collection and the U.S. Marine Corps Museum, Washington, D.C.

Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute

by JAI PRESS INC.

Stamford, Connecticut • London, England

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis
A Journal of World Affairs

Editor
WALTER A. McDOUGALL

Assistant Editor
STEPHEN WINTERSTEIN

Contributing Editors
BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ
PAUL BRACKEN
PATRICK CLAWSON
MARK FALCOFF
MICHAEL RADU
HARVEY SICHERMAN
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU

BOARD OF EDITORS

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
University of New Orleans

PAUL BALARAN
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

HENRY S. BIENEN
Northwestern University

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

ELIOT A. COHEN
The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

STEPHEN P. COHEN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

L. GORDON CROVITZ
Hong Kong

ARTHUR CYR
Carthage College

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

COLIN S. GRAY
University of Hull

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Rutgers University

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
Center for Strategic & International Studies

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Hudson Institute

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

BARRY R. POSEN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PETER W. RODMAN
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
University of California at Berkeley

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI
Foreign Policy Research Institute

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHEN VAN EVERA
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

GEORGE WEIGEL
Ethics and Public Policy Center

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Articles appearing in *Orbis* are indexed and/or abstracted in *ABC Political Science; Academic Index; America: History and Life; Articles 1st; CARL UnCover; Contents 1st; Current Contents: Social and Behavioral Sciences; Historical Abstracts; International Political Science Abstracts; (Newspaper and) Periodical Abstracts; Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS); Social Science Citation Index (SSCI); Social Science Index; U.S. Political Science Documents.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 43, Number 1, Winter 1999

Editor's Column — Walter A. McDougall — 1

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN MILITARY CULTURE

Introduction — Harvey Sicherman — 9

An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture — Don M. Snider — 11

Does Military Culture Matter? — Williamson Murray — 27

Must U.S. Military Culture Reform? — John Hillen — 43

Nuclear India and Indian-American Relations — Mohammed Ayoob — 59

The Russian Far East's Endless Winter — Felix K. Chang — 77

The Rise of Russian Anti-Imperialism — Henry E. Hale — 111

Germans On Their Future — Alvin Z. Rubinstein — 127

Review Essays

In Search of New Military Paradigms — Andrew J. Bacevich — 145

The Reagan Legacy Up for Grabs — Mark T. Clark — 152

The Wisdom of Robert Strausz-Hupé — 163

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"For [over] twenty years IS has been influencing scholarship and public discourse. On a wide range of topics, it has become our most interesting and important journal."
–Robert Jervis, Columbia University

"The best journal in the field."
–Kenneth Waltz, University of California, Berkeley

"Absolutely indispensable."
–Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University

"A forum for the most important scholarship on international security issues."
–Benjamin Frankel, Editor, Security Studies

"Excellent"
–The Times Higher Education Supplement

INTERNATIONAL
Security

For over twenty years, *International Security* has published articles that have defined the debate on all aspects of war, peace, and security studies. Its lucid and well-documented essays come from all political and theoretical perspectives. Subscribers receive the most provocative and most frequently cited articles on today's security agenda.

Steven E. Miller, Editor in Chief
Michael E. Brown, Managing Editor
Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Owen R. Coté, Editors

http://mitpress.mit.edu/ISEC

Select Recent Contributions
Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival Avery Goldstein
Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy Philip Gordon
Dayton Report Card Jane M.O. Sharp
The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity John Orme

1998 Rates
$38 individuals, $110 institutions, $22 student/retired (copy of current ID required). Outside U.S.A., and Canada add $16 postage and handling. Canadians add 7% GST. *Prices subject to change without notice. Prepayment required.* Send check or money order—drawn on a U.S. bank in U.S. funds, payable to *International Security*—AMEX, MC, or VISA number to:

Circulation Department
MIT Press Journals
Five Cambridge Center
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
617-253-2889 tel / 617-577-1545 fax
journals-orders@mit.edu.

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. ISSN 0162-2889

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor's Column

The tabloids proclaim that the winter of 1999 is to be the coldest in decades, a guess inspired by the climatic astrology that has the warm and moist *El Niño* giving way to the cold and dry influence of *La Niña*. (No reaction yet from the feminist camp about said sea change, nor from White House reporters.) Scare stories in more responsible journals trumpet the Y2K effect that the coming of the year 2000 will have on our computers, and warn that if institutions, industries, and whole nations have not already taken precautions, it is probably too late to avert a season of chaos. Still others imagine nuclear or biological terrorism's visiting American shores, or a global economic meltdown triggered by the collapse of currencies in East Asia, Russia, and other developing markets. And all the while America, the "indispensable nation," only conceivable world leader, and last, best hope for mankind resembles the decadent Roman Empire more than the self-confident Republic governed in the name of the Senate and People by the virtuous consuls Franklin, Harry, Dwight, Jimmy, Ronald, and George.

But all this should be greeted with a certain equanimity. If war is described as long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of terror, world politics is characterized by a lengthy parade of fears interrupted by moments of boredom—moments significant mostly for the harm they do to the funding of foreign policy institutes.

In These Pages

After Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Winston Churchill enjoyed taunting disarmers, appeasers, and League of Nations faithful with the politically incorrect cry, "Thank God for the French army!" Alas, the French army would later let everyone down, but Churchill was nonetheless right that it was the only force capable of stopping Nazi Germany without world war, at least up through 1936. Today, the armed forces of the United States play a similar role in that they alone can squelch the ambitions of aggressors before they get out of hand. And that is why signs of demoralization, dissension, dishonor, and anti-intellectualism in the uniformed officer corps should prompt the alarms that others sound for bad weather and crashing computers. Simply put, the U.S. military on which the world relies is wandering without maps onto uncharted terrain after the Cold War. No one knows just what the national security challenges of the near future will be, what the next big war will be like, and thus how to win it. No one can be sure whether U.S. defense spending is at a needlessly high peacetime level, or at a dangerous post–Pearl Harbor nadir. No one knows whether the apparent "gap"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between civil and military values and institutions in the United States is a healthy or sick development for our democracy. Above all, perhaps, no one knows whether the U.S. military's unprecedented experiment with respect to the thorough integration of women will spawn a brave new world of gender equality or do severe damage to American combat performance. Worse still, what passes for debate over these issues has to date been ignorant and politicized, as strident civilians denounce each other's motives rather than examine their contentions, and active duty officers duck for cover in a conspiracy of silence.

This summer the Foreign Policy Research Institute hosted a candid, off-the-record conference on these issues and more, in the hope that even if we could not pronounce where U.S. military culture is or ought to be going, we might at least frame the right questions. The results of that highly charged colloquy appear in these pages. First, Don Snider tackles the problem of definition, demonstrates that we have in fact numerous military cultures, and asks how well they work together. Next, Wick Murray asks why military cultures matter, and his examples from the past and present prove that they could not possibly matter more. Thirdly, John Hillen tackles the provocative issue of whether and how the cultures of America's armed services ought to be changed, especially in the face of multiple new pressures, including demands from the advocates of women's and homosexuals' rights. Finally, Andy Bacevich reviews some recent books calling for real revolutions in American military affairs, including ex-Senator Gary Hart's appeal to restore the draft and entrust this democracy's defense to a militia comprised of citizens-in-arms.

Looking abroad, 1998 would appear to have been one of those years in which small hints of big changes first make their appearance. One need only think of the Asian economic flu, the testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the de facto end of the inspection regime in Iraq, the war in Central Africa, and the financial collapse and reactionary political turn in Moscow. But our other contributors warn against premature prophecies of doom. Thus, Mohammed Ayoob explains to us why the Indian government did what it did *when* it did, and advises America how to adjust to the new reality. Alvin Z. Rubinstein reports on what Germany's foreign policy experts really think about their nation's future leadership role and whether the election of the Social Democrats will make a real difference on the course of German history. And Henry Hale recounts the powerful constraints that have inhibited any neo-imperialist initiatives in Russian foreign policy—constraints that will vex reactionaries whatever the fate of Yeltsin or his liberal economic agenda.

We also welcome back Felix Chang, whose previous appearance in *Orbis* involved a three-part analysis of Chinese military capabilities that was so compelling that certain American security agencies took note. He now offers a two-part series on the Russian Far East, examining in this issue the almost total economic collapse of those far-flung Pacific provinces, and in the next issue the military strength (or weakness) of Russia in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Far East. Finally, Mark Clark returns to assess several new books on Ronald Reagan's foreign policy legacy, a subject still of great moment not only to Reagan's critics, but also to those Republicans who would claim Reagan's mantle for themselves in the run-up to the 2000 election.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

Objectivity is the historians' highest professional virtue. They are, in theory, pledged to attempt to reconstruct the past, in Leopold von Ranke's famous phrase, "wie es eigentlich gewesen." That is usually translated "as it actually was." The German really says "as it essentially was"—a more modest ambition—but the intention is nonetheless clear. Historians are supposed to try to suppress their personal biases, transcend their own time and place, and see the world through the eyes of their historical subjects. How else can they claim to "explain," say, the words and deeds of a medieval pope or a French revolutionary?

It goes without saying that historians, being human, fall short of that goal. They may, for instance, marshal evidence to support interpretations of the past that will attract attention, impress their critics, and advance their careers, while ignoring evidence to the contrary. But even scrupulous historians have a way of fooling themselves. When confronted with a daunting mass of memoranda, policy statements, and public speeches, they may read too much, or not enough, into the words of their historical actors. Take for instance President Clinton's 1998 statement in Beijing in which he associated the United States, for the first time, with China's insistent "Three No's" regarding the status of Taiwan. Did he himself understand how radical a shift in American policy that was, or did he just blunder from having been put on the spot or inadequately briefed by his aides? And if he did understand what he was doing, did he do it because he believed it was wise on the face of it, or because it was a concession made to obtain Beijing's help on some other foreign policy problem, or because he was "paying off" the Chinese for services rendered to his political campaign? Now, diplomatic historians tend to assume rationality. They assume that the U.S. government does have a China policy, and that that policy is based on some calculation, be it a good or bad one, of the national interest. But that assumption is not always warranted, and not only because politicians are even more slippery than those who attempt to explain them. It is not warranted because words themselves are opaque. Consider the wisdom of Aristotle:

> Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all. Injustice is all the graver when it is armed injustice; and man is furnished from birth with arms (such as, for instance, language) which are intended to serve the purposes of moral prudence and virtue, but which may be used in preference for opposite ends. That is why, if he be without virtue, he is a most unholy and savage being, and worse than all the others in the indulgence of lust and gluttony.[1]

[1] *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How modern he sounds! But then, to say that an ancient writer sounds "modern" is just to admit that not only *these* times, but *all* times try men's souls in similar ways for similar reasons born of the immutable human condition. Whether one prefers to name it vice with the philosophers, sin with the theologians, or dysfunction with the psychologists, the universal perversity of human behavior is an empirical fact. It is what makes governments necessary, then promptly corrupts those governments, making necessary a balance of power within states and among them if human beings are to enjoy some interstices of peace and liberty during their brief span of years.

Aristotle is especially wise to identify language as a tool apt to be turned into a weapon, and to associate its corruption with savagery. In our own time we think of George Orwell's essays and novels decrying the way twentieth-century tyrants make words mean their opposite and govern through lies. He himself first witnessed this crime as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil War. His heart was with the earnest revolutionaries fighting for the Republic against Franco, but their cause was betrayed by their Communist "allies" who said there would time enough for social revolution after the war was won. "The thing for which the Communists were working," he realized, "was not to postpone the Spanish revolution till a more suitable time, but to make sure that it never happened. This became more and more obvious as time went on, as power was twisted more and more out of working-class hands, and as more and more revolutionaries of every shade were flung into jail."[2]

The corruption of language is a specialty, of course, of totalitarian regimes as satirically exposed in Orwell's *1984* and *Animal Farm*, where freedom is slavery, war is peace, and some animals are more equal than others. But the human condition being what it is, all statesmen of whatever stripe must practice deception to some degree or else be outmaneuvered by more ruthless opponents. Strategic thinkers from Sun Tzu to Sir Basil Liddell Hart and our own Edward Luttwak have explained how deception and the indirect approach are often fundamental to victory in any sort of strategic conflict. A cynic might claim that this applies as well to everyday life: in an automobile showroom, in competitive games and sports, in a negotiation on the job, committee meeting, or court proceeding, in an encounter with a traffic cop, or quarrel with a spouse—indeed in any social situation in which we hope to advance our cause whether for good motives or ill. That does not mean we tell bold-faced lies, only that we choose our words so as to soften or shade the truth in situations where blunt honesty would be imprudent. At other times, we may indeed tell the "naked" truth, or profess to do so, but not because we are mythical George Washingtons who "cannot tell a lie," but rather because we judge that the appearance of honesty, or a reputation for honesty, best serves our purpose at this time before

[2] George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (1938; reprint, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1980), p. 67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this audience. In sum, words and truth, rhetoric and reality, do not coincide as often as we might like.

A true cynic might agree with Machiavelli's observation that

> the experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's brains, and who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their foundation. . . . I will only mention one modern instance. Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, he thought of nothing else, and found the occasion for it; no man was ever more able to give assurances, or affirmed things with stronger oaths, and no man observed them less; however, he always succeeded in his deceptions, as he well knew this aspect of things.[3]

To be "practiced at the art of deception," to quote the Rolling Stones' lyric, is thus a *sine qua non* of what the world considers success—and a reputation for honesty useful only insofar as it is undeserved.

All this confounds historians, who must work almost exclusively from literary sources—documents—in their attempt to reconstruct past events and explain why they happened. Harvey Sicherman, president of the FPRI and veteran State Department speechwriter, knows from experience that in our Republic of Leaks and Freedom of Information Acts few documents are drafted, especially those classified Secret (!), without the author's keeping in mind the impression they will make on the media (and future historians) once they become public. Or, as a wise man of my acquaintance once said, "Don't put anything on paper that you can say on the telephone; don't say anything on the telephone that you can say in person; and don't say anything even in person that can be conveyed with a wink." Frankin D. Roosevelt was just such a sphinx. He put very little of substance on paper. He habitually and breezily promised one thing to a cabinet member, reporter, or visitor in the morning, implied the exact opposite to another after lunch, and denied both accounts to a third in the evening. Then, in speeches and press conferences, he wittingly mocked those who dared challenge his veracity! No wonder historians are still in the dark about the real motives behind his domestic and foreign policies. But for all his dissimulation over thirteen years in office, he never lost the trust of the majority of the American people.

So far, I think, the post-modern deconstructionists would applaud what I have written. To them, all language is without intrinsic meaning and all values and concepts, from love and beauty and truth and justice to freedom, equality, sanity, and reality are mere social constructions: conventions, really, that the dominant race, class, or gender in a given culture at a given time has imposed on the masses, the better to maintain its own privileged position. Thus, not only ideological dictatorships, but also monarchies, liberal democracies, churches, clubs, families, and every

[3] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: New American Library, 1952), pp. 92–93. Rodrigo Borgia, Pope Alexander VI (1431–1503), "holds a high place on the list of the so-called bad popes" in the restrained language of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sort of human hierarchy employ language as a mere tool of power. According to the post-modernists, language does not need to be twisted, because it is of its nature a twist. There is no such thing, *pace* Aristotle, as language "intended to serve the purposes of moral prudence and virtue" because somebody did the "intending" and somebody decided what is to constitute "prudence and virtue."

But I must disappoint the post-modernists. For even as I agree, being a student of politics, that language is a tool of statecraft susceptible to infinite manipulation, I do not conclude that it therefore means nothing—or anything, as in the *Alice in Wonderland* world of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. In the world of strategy, words do mean something real and important to the speaker and to the audience. The words just do not always mean what they appear to mean, and if the statesman is good at his task, the audience knows and applauds it. For the people are in on the fraud: they are the willing accomplices in their own apparent deception. To be sure, such political chemistry is hard to measure, and any attempt to decode political rhetoric, much less deduce from it a statesman's genuine policy, will strike some as intuitive. But the tweaking of rhetoric is grounded in the hardest reality: the need to persuade, admonish, or dupe the masses into supporting the leadership so that policy may move ahead, while at the same time signaling friends and foes alike as to what that policy is. It is a reality that politicians (indeed any strategist) and their speech writers and spinmeisters must confront every day.

We are overdue, I know, for examples, and at the risk of my reputation I shall suggest some. When FDR told the American people that they had "nothing to fear but fear itself," he was not saying to them, "Don't worry, be happy" or "What, Me Worry?" or "Happy days are here again." He was really telling them, "I know you are afraid. You have every right to be. And I intend to exploit that fear to rally support for whatever emergency measures I decide to take, because elements in the Congress, courts, and business community are going to resist them and say terrible things about me. So don't forget your fear. I'm going to need it."

Implicit bargains between leaders and voters are more complicated in foreign relations because most Americans most of the time don't want to hear about foreign policy, while the president must craft his words for their effect on foreign governments as well as for their effect at home. Thus, when Khrushchev rattled his rockets and threw up the Berlin Wall in 1961, President Kennedy made loud noises about resistance, beefed up U.S. forces in Europe, visited Checkpoint Charlie himself, and declared, "*Ich bin ein Berliner.*" That satisfied both his constituencies perfectly, because it made the American people and Europeans feel good while at the same time signaling the Soviets that he in fact had no intention of risking World War III over Berlin. That is, Kennedy took it upon himself to reconcile Western public opinion to the Soviet outrage. And if you doubt that, contrast it with Eisenhower's handling of the previous Berlin crisis of 1959. He said nothing and even withdrew some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American conventional forces from Germany, while at the same time quietly reinforcing U.S. *nuclear* forces on station. Not knowing how serious its government was, American public opinion was quiescent. Khrushchev, knowing full well what Ike's signals meant, forgot all about his ultimatums and deadlines.

What did Mao Zedong expect to achieve when he bragged that the East is Red and denounced the United States as a "paper tiger"? Surely he did not think Americans would collectively answer, "Mao is right! We Yanks should be ashamed of ourselves, imperialist running dogs that we are, and withdraw from East Asia immediately." On the contrary, by simultaneously promising to assist Communist "wars of liberation" in Asia and belittling American resolve and power, he was all but inviting the United States to remain engaged in Southeast Asia. Why? Because the Chinese had no desire to see Vietnam, which had hated and feared China for a thousand years, unite under the tough regime in Hanoi and make common cause with Mao's real enemy, the Soviet Union.

Orwell was right: in political rhetoric peace often means war, and war peace—and not just in the propaganda of dictators. Recently, President Clinton declared war on terrorism. Did he really mean it? Of course not, and the American people knew it, which is why they continued to give him high marks for leadership instead of rising as one to protest a "war" that could make their daily commute to work a nightmare of uncertainty. Do the American people really want to bomb and invade half a dozen Islamic countries and thus invite retaliatory acts of terror in their own hometowns, which is what Clinton's declaration, taken literally, would entail? Of course not. What really happened was that just as Osama bin-Laden needs to blow up some embassies once in awhile to establish his *bona fides* among his own followers, so Clinton needs to express outrage and fire off some missiles into obscure corners of the Islamic world so as to *liquidate* the affair in American politics.

"We are the folk song army and every one of us *cares*/We all hate poverty, war, and injustice, unlike the rest of you squares." So went Tom Lehrer's spoof on the 1960s protesters' penchant for declaring risk-free war on abstractions. But real statesmen do not publicly target abstractions like terrorism. They secretly target terrorists, instruct their agents to put a dozen contracts out on the ones they want out of the way, then rely on the intrigues of the bazaar to provide at least one assassin with a motive and a chance to succeed. That's the way the British did it, from the Sudan to Afghanistan, for over a century.

The art of political signaling is ubiquitous, ancient, and highly developed. But diplomatic and political historians have only begun to study that art in any systematic fashion. Reading the tea leaves of what statesmen say and how they are heard, in order to make an educated guess as to what they are trying to achieve, is no simple task. Some statesmen are literal to the best of their ability: Harry Truman comes to mind, at least by reputation. But recall that reputations, too, are pieces in the political chess game. A notorious liar can use the truth in ways honest people cannot,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whereas a reputedly honest man can run bluffs the liar cannot. That is why prestige, derived from a medieval French word denoting "a juggler's tricks" and considered by some an unworthy pursuit, can be a critical political asset. Consider a country whose military force is always underestimated by its rivals. Such a country will not fare well in negotiations and can only exploit the misperception of others through war (just think of Prussia in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, and Japan between 1890 and 1941). By contrast, a country always deemed stronger than it is in reality can often prevail without war, but it takes a mighty risk in throwing its reputation around, for if war should come anyway it may face disaster.

Historians have developed a number of structural theories and identified a plethora of material forces at work in human events in the hope of explaining the patterns of the past. But history can never cease to be about individual people for the reason that if people did not display vice, sin, dysfunction—whichever you will—there would be no history at all. Language, in turn, is the medium people use to communicate, and without it there would be no nations or governments, societies, cultures, or families. In our quest to understand the place of words in the arena of power and to judge their effect on real events, we historians will indeed have much to learn from semiotics (the science of symbols) and linguistic theory of the constructive variety. But we may learn even more from Aristotle, Cicero, and the ancients. And we shall learn most of all, I suspect, from observing ourselves, which is to say, the contrast between our true selves and the selves we craft for others to see and hear.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Introduction

The Future of American Military Culture

Ever since the end of the Cold War, America's military has been caught in a crossfire. Decreasing budgets and forces have been strained by increasing operations, especially deployments abroad for so-called peacekeeping missions. On top of this, rapidly changing technologies in communications and weapons pose new challenges. Meanwhile, the Pentagon faces demands for different policies regarding the treatment of women and homosexuals.

In 1996, the Foreign Policy Research Institute established a Defense Task Force to assess the impact of these and other developments on America's military strength. Its first report, "The Demilitarization of the Military," issued in March 1997, warned of trends that, if not arrested, would result in a military much less able to protect the nation. These trends included the increasing use of U.S. forces for peacekeeping at the expense of training for the primary mission of deterrence; a unilateral disarmament flowing from procurement shortfalls and a shrinking defense industrial base; and a potentially dangerous gap between the military and the society it protects, particularly as fewer and fewer Americans, especially American leaders, participate in our national defense. Recommendations were made to fix these problems, and the report itself was given wide circulation. *Orbis* also published a set of papers commissioned for the Task Force in a special issue (Spring 1997) under the title "Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?"

We emerged from this experience convinced that the American military was facing a profound challenge to its very "culture," or to be more direct, "the American way of war." Recognizing that this subject was neither well understood nor subject to quick fixes (such as more money), we assembled another Defense Task Force to examine three questions: What is military culture? Why does it matter? How should it change?

The Task Force was chaired by the Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr., former secretary of the navy, and directed by Dr. Harvey Sicherman, president of FPRI. It was divided into three panels, each with a rapporteur.

For the first panel, dealing with the definition of military culture, the rapporteur was Col. Don Snider, USA (ret.), the Olin Professor of National Security Studies at the United States Military Academy (USMA). Dr. Snider, a distinguished soldier and analyst, is a Vietnam combat veteran who served later as Chief of Plans for Theater Army in Europe and Joint Planner for the Army Chief of Staff. In 1987, he became Director of Defense Policy at the National Security Council Staff and worked for both the Reagan and Bush administrations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He received the Department of Defense's highest military award for service, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Prior to his current position, he directed the Political-Military Studies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Holder of a doctorate in public policy from the University of Maryland, he has published widely here and abroad.

Rapporteur for the second panel, which focused on the importance of military culture, was Dr. Williamson Murray, then Charles Lindbergh Professor at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution. Dr. Murray (Ph.D., Yale University) is a veteran of the United States Air Force and has taught at Yale, Ohio State, the U.S. Military Academy, the Air and Naval War Colleges, and the Marine Corps University. He was professor at the Smithsonian when this paper was completed and is now the Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army War College. A distinguished author, he has written penetrating books on the European balance of power, German military effectiveness, and the air war in the Persian Gulf.

Rapporteur for the third panel, charged with examining changes in American military culture, was Dr. John Hillen, the Olin Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. Army officer. In addition to service in Europe and the Pacific, he is a combat veteran of Operation Desert Storm and was awarded a Bronze Star medal. He holds a doctorate from the University of Oxford, and among his extensive writing credits is the recently published *Blue Helmet: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Brassey's Inc, 1998).

The Task Force panelists were a most distinguished group that included Professor Deborah Avant of the departments of political science and international relations at George Washington University; Professor James Burk, department of sociology, Texas A&M University; Ms. Elaine Donnelly, the president of the Center for Military Readiness; Maj. Christopher Gibson, an officer serving in the army's congressional liaison office; Professor Eugenia Kiesling, department of history, USMA; Dr. Walter A. McDougall, the Alloy Ansin Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania; Mr. Thomas E. Ricks, Pentagon correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal* and author of the recent book *Making the Corps* (Scribner, 1997); Dr. David Alan Rosenberg, the Arleigh Burke Professor of Maritime Strategy at the National War College; Col. Harry G. Summers, USA (ret.), a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*; and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, USMC (ret.), an associate at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

The three essays printed here, authored by the rapporteurs, are drawn from the conference discussions, but also go beyond them. FPRI will soon release a separate report on the findings of the Task Force. The views expressed in these essays, therefore, do not necessarily reflect a consensus of the panels or the Task Force. We present them as part of our continuing effort to make Americans, especially policymakers, more aware of long-term defense issues vital to our national security.

Harvey Sicherman

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of American Military Culture

An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture

by Don M. Snider

A decade of debate and legislation in Washington designed to change the "military culture" of our armed forces has not been in vain. The number of African-American and female officers and enlisted persons has increased dramatically, women now hold scores of jobs reserved for men just a few years ago, and President Clinton's "don't ask, don't tell" policy has given homosexuals executive sanction to serve in our armed forces.[1] During the same time, serious failures by the officer corps of two services have focused national attention on isolated incidents of sexual harassment that indicate to many the need for further reform. The most recent example of the continuing attempts to reform military cultures flowed from the celebrated cases of Air Force Lieutenant Kelly Flinn and Army Major General David Hale, and resulted in the attempt by the secretary of defense to standardize across the services the official sanctions imposed for adultery and fraternization.[2]

Various interpretations clash over this ongoing reform of our armed forces. One prominent participant sees the entire debate through political and conspiratorial lenses, positing that it really started in 1975 when women were admitted to the military academies under the feminists' demand for "simple equality," whereas their real purpose was to overthrow the traditional culture. What is more, the effects of such decisions remained unexamined even today.[3] Another widely read and referenced source holds that the American military is becoming dangerously isolated from the society it protects, and notes the disdain in which some members of the armed forces hold that society. In this view,

[1] Craig Donegan, "New Military Culture," *CQ Researcher*, April 26, 1996, pp. 361–84.

[2] Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Secretary of Defense Directs More Uniformity and Clarity in Service Policies Pertaining to Good Order and Discipline," News Release No. 404-98, July 29, 1998.

[3] James Webb, "The War on Military Culture," *Weekly Standard*, January 20, 1997, pp. 17–22.

Don M. Snider is professor of political science at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. In 1990 he completed a military career as an infantry officer and strategist, including three combat tours in Vietnam and service in the White House on the staff of the National Security Council during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Military Academy nor the Departments of Defense or the Army.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

further changes in military culture are warranted to reconcile the armed forces to civil society.[4]

In my own judgment, it is fair to say that in most of the debate to date, "military culture" has been presented by the progressive advocates as something unacceptably different from the prevailing culture of contemporary American society. Hence they represent military culture as a belief system homogeneous across all services and conforming to a "traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior paradigm." Counterpoised against it is an "evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness."[5] Clearly, given the author's selection of adjectives, the focus of this representation is on the composition of our armed forces and on issues of gender and sexual preference as they are either included or excluded from "military culture."

Such attempts to change American military culture no doubt will continue, and they will continue to inspire a largely rhetorical debate, focused narrowly on the role of the traditional "warrior" in military culture and on issues of interest to the progressive advocates of identity politics. And insofar as this debate remains centered on the role and treatment of women, minorities, and homosexuals in the military, then uniformed military leaders are clearly not setting the terms.[6] As a result, our national discourse is not really about military culture at all, and is incapable of judging whether the changes it is producing are for the good of America's armed forces and the nation as a whole. I believe that the political discourse leading to these changes has not yet addressed the truly important questions because the debate thus far has been *false* and *misleading*. It has been *false* because it has largely ignored what military culture really is and why it is important. Seldom discussed is the functional, warfighting rationale behind the peculiarities of military culture, what our British colleagues describe as "the right to be different."[7] In fact, the adjective "military" is seldom even defined in the context of military missions and tasks, and perhaps even more important, almost never with the additional description as "effective" or "successful." America has, and has had, a very successful military, and to debate policies designed to change its culture without at the same time having an informed discussion of the consequences in terms of military effectiveness is folly.

Secondly, I will argue that the dialogue has been *misleading* largely because of the missing voice of the uniformed military leadership, that is, those charged with representing in a professional manner to the American people the nature, characteristics, and needs of our military forces. Their abdication of

[4] Thomas E. Ricks, *Making the Corps* (New York: Scribner, 1997); James Kitfield, "Standing Apart," *National Journal*, June 13, 1998, pp. 1350–58.

[5] Lt. Col. Karen O. Dunivin, "Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift?" Maxwell Paper No. 10 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1997), p. iii.

[6] If they had set the terms, the results likely would have been different, as they were in the case of the Weinberger Doctrine. See Cori Dauber, "The Practice of Argument: Reading the Conditions of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1998, pp. 435–46.

[7] Patrick Mileham, "Military Virtues 1: The Right to be Different," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1998), pp. 169–90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this responsibility has left others to take it up, albeit with far less effectiveness than they could do themselves.[8] But this goes beyond the issue of who speaks for the military or how vocal they may or should be.[9] Rather it goes to the issue of the very nature and character of the military institution that is being portrayed to the American public. Is it a truly professional institution that the public will continue to legitimize and support as such, or is it a deprofessionalizing military that will soon lose public support as last occurred after Vietnam? At a time when the press, while reporting on America's newly found "war" on terrorism, is creating moral equivalency between the soldiers of a democracy and international criminals and thugs, this is not a trivial question.

Thus, in the sections that follow, I will synthesize from the various literature and from my own experiences better informed, alternative views of just what military culture is, and is not. In concluding I shall return to the issue of the missing voices of military professionals.

Military Culture Broadly Defined

Our first understanding of military culture is drawn from the academic disciplines within which it is studied, including organizational science, anthropology, sociology, and political science. For the purposes of this discussion, perhaps the most useful starting point is the broad definition offered by Edgar Schein for any organizational culture:

> We must first specify that a given set of people has had enough stability and common history to have allowed a culture to form. This means that some organizations will have no overarching culture because they have no common history or have frequent turnover of members. Other organizations can be presumed to have strong cultures because of a long shared history or because they have shared important intense experiences (as in a combat unit). But the content and strength of a culture have to be empirically determined. They cannot be presumed from observing surface cultural phenomena. Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive, and an emotional process. . . .
>
> Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems.[10]

[8] This is not to denigrate the efforts of those who have filled the void, such as members of the Pentagon press corps and individuals such as Elaine Donnelly of the Center for Military Readiness. But even Ms. Donnelly admits to the frustration of repeatedly being asked to provide publicly the expertise and nuance that only serving military professionals possess. (Author's discussions with Ms. Donnelly, July 15, 1998.)

[9] Sam C. Sarkesian, "Military Officers Should Speak Their Minds," *Orbis*, Summer 1998, pp. 423–37.

[10] Edgar Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist*, February 1990, p. 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to Schein's classic definition, and those of other theorists, military culture may be said to refer to the deep structure of organizations, rooted in the prevailing assumptions, norms, values, customs, and traditions which collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectations among the members. Meaning is established through socialization to a variety of identity groups that converge in operations of the organization. Culture includes both attitudes and behavior about what is right, what is good, and what is important, often manifested in shared heroes, stories, and rituals that promote bonding among the members. It is, in short, the "glue" that makes organizations a distinctive source of identity and experience.[11] Thus, a strong culture exists when a clear set of norms and expectations—usually a function of leadership—permeates the entire organization. It is essentially "how we do things around here."[12]

Closely associated with an organization's culture is its climate. In contrast to culture, organizational climate refers to environmental stimuli rooted in the organization's value system, such as rewards and punishments, communications flow, and operations tempo, which determine individual and team perceptions about the quality of working conditions. It is essentially "how we feel about this organization."[13] Climate is often considered to be alterable in the near term and largely limited to those aspects of the organizational environment of which members are aware.[14]

Climate and culture are obviously related in complex ways, climate being an observable and measurable artifact of culture, and considered by many to be one of the major determinants of organizational effectiveness. More recent research indicates that other cultural traits, such as involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission orientation are positively related not only to members' perceptions of organizational effectiveness, but also to objective measures of the same.[15] Such definitions would seem to establish from the outset that those who tinker with the culture and climate of military organizations may well be, either unknowingly or without concern, modifying the long-term effectiveness of America's armed forces.

The Four Basic Elements of Military Culture

A second view of military culture is functional in its approach. That is, the elements of military culture derive from the purpose or tasks for which

[11] Bernard Bass, "A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry Into Transformational Leadership" (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Va., February 1996).

[12] Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Preliminary Notes, Project on Military Culture" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 7, 1998, mimeograph), p. F1.

[13] Ulmer, "Preliminary Notes."

[14] Daniel R. Denison, "What IS the Difference Between Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate?" *The Academy of Management Review*, July 1996, p. 624.

[15] Daniel Denison and A. Mishra, "Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness," *Organizational Science*, Vol. 6 (1995), pp. 204–23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

societies raise, support, and maintain modern militaries, for instance, waging war on behalf of the nation-state and, if needed, enforcing domestic order. Even though the end of the Cold War has brought a new emphasis on missions such as peacemaking and peacekeeping, James Burk argues, correctly I believe, that "warfighting still determines the central beliefs, values and complex symbolic formations that define military culture."[16]

What makes military culture unique, not surprisingly, is that its central elements derive from "an attempt to deal with (and, if possible, to overcome) the uncertainty of war, to impose some pattern on war, to control war's outcome, and to invest war with meaning and significance." In so saying, scholars are not suggesting that military culture is in any way a mechanistic response to war's horrific environment, nor that the elements are instrumentally rational, thereby "fitting" armed forces to the task of fighting wars. Rather, history abounds with examples of military cultures that rendered armed forces grossly ineffective at their assigned task, the U.S. Army in Vietnam being a notorious one.[17] These scholars maintain that military culture is "an elaborate social construction, an exercise of creative intelligence, through which we come to imagine war in a particular way and to embrace certain rationalizations about how war should be conducted and for what purposes." While it is a product of war, military culture also influences the likelihood and form of future wars.[18]

The first such element is discipline, "the orderly conduct of military personnel, whether individually or in formation, in battle or in garrison, and most often prescribed by their officers in command." The purpose of discipline, needless to say, is to "minimize the confusion and disintegrative consequences of battle by imposing order on it with a repertoire of patterned actions that they may use on their own initiative, or in coordination with others, quickly to adapt and to prevail in battle." In the Gulf War's celebrated tank battle of 73 Easting, the performance of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment in combat against the Tawakalna Division of Iraq's Republican Guard convincingly demonstrated the value of individual, team, and unit discipline.[19] A second purpose of discipline, scholars maintain, is to ritualize the violence of war. Following discipline reassures soldiers in combat and defines when and how they are "authorized" to violate the normal societal prohibitions against killing and violence. In my own experience as an infantry company commander in Vietnam, when the enemy was seldom clearly seen and thereby provided few real targets to engage, the discipline of a full rifle team or squad providing covering fire

[16] Within this section all quotations without footnotes are from James Burk, "Military Culture," in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Lester Kurtz (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, forthcoming 1999).

[17] See either Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); or Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

[18] Theo Farrell, "Figuring Out Fighting Organizations: The New Organizational Analysis in Strategic Studies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1996, pp. 122–35.

[19] Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," *International Security*, Fall 1996, pp. 139–79; Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations and Warfare in the Developing World," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, June 1996, pp. 171–212.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for maneuvering comrades enabled many reluctant soldiers to fire their weapons when they otherwise would not. This reluctance to fire was not new to Vietnam, having been widely documented in previous wars.[20]

Scholars also note historical patterns with respect to the levels of discipline military organizations need and how they are achieved. First, since the earliest times discipline within a military culture has been manifest at the individual level, whether as combat among warrior "heroes," charioteers, or individual cavalrymen. It is a tradition carried on today by fighter pilots in aerial dogfights or tank commanders on the desert floor, however distant they may be when they engage the enemy.

A growing pattern in contemporary war, however, is combat based on the crew or team, disciplined units fighting combined-arms battles within joint commands. In such team-based forces the will and needs of the individual must be subordinate to that of the group (in sharp contrast to the trends in our hyperindividualistic society). Such group discipline, military leaders have learned, must be engendered and enforced by other than the primarily punitive means used in earlier eras when the emphasis was on individual discipline. Janowitz hypothesized correctly in 1960 that with the industrialization of war "there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus."[21] Today, leadership texts at schools for officers emphasize routinely, almost regardless of specific theory expounded, the critical role of the team and group to the success of military units.[22]

The second element of military culture is a professional ethos, defined, in the American case, as that "set of normative self-understandings which for the members define the profession's corporate identity, its code of conduct and, for the officers in particular, its social worth." This ethos must also be recognized and accepted by the larger society to provide legitimacy and support to its profession of arms, thus emphasizing again the critical importance of the current debate over military culture. Huntington explains it this way:

> People who act the same way over a long period of time tend to develop distinctive and persistent habits of thought. Their unique relation to the world gives them a unique perspective on the world and leads them to rationalize their behavior and role. This is particularly true where the role is a professional one. A profession is more narrowly defined, more intensively and exclusively pursued, and more clearly isolated from other human activity than are most occupations. *The continuing objective performance of the professional function gives rise to . . . the values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function.* The military function is performed by a public bureaucratized profession expert in the management of violence and responsible for the military

[20] S.L.A. Marshall, "Americans in Combat," in *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, D.C.: American Forces Information Service, Department of Defense, February 1988), p. 80.

[21] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 8–9.

[22] Robert L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordon J. Curphy, *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill.: Irwin Publishing, 1996), particularly chap. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security of the state. *A value or attitude is part of the professional ethic if it is implied by or derived from the peculiar expertise, responsibility, and organization of the military profession.*[23] (italics added)

As Huntington makes quite clear, the professional function—"the management of violence" on behalf of society—is the principle determinant of the military ethos. In General MacArthur's words, "yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose the nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be Duty, Honor, Country."[24]

A self-serving society finds it difficult to accept the soldier's willingness to die.

In the American case, however, military ethos is shaped not only by this functional imperative derived from the nature of conflict itself, but also from the society the armed forces serve and from international law, which is accepted as binding on the conduct of this nation's armed forces.[25] Thus, while American military leaders today may share many opinions, values, and professional codes and principles with their counterparts in other countries and eras of history, their military ethos is also uniquely informed by the founding values of our republic, including liberty, equality, and the dignity of the individual. The American ethos holds that military institutions should only exist when and to the extent they are needed for external defense, and that the military establishment is always subordinate to the civilian organs of state. Likewise, the moral character of the international laws of warfare to which the United States ascribes (for example, the humane treatment of prisoners of war) influences the American professional military ethos.

Thus our military ethos is and likely will remain, in Burk's words, "an amalgam of heroic traditions, technological traditions associated with modern weapons and their use, and managerial traditions of modern bureaucracies that emphasize skilled leadership and coordination of human effort to achieve group goals by rationally efficient means." That said, it is also obvious that there are inherent tensions among these various influences, tensions contributing to the debate today over military culture. Members of a society wherein self-serving individualism is extolled will find it difficult to accept the soldier's commitment to unlimited personal liability on behalf of American society, a commitment that presumes personal willingness to kill and to be killed for oneself and for those one commands.

The third element of the military culture, perhaps the most observable in peacetime, consists of the ceremonial displays and etiquette that pervade

[23] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1957), p. 61.

[24] Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Address to the Corps of Cadets, West Point, N.Y., May 12, 1962, in William Safire, ed., *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1962), pp. 74–78.

[25] Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1989), pp. 27–29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military life. As Burk writes, "These ceremonies and etiquette make up an elaborate ritual and play the role that ritual typically plays in society: to control or mask our anxieties and ignorance; to affirm our solidarity with one another; and to celebrate our being, usually in conjunction with a larger universe"—in this case the smaller military unit as part of a larger one, and the military as a whole as a part of American society.

Those who have participated in war know only too well the role anxiety plays, both constructively and destructively, in the daily activities of a soldier, sailor, or airman. Thus the reliance on constructed rituals to guide individual conduct and provide a semblance of order to the harsh reality of death and destruction that often threatens to be overwhelming. The salute, the uniform, insignia of rank, ceremonies of induction, promotion, and change of command, all inculcated in training, provide order, hierarchy, and continuity to the life of military units. Burk continues:

> Military weddings, retirements, and funerals mark the life cycle of soldiers just as bugle calls and formations at dawn and dusk mark the passing of the soldiers' working day. Such rituals mark collective identity and group affiliation, forge a common identity and symbolize a common fate. They also serve effectively to connect the unique burdens of military service with the larger society the military serves.

An example of this last function might be when at Andrews Air Force Base political leaders meet the flag-draped coffins of young Americans who "have given the last full measure of devotion" to their comrades and to their country.

As even this brief overview displays, such ceremonialism is not, as many outside the profession of arms contend, an anachronistic persistence of tradition in modern times. Rather, it helps to provide substance and motivation within a culture where one's self-selected and self-abnegating service to country can be sustained, can be deemed sufficiently worthy as to overcome the increasing degradation of the historic career incentives such as income, medical care, and retirement benefits.

The fourth element of military culture is cohesion and esprit de corps, which are the measures of a unit's morale, its willingness to perform a mission and to fight. As discussed earlier, this is a critical element with respect to the connection between military culture and the operational effectiveness of military units. According to Burk,

> Military cohesion refers to the feelings of identity and comradeship that soldiers hold for those in their immediate military unit, the outgrowth of face-to-face or primary (horizontal) group relations. In contrast, esprit de corps refers to the commitment or pride soldiers take in the larger military establishment to which the unit belongs, an outgrowth of secondary (vertical) group relations. Both result to an important degree from structural factors of military organization, but they are primarily matters of belief and emotional attachment.

Behavior studies since the Second World War have convincingly shown that, in the main, soldiers do not fight cohesively because of ideology or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

patriotism. Rather, Burk argues that the key factor is loyalty to other members of the unit:

> [It] was the capacity of the soldiers' immediate unit, their company and platoon, to meet their basic needs for food, shelter, affection and esteem. These factors increased in importance as war genuinely threatened soldiers' sense of security and recognition of worth as human beings. So long as these needs were met, soldiers believed themselves part of a powerful group and felt responsible, even empowered, to fight for their group's well being. However, when these needs were not met, soldiers felt alone and unable to protect themselves; the unit disintegrated and stopped fighting.[26]

It should not be concluded from the foregoing, however, that all cohesive military units will be combat effective. Cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such effectiveness, which depends as well on the technical competence of the individuals and the trust and commitment that link the small unit to the larger command that supplies it with mission, materiel, intelligence, and "the situation specific context within which small unit operations gain or lose meaning and become objects of pride or disgrace." A superb World War II example of the effects of such spirit was the ability of the 101st Airborne Division to fight on at Bastogne, though surrounded, frozen, and badly outnumbered. They had confidence that Patton's Third Army would come to their rescue. These complex relationships between cohesion, competence, chain of command, and esprit de corps are seldom noted, much less analyzed, in today's debates on military culture.

The Heterogeneity of Military Culture

A third fruitful approach to the understanding of military culture questions the homogeneity that is seemingly taken for granted in our uninformed public debates. Is there, in fact, such a thing as an American "military culture" that politicians and other advocates should be concerned to preserve, reform, or abolish? Or are there, instead, an identifiable set of subcultures about which the public needs to be educated? I argue that the latter is clearly the case.

To begin with, it should be obvious to any observer, not to mention participant, that the army, navy, air force, and marine corps display sharply divergent cultures.[27] Derived over time from their assigned domain of war on land, sea, and in the air, these individual services have developed very different ideals and concepts that in turn strongly influenced their institutional cultures and behavior, particularly their strategic approach to war that establishes their

[26] Indicative of the inadequacy to date of the culture debate is its nearly complete failure to address the implications of this, or subsequent, research on why soldiers fight. What will happen to cohesion and unit effectiveness on the battlefields of the future as units are intentionally more widely dispersed and isolated? See Walter F. Ulmer, "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge Too Far?" *Parameters*, Spring 1998, pp. 4–25.

[27] Equally distinct, but beyond the scope of this essay, is the subculture of the reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard with its militia traditions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

claim on the nation's assets.[28] For example, the air force holds dear to the idea that air power is now the decisive instrument of war.[29] The army has long understood that to be successful in battle, its ground forces must be supported by other branches and services, and cannot even reach battlefields overseas without the aid of the other two services. Thus, historically its strategy has been based on an integrative, joint approach. But where the air force bases its claims to resources on advancing technological development, the army tends to emphasize the human dimension of war, and lobbies for resources to meet the needs of the nation's soldiers and their families.

Different from both of the above, the navy emphasizes tradition and independence, as befits a service whose forces are "over the horizon" much of the time and whose personnel remain focused on "going to sea."[30] Hence, the navy's strategic culture has long emphasized America's insularity and reliance on overseas trade, and based its claim to resources on the need to maintain control over (and under) vast oceanic expanses. Thus, "military" culture and "naval" culture have been, of necessity, quite different. Manifestations of these different beliefs and attitudes have been repeatedly documented, most recently in the high-tech aspects of command and control of joint forces.[31]

During the 1980s, the campaign to merge the various services' capabilities in effective joint forces sparked one of the epic battles of inter-service rivalry, resulting in 1986 in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation that reorganized the national military establishment.[32] Of importance to this discussion is the fact that now, more than a decade later, during which America's armed forces have fought several conflicts under unified command, a new joint culture is emerging at the field-grade and senior officer levels, belying yet again any notion of a homogeneous "military culture."[33] Whether this is a good thing is largely unresearched, particularly since it remains to be seen at what level conventional service forces will be integrated into joint formations. If, as it appears, they will not be integrated routinely below battalion or squadron level in the future, then organic units of a single service will still obtain "at the point of the spear." But the fact that an identifiable joint culture is emerging among those officers in permanent joint headquarters suggests the ongoing evolution of multiple military cultures. It also highlights, as will be discussed later, the increasing dominance of the officer subculture.

[28] Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, A RAND Corporation Study (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 31–43.

[29] Earl H. Tilford Jr., "Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in Old Wineskins . . . with PowerPoint" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 1998).

[30] David A. Rosenberg, presentation during the FPRI conference, *The End of Military Culture*, Bryn Mawr, Pa., July 15–16, 1998.

[31] Kenneth Allard, *Command and Control and the Common Defense*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), pp. 47–88.

[32] James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, pp. 10–17.

[33] Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Officer," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, pp. 53–57.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The myth of a homogeneous military culture is further exposed by easily identifiable sub-subcultures within each uniformed service. Thus, Rosen observes

> that each service is far from monolithic and is not composed of sub-units simply pursuing their own organizational self-interest. U.S. Army officers may come from the infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, airborne or special forces. Navy officers may be carrier pilots from the fighter or attack communities, antisubmarine warfare pilots, submariners, surface ship commanders, or from an amphibious force. Each branch has its own culture and distinct way of thinking about the way war should be conducted, not only by its branch, but by the other branches and services with which it would have to interact in wartime. If we start with this perspective we will be inclined to regard military organizations as complex political communities in which the central concerns are those of any political community: who should rule, and how the "citizens" should live.[34]

The point here is that identifiable subcultures, and even sub-subcultures, do exist and are reflective of the domain of war and applicable warfighting doctrines for which their service, or branch, is responsible. Good policy analysis and debate should, indeed must, recognize and account for these differences. It is doubtful that any single policy change will be equally effective when applied uniformly to all of the services, as the secretary of defense is now attempting to do with adultery and fraternization. Broadly based policy changes applicable to all services and branches simply fly in the face of a more informed understanding of military culture. Fortunately, one military leader, the current commandant of the Marine Corps, understands this and has effectively expressed such views on the issue of standardizing sanctions for the offense of adultery.[35]

Another way to grasp the heterogeneity among military cultures is through the metaphor of the spear. Warrior subcultures within services, such as the infantry, fighter pilots, and all who do actual killing, are at the point of the spear. Others farther down the shaft support those in direct combat through communications and intelligence. Still others near the base of the spear constitute the service support and civilian components that provide theater-level logistical functions such as medical services, materiel logistics, and mobility operations. Though laid out in operational format, this metaphor of the spear has its roots in an important body of sociological research quite relevant to the debate today.

Do we really want our combat troops to "think more like civilians"?

In the late 1970s, after the Vietnam debacle, the armed forces suffered from an evident malaise, particularly within the officer corps. Observing this, Moskos theorized in 1977 that the military seemed to be developing the characteristics of a civilian occupation rather than the profession it had always considered itself. The basic distinction between these two conceptions of the military lay in their relation to, and legitimization by, American society. Moskos

[34] Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 19.
[35] Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "Marines Have to be Held to Higher Standards," *USA Today*, August 11, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

noted that society legitimates an institution "in terms of norms and values, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of a *professional* institution are often seen as following a calling captured in words like *duty, honor, country.*"[36] Conversely, an *occupational* model is legitimated in terms of the marketplace where supply and demand are paramount, and self-interest takes priority over communal interests.

Building on this institutional/occupational model (I/O), Moskos cautioned that at least three aspects of the creeping occupationalism should give military leaders concern: mission performance, member motivation, and professional responsibility. Research had already demonstrated that: (1) an institutional identification, rather than occupational, fostered greater organizational commitment and performance by the members; (2) an institutional orientation relied more on intrinsic motivational factors such as social responsibility, as opposed to extrinsic factors such as a soldier's pay; and (3) if an occupational model prevailed, the military function could be falsely quantified for decision-making analysis, severely eroding the value of professional military advice to civilian decision makers. Research conducted over the following decade with the I/O model helped the military make its transition to an all-volunteer force without eroding institutional norms and degrading overall professionalism. In fact, as noted earlier, the 1980s were a period of sharply increased professionalism in all services of our armed forces.

Subsequent research based on Moskos's model shows that soldiers can manifest both orientations and that the career soldier of the post–Cold War era exhibits a "pragmatic military professionalism" reflecting concerns for both individual welfare and collective national security.[37] But where "along the spear" such an orientation has positive results, and where negative, is a question that must be answered by uniformed professionals themselves. Perhaps it is harmless, and even productive, for logistical personnel to "think more like civilians"—but do we really want our combat troops to do so?

The Cultural Dominance of the Officer Corps

The fourth and final perspective on military culture focuses on the stratification of the military by rank, divided as the services are into officer, non-commissioned officer (NCO), and enlisted personnel. This, too, is a distinction seldom addressed, much to the detriment of our current discourse. If it were addressed, then feminists advocating women in combat would recognize, and perhaps even accept, that the vast majority of female soldiers do not rally

[36] Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional and Occupational Trends In Armed Forces," in *The Military: More Than Just A Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (London: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1998), p. 16.

[37] David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1989), p. 72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to their cause since the issue affects for the most part only female officers.[38] The necessary distinctiveness of the officer corps, as well as the nature of the vocation of officership, is perhaps even misunderstood today by members of the profession of arms, including some of the senior officer leaders.

My analysis indicates three reasons for the importance and dominance of the officer subculture. First, officers develop, maintain, and carry through time the unique elements of the profession essential for the military to be accorded high professional status by American society.[39] But it has not always been so, with the profession having to reestablish after the Vietnam War its professional status, both to itself and to the American people. It was a process conceptualized and executed almost exclusively by officers, a process of reintellectualizing, reorganizing, reequipping, and retraining a demoralized and defeated army.[40] And yet this was very similar to the manner in which that same army was, along with the navy, initially professionalized during the decades of 1880–1910.[41]

Why is it that some vocations, particularly military ones, are viewed by our society as true professions? According to Huntingon, professional status implies a unique and socially useful expertise (the management of violence), a moral responsibility to provide and use that expertise on behalf of a society that cannot defend itself, and an organic unity and consciousness of itself as a group apart from laymen.[42] Millett, in turn, emphasizes "a life-long calling by the practitioners," and notes that "professions are organized to control performance standards and recruitment," thus using their monopoly of expertise for self-policing of the profession. Such limited autonomy marks all true professions, in his view.[43]

The point here is that these elements of a profession are almost exclusively the domain of officers, whether it be theorizing about strategy, researching and teaching about war and conflict, crafting the simulations needed to develop new capabilities, writing and controlling the contracts for work done by the private industrial sector, developing the training and evaluation systems, or adjudicating the military legal system to maintain discipline. Very seldom is policy, regulation, doctrine, or personnel action ever promulgated except over the signature of a commanding officer or staff officer. In sum, because of their role, their longevity, and their profession's unique avoidance of lateral entry, officers create and maintain over time those elements that make the military a

[38] Laura Miller, "Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat," Working Paper No. 2, Project on Post–Cold War Civil-Military Relations (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, December 1995).

[39] Louis Harris and Associates poll, reported in Rowan Scarborough, "Poll Gives Military Its Top Rating," *Washington Times*, February 17, 1998.

[40] For a very informative and readable current-history review of this process, see James Kitfield, *The Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

[41] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), particularly chap. 13, pp. 413–49.

[42] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp. 11–18.

[43] Allen R. Millett, "Military Professionalism and Officership in America," A Mershon Center Briefing Paper, No. 2 (Ohio State University, May 1977), p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

profession. If you change what the officers think, you will succeed in changing the culture. No wonder that Huntington could confidently conclude decades ago that a military can only be considered professional so long as the vast majority of its officers are loyal to its ethos.[44]

A second argument for the unique dominance of the officer subculture is that officers, through their formal commission as well as their unwritten contract, are the military's connection to American society. It is true that all Americans who have ever served in our armed forces remain connected to their service, if only in memory. But it is also true that officers, particularly while on active duty, fulfill the representative function of the military to civil society. They are the ones who have received a commission, a warrant, from that society to be its agent and to act on its behalf, and it is logical for society to expect individual accountability. As noted decades ago by Marshall, it is the responsibility of the officer corps to serve such that they strengthen the claim of the service on the affections of the American people.[45] Thus, the concern shown by average Americans to the Tailhook and Aberdeen scandals, though exploited by certain lobbyists in Washington, was entirely logical and correct. To this author more surprising is how mild the public reactions were, inasmuch as these instances were egregious examples of officers betraying their "sacred trust," and significantly diminishing the professionalism of their services. But even this failure points out the dominance of the officer in military subcultures. While the NCOs involved were held accountable to legal standards for their failures, the understandable outrage of Americans was focused on the officer corps, whose unique responsibility it is to shape military subcultures, particularly with regard to discipline and ethos.

The third reason that officers tend to dominate the service subcultures is their responsibility to shape the organizational climate of every operational unit in every armed force every day, wherever deployed. But if officers, and particularly commanding officers, so strongly influence organizational climate and the military's state of professionalism, what is the professional role today of the non-commissioned officers? What is their influence on military culture? The answer is not so clear. Decades ago, Huntington concluded that, "enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence, not in the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade, not a profession."[46] But, while NCOs do not have the social responsibility of the officer and thus serve without commission, they are today much better educated and trained, particularly in leadership skills. In fact, all services have made significant strides in providing sequential schools for the professional education of their career NCOs, just as they have always had for their officers.[47] The more decentralized military

[44] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp. 61–62, 74.

[45] S.L.A. Marshall, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

[46] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp. 17–18.

[47] The army's success in rebuilding its NCO corps by "leadership development" programs that essentially bundled indistinguishably the roles of the officer and NCO, particularly in training soldiers, also had the ironic effect of confusing officers as to their own distinct role under their commission.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operations become, the more organizational climate will be influenced by the performance of NCOs, thus influencing the overall effectiveness of the unit. This is a key stratum of leadership, but one that has been almost totally ignored in the debates on whether and how to change our military culture.

Conclusions

America can have military cultures different from those that now exist within the services, and in fact further change may be both necessary and desirable. But we will not learn that from the debate as it has been conducted to date. A truly informed debate is called for—one concerned with effective policymaking and focused on all the subcultures and their influences, both positive and negative, on military capabilities and effectiveness. The purposes of the military and its ability to fulfill those purposes should drive the debate, not its racial or gender composition.

At the very least, such a political dialogue should focus on what is distinctively *military* about military culture and why that is so. For example, the changing nature of warfare in each of its domains, as fought by modern western powers with volunteer soldiers, needs to be injected strongly into the debate. Unlike the generalized discussions of the past, the level of analysis should extend to missions and tasks to be undertaken by the services and the relative priorities of each. As discussed earlier, these are the principle determinants of the professional ethos and the reason there are military cultures in the first place. In particular, the officer subculture should become, for the reasons already presented, a major component of the public dialogue.

Uniformed military professionals must also become much more involved in the political debates over military culture with well-researched analyses and recommendations. Unfortunately, this remains a field of inquiry almost untouched, particularly by historians, and particularly since the inception of the all-volunteer force in the late 1970s.[48] But there is another and more important reason why uniformed professionals within the services must articulate better the needs of their services with respect to potential changes in the culture of the organization they lead. Simply put, they are the professional experts and no one else is! Their expertise is born of decades of training and study and episodic experiences in war and conflict, experiences in which American forces have acquitted themselves superbly. And in addition to their experience from the past, uniformed leaders are charged always with doing the analysis to prepare for the future. In this regard, the current era presents particular problems. In eras between wars, military organizations usually adapt themselves, both intellectually and organizationally, to major changes in the security environment and technologies of the nation they are protecting.[49] The level of professionalism

[48] Williamson Murray, presentation during FPRI conference, *The End of Military Culture*, and Andrew J. Bacevich, "Absent History: A Comment on Duaber, Feaver, and Desch," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1998, pp. 447–54.

[49] Williamson Murray and Allen Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the armed forces during such periods of peace tends to fall for a number of reasons, but then rises again as the reintellectualization of the profession produces "new theories of victory" and the means to execute them in the campaigns of the future.

Today, it is fair to say that that process of reintellectualization after the Cold War has only just begun, and not evenly across all the services. Thus, it is likely that in many areas it is not yet clear just what changes in service cultures are either needed or acceptable. But the responsibility to get on with the necessary research and experimentation to make those determinations rests with no one other than the officer corps itself. To be sure, there will continue to be other voices in the debate, as befits our pluralistic form of government. But none of these other voices speaks with the experience and judgment that derive from the continuous study, experimentation, and refinement of how best to fight our nation's wars.

It is high time, therefore, that our military professionals reread the advice of General Ridgway as he and President Eisenhower faced the mission of "preserving the peace":

> I say that the professional soldier should never pull his punches, should never let himself for one moment be dissuaded from stating the honest estimates his own military experience and judgments tell him will be needed to do the job required of him. No factor of political motivation or political expediency could explain such an action.[50]

[50] Gen. Matthew Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 271.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of American Military Culture

Does Military Culture Matter?

by Williamson Murray

History, with its grim landscape of defeated armies and shattered nations, would certainly suggest that military culture matters. But how and why that is so is not entirely clear. Unfortunately, historians have done little work on the subject, focusing for the most part on more immediate factors such as leadership, doctrine, or training to explain victory or defeat.[1] Even works specifically examining military effectiveness and innovation tend to discuss military culture as a tangential issue.[2] Yet, military culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, but also in the processes involved in military innovation, which is essential to preparing military organizations for the next war.

If military culture does matter, what might an acceptable definition of it be? Military culture represents the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms of experience and intellectual study, that contribute to a common core understanding of the nature of war within military organizations. As Michael Howard has suggested, no other profession is as demanding in physical or mental terms as the profession of arms.[3] In the latter case this is particularly true because military institutions must spend long periods of time *not* engaged in their fundamental purpose—war. Rather, they must estimate the impact of technological, tactical, operational, and societal changes as they apply to war,

[1] For a graphic account of the differences between military cultures, and their resulting effects on the battlefield, see Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., *Rommel's Greatest Victory: The Desert Fox and the Fall of Tobruk, 1942* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1998). See also Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); MacGregor Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and particularly, Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (London: John Murray, 1997).

[2] See Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, 3 vols. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); and Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[3] See in particular Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, January 1962, pp. 4–10.

Williamson Murray is the Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without fully testing those conceptions until war occurs. Thus, military organizations can never completely evaluate peacetime innovations and preparation until the audit of war itself, in which fear, chaos, ambiguity, and uncertainty dominate. Military culture thus represents the intellectual and spiritual capacity of the armies, naval forces, and air forces to come to grips with the business of preparing for and executing war.

The difficulty in addressing military culture in a scholarly fashion derives not only from the complexity of the subject, but also the fact that its influence is almost always the result of long-term factors rarely measurable and often obscure even to historians. What is more, military culture obviously changes over time in response to changes in a society's culture, the advance of technology, and the impact of leadership. As one senior marine has noted, military cultures are like great ocean liners or aircraft carriers: they require an enormous effort to change direction.[4] While those making changes in an institution's value system at times have a clear idea of the results they seek, in most cases they do not, and in any case cannot be assured of achieving the desired results.[5]

The purpose of this essay is to suggest some of the complexities involved in military culture, the historical evidence that demonstrates why military culture is so important, the current cultural framework of the U.S. military, and finally some ideas about how we might think about influencing American military culture in positive directions. The larger purpose is not to suggest answers or solutions, but to think more coherently and intelligently about military culture, past, present, and future. There are no short-term solutions to problems in military culture. Those interested in reforming military culture must recognize instead that reforms, changes in emphasis, or even radical surgery will not yield immediate results. An effective change in military culture can only occur over a period of decades, and it is as likely that unintended effects of reforms on the cultural patterns of an organization may be more significant than intended effects.[6]

The Larger Cultural Framework

As one of the members of this panel suggested, military culture is a coat of many colors. Influencing the culture of military organizations are factors such as history, the professional ethos, geography, the milieu within which that

[4] Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, USMC (ret.) to the author in conversation, July 1995.

[5] Changes made in the 1920s to requirements for command positions were intended simply to aid the navy's fledgling aviation community, but as a result, by the late 1930s the navy had become the most aviation-minded in the world. See Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, "Military Innovation in Peacetime," in *Military Innovation*, pp. 383–405.

[6] Along these lines it is the opinion of the author that the efforts at cultural and intellectual change that Gen. Al Gray set in motion when he was commandant of the Marine Corps in the late 1980s (the creation of the Marine Corps University, the Commandant's Reading List, and FMFM 1 [*Warfighting*], among others) are only now beginning to exert their full impact not only on the senior marine leadership, but also on the larger body of the officer corps of that service.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization operates, recent military experience, and the *Weltanschauung* of the external society. Moreover, even within military organizations there will be separate and distinct subcultures heavily influenced by traditions as well as the mission they perform.[7]

In the largest sense, it is possible to talk about national military styles. The German military possessed a devotion to duty, a seriousness about tactics, and a breathtaking contempt for logistics and intelligence in the two world wars.[8] The reason why German military culture paid so little attention to logistics has much to do with geography. The Germans have always been at the center of military operations throughout the history of European warfare, and Prussia's catastrophe at Jena/Auerstadt in October 1806—whereby a single day's defeat resulted in the collapse of the state—exercised a baleful influence as late as May 1945. The failures of German intelligence are more difficult to understand. They most probably had to do with an overemphasis on tactics and operations, but also with the culture of a society that over the course of two world wars possessed a fundamental belief in the innate racial superiority of the German *Volk*.

On the other hand, the Italian military services, as MacGregor Knox has noted, confronted the fundamental problem of "the Italian general staff tradition: Custoza, Lissa, Adua, Caporetto. On those occasions the military, as yet uncontaminated by contact with Fascism, distinguished itself by the absences of the study, planning, and attention to detail that characterized the Germans. . . ."[9] Admittedly, Italian society at large, particularly the middle class, regarded a military career in the officer corps as worthy of only the dumbest—in other words those incapable of supporting themselves in some other career. The culture of the officer corps lived up to the expectations of the society. As General Ubaldo Soddu, who was largely responsible for the operational and tactical disaster in Greece, commented about a career in the Italian military, "when you have a fine plate of pasta guaranteed for life, and a little music, you don't need anything more." In October 1940, as his troops were suffering a terrible battering from the Greeks, Soddu would spend his evenings composing musical scores for movies.[10] The results spoke for themselves when the Italian officer corps abdicated its responsibilities and military catastrophe followed. Yet, Italian soldiers themselves, badly equipped and ineptly led, fought far better in North Africa and on the plains of Russia than historians have given them credit for.

[7] See Don M. Snider's discussion of military heterogeneity in his article in this cluster.

[8] The basic doctrinal manual for the Luftwaffe, *Die Luftkriegführung* [Waging Air War] (Berlin: n.p., 1966), for example, is a brilliant discussion of the operational and tactical framework within which air war has taken place (far superior to anything the U.S. Air Force has ever produced), but it ends with the note that sections on logistics and intelligence had yet to be written. They were never written, and the Luftwaffe's performance in World War II lived up to its sister services' appalling performance in those areas.

[9] MacGregor Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed*, p. 16.

[10] Ibid., p. 57.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, a societal rejection of all things military, as well as a governmental emphasis on its military organizations' protecting the regime from revolution, framed Italian military culture.[11] The German military style reflected a national attitude that took war very seriously—a predilection inspired by the numerous invasions that German states had suffered over the course of centuries. The German navy, however, proved in two world wars that there was nothing innately competent about German military organizations; as a result, one should hesitate before ascribing undue influence to national culture in how service cultures develop.

The United States, of course, has had its own military style—one characterized by heavy emphasis on logistics, overwhelming material superiority, and an inclination to avoid military or political conflict until late in the game. To a great extent this culture also reflects the impact of geography. The United States is a great island nation protected by oceans. Thus, the projection of military power has demanded an emphasis on logistics. Even in the American Civil War, which has exercised such great influence over the general military culture of the U.S. services, Union forces waged a continental war on a scale equivalent to the distances in Europe from Paris to Moscow.[12]

Another major factor in military culture is the generational change that occurs in military organizations as the collective experiences of the senior officer corps evolve with the passage of time. Such a change has been occurring in the American military over the past decade, as the Vietnam War generation has reached retirement.[13] When such change in the collective experiences of the officer corps occurs, officers come to view the world differently. Similarly, the U.S. Army, which so heavily focused on defense of West Germany's Fulda Gap from 1973 through the end of the Cold War, will only fully adapt to the military problems raised by the new strategic environment when those officers whose *Weltanschauung* was so heavily framed by European experience have retired.

It is almost impossible to change the larger cultural and geographic framework within which military organizations operate.[14] The United States will always confront the problem of projecting military power across the world's oceans, hence a focus on logistics will remain a dominant theme in the culture of U.S. services. Nevertheless, if one cannot change this larger framework, except perhaps as societal and political changes work their influence over decades, one certainly needs to remain aware of the peculiar circumstances that frame the larger military culture—particularly if one is interested in the issue of military reform.

[11] The *Carabinieri*, Italy's militarized police, have been regarded as the elite formation of the Italian military, a sure indication of the emphasis on the military's internal role over its external one.

[12] See Williamson Murray, "Why Did It Take the North So Long?" *Military History Quarterly*, Summer 1989, pp. 24–33.

[13] See Williamson Murray, "Computers in, Clausewitz Out," *National Interest*, Summer 1997, pp. 57–64.

[14] Perhaps an experience such as catastrophe can result in great change in the culture of military organizations, as occurred in Germany in 1945, but one suspects such a change reflected the changes in the larger political culture of German society after the war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military Cultures in the Past

Historians have correctly judged the German victory on the banks of the Meuse in May 1940 as one of the crucial events in the history of the twentieth century. That victory enabled the Germans to overcome their considerable strategic weaknesses and in effect to fight the great world war that lasted until 1945.[15] That war, in turn, terminated the period of European imperialism and led inevitably to the Cold War. Yet the military capabilities that enabled the Germans to win in 1940 resulted not from revolutionary changes occurring in the 1930s, but rather from fundamental changes in the German military's organizational culture that had occurred during the early 1920s, when Hans von Seeckt, the first chief of staff and in 1920 commander in chief of the Reichswehr, altered the cultural patterns of the German officer corps as a whole. Faced with the task of reducing the German army's officer corps from more than 20,000 officers to the limit set by the Treaty of Versailles, Seeckt turned the officer corps over to the control of the great general staff.[16] By so doing he deselected important constituencies, namely the Junker aristocracy and *Frontsoldaten.* The effect was to infuse the whole army with the cultural attributes of the general staff: systematic, thorough analysis, a willingness to grapple with what was really happening on the battlefield, and a rigorous selection process that emphasized officers' intellectual attainments—in a professional sense—as well as their performance in leadership positions became the hallmarks of the new German army.

Along with this emphasis, Seeckt appointed no fewer than fifty-seven different committees to study the lessons of World War I. This thorough, complete study of the last war stands in stark contrast to the experience of the British army, which failed to establish a single committee to study the lessons of that war until 1932, more than a decade after the Germans. Even then, the chief of the British imperial general staff had the report rewritten to cast a more favorable light on the army's wartime performance. The Germans built on the work of Seeckt's committees to fashion a coherent, combined arms doctrine; by 1923 the German army was well on the way to inventing the Blitzkrieg.[17]

In 1932 two of the Reichswehr's most respected generals, Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck, rewrote the German army's basic doctrinal manual, *Die Truppenführung* (Troop Leadership), which served as the basis for the combined arms battle doctrine with which the Germans fought the Second

[15] See Williamson Murray, *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to Ruin* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 1.

[16] While the general staff tradition had played a major role in the German army's inventing of modern war between 1916 and 1918, it remained a subculture within the army until 1920. See Timothy Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Government Printing Office, 1981); and Martin Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918* (London: Frank Cass, 1995).

[17] James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1992), especially chap. 4; Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare," in *Military Innovation,* p. 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World War. The opening paragraphs of that manual encompassed the fundamental cultural assumptions of the German army:

> 1. The conduct of war is an art, depending upon free, creative activity, scientifically grounded. It makes the highest demands on individuals.
>
> 2. The conduct of war is based on continuous development. New means of warfare call forth ever changing employment. . . .
>
> 3. Situations in war are of unlimited variety. They change often and suddenly and are rarely discernable at an early point. Incalculable elements are often of great influence. The independent will of the enemy is pitted against ours. Frictions and mistakes are an every day occurrence.[18]

Fritsch and Beck would assume control of the German army soon after Hitler came to power, and held responsibility for developing the qualities that made that army such a formidable fighting instrument in the coming war.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, German army culture demanded not only high standards in terms of troop leadership but also serious study of the profession of arms. The case of Erwin Rommel suggests how widespread was this culture of serious intellectual preparation of the officer corps. Certainly, if ever there was a "muddy boots combat soldier," it was Rommel, yet he not only avidly devoured books, he wrote them, and his *Infantrie Greift An* (Infantry Attacks) is one of the great classics in the literature of war.[19]

Historians have often suggested that armies study only the last war and that is why they do badly in the next. In fact, as the above suggests, there are few military organizations that possess a culture that encourages the study of even the recent past with any thoroughness. Most military organizations quickly develop myths that allow escape from unpleasant truths; such was the case with the French army in the immediate aftermath of World War I.[20] And in some cases military cultures reject the past as having no relevance to the future of war. Air forces have been particularly attracted to a technological culture that holds that even the study of recent military experience is of limited use in preparing for a revolutionary technological future.[21]

[18] *Die Truppenführung* (Berlin: n.p., 1933); quotation from the translation, *Troop Leadership*, U.S. War Department typescript (Washington, D.C.: 1936), p. 1.

[19] A recent biography of Rommel, Sir David Fraser's *Knights Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), underlines the extraordinary interest and effort that Rommel devoted to the study of military history and his profession.

[20] See in particular, Robert Doughty, *Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1985).

[21] The Royal Air Force's air staff explicitly stated in 1924 that an air force can "either bomb military objectives in populated areas from the beginning of the war, with the objective of obtaining a decision by moral effect . . . or, alternatively, they can be used in the first instance to attack enemy aerodromes with the aim to gain some measure of air superiority. . . . The latter alternative is the method which the lessons of military history seem to recommend, but the air staff are convinced that the former is the correct one." Public Record Office AIR 20/40, Air Staff Memorandum No. 11 A, March 1924.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such military cultures tend to mold the evidence to support the view of those at the top. The French army in the interwar years, as well as the U.S. Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force during the same period, was particularly prone to making evidence fit its theory. Such cultures are also intolerant of any kind of dissent from the "official" view. Moreover, with a hard, unyielding view of war, such military cultures have proven resistant to adapting to the actual conditions of war.[22] In peacetime they tend to follow a preconceived trail that will even reject technological possibilities as impossible if they do not fit dogmatic notions of what war will look like.[23]

In other words it has often taken defeat to force substantive adaptation to the actual conditions of war. The less willing a culture is to display flexibility in peacetime, the more likely it is to have difficulty in adapting to the real conditions of war. There is a consistent historical pattern of military organizations attempting to impose their prewar concepts of future combat on the actual conditions of war instead of adapting to those conditions. In the case of the French army in World War II, the resulting defeat could only be reversed by the intervention of other powers. The serious losses suffered by the Eighth Air Force in summer 1943 were not sufficient to derail the Combined Bomber Offensive. But it is worth noting that it took catastrophic losses on two missions against the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt (August and October 1943) before the Eighth Air Force leadership finally recognized that unescorted bomber formations, as prescribed in prewar doctrine, were simply incapable of fighting their way through the ferocious opposition of the fighter planes thrown up by the Luftwaffe.[24]

The history of the U.S. military services likewise suggests the strengths and weaknesses of a democratic system of civil-military relations. Accustomed usually to minimal civilian support, the American military endured a glacial promotion system that kept officers in the same grade for interminable periods of time. On the other hand, the performance of U.S. military institutions in World War II suggests that Martin van Creveld's view that the American officer system was entirely deficient in comparison to the German one has considerable flaws.[25] Thus, recent historical works have judged the U.S. Army's performance in World War II, particularly against the Germans, far more favorably than was

[22] Andrew Krepenevich's *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) underlines the unwillingness of the U.S. Army to change its paradigm in accordance with the actual conditions of war in Southeast Asia. Timothy Travers, in his *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), is also particularly good on the similar inability of the British high command in World War I to adapt to the real conditions of war.

[23] Even as late as 1941 the senior leadership of the RAF was arguing that a long-range escort fighter was technologically impossible. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany*, vol. 1, *Preparations* (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 177.

[24] For a discussion of the air battles of 1943, see Williamson Murray, *Luftwaffe* (Baltimore, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Press, 1985), chaps. 5 and 6.

[25] See Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the case a decade ago.[26] U.S. Army formations proved adaptable, flexible, and increasingly combat effective from 1943 on.[27] Moreover, whatever the difficulties in 1942 and early 1943, one needs to remember that American rearmament began late in comparison to that of Nazi Germany, while U.S. forces were committed to battle almost immediately. Rearmament of the U.S. Navy began in 1938, but that of the army only in July 1940 in response to the catastrophe in France. Thus, hastily prepared U.S. ground forces found themselves in combat with the Japanese in the Pacific in summer 1942 and with German forces in North Africa in November 1942. In contrast, the German army did not find itself in combat until September 1939—six and one-half years after Hitler had embarked on a massive program of rearmament. The desperate fears the German army's leadership felt about the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 suggest how little prepared that army was after its first three years of rearmament.

Military organizations develop myths that allow escape from unpleasant truths.

Throughout the interwar period, the culture of the American military appears to have been open to serious thinking about the profession of arms. In the aftermath of World War I the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) headquarters established twenty separate boards to examine the lessons of the last war. Then a group led by some of the army's most respected officers produced a final report drawing from the reports of the twenty boards.[28] That analysis played a major role in the codification of a new basic doctrinal manual, Field Service Regulations, in 1923. Far more than was the case with the British, the Americans made a considerable effort to come to grips with the harsh lessons of the Western Front. The new doctrine displayed some influence of the French top-down approach to war, but German experiences also influenced American thinking.[29] In fact, both influences are still evident today, in the form of a top-down mechanistic emphasis on distant firepower (the French influence) and the emphasis on maneuver warfare (the German approach).

The emphasis that professional military education received throughout the interwar period in the United States also suggests a military culture that placed considerable emphasis on the preparation of officers for the serious business of war. Unlike the German and British armies, the U.S. Army developed a two-tier approach to professional military education, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College

[26] See in particular Michael D. Dobler, *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945* (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1994).

[27] To compare that with the performance of the British army in World War II, see Williamson Murray, "British Military Effectiveness," in *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 3, chap. 3.

[28] William Odom, *After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Combat Doctrine, 1918–1939* (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, forthcoming).

[29] As James Corum pointed out in a paper presented at the Dueling Doctrines conference sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C., June 1998), there was a strong French influence on the American military since the 1840s and strong German influence since the 1870s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Washington.[30] The navy had its own war college, while the marines' school at Quantico, Virginia, and the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, provided substantial input into the innovations that contributed so much to the American victory in World War II. Equally important from the army's point of view were the branch schools, particularly the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Under the leadership of George C. Marshall a whole generation of army officers received a first-rate education in thinking about war, as well as being judged by the cold blue eyes of the army's future chief of staff.

The respect with which the U.S. military's leadership regarded tours on the faculty of such schools suggests how seriously it took professional military education. The future admiral Raymond Spruance served not one but two tours on the faculty of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island.[31] Richmond Kelly Turner, who played a commanding role in amphibious warfare in the Pacific, and John Reeves, a key aviation pioneer, also served on the Newport faculty. After the war Admiral Chester Nimitz went so far as to suggest that "I credit the Naval War College for such success [as] I achieved in strategy and tactics in the war."[32] As for the army, out of its seven members, the faculty of the Army War College for the 1939–40 academic year counted Colonel W. H. Simpson and Major J. Lawton Collins—the former would be a three-star commander within four years, while the latter eventually ended his career as the army's chief of staff. The following year Alexander Patch, also to become an army commander in World War II, reported for duty on the faculty.

The contribution of the schools at Quantico in writing the basic doctrine for amphibious warfare is well known. Similarly, the Naval War College and its president in the early 1920s, Admiral William S. Sims, were experimenting with possible uses for aircraft carriers before the U.S. Navy possessed a single one. Significantly, Sims had chosen to return from his position as commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe during World War I to become the president of the Naval War College.[33]

The history of the first half of this century would suggest that military culture was a crucial determinant in how well military organizations adapted to war. But an examination of the historical record also suggests that there are no easy ways to change the cultural patterns by which officers judge themselves and their environment. In fact, the history of the interwar period suggests that

[30] After World War II, the Army War College moved to Carlisle Barracks, Pa., while the National War College took over its buildings at Fort McNair.

[31] Over the past thirty years there has apparently been only one admiral who served on the faculty at Newport. Since it is hard enough for the navy to justify sending its best officers as *students* to Newport, this is not surprising.

[32] E.B. Potter. *Nimitz* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 136.

[33] Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, "Military Innovation in Peacetime," in *Military Innovation*, pp. 383–405. Similarly, Admiral Spruance chose to come back from command in the Pacific to become president of the Naval War College.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cultural patterns were set almost immediately after the First World War and, for better or worse, remained fixed throughout the run-up to the Second.[34]

Military Cultures, Present and Future

If military culture has mattered in the past, then it is surely important to judge the current cultural climate in the U.S. military services. As suggested earlier, there is no monolithic American military culture. Rather, the four services, reflecting their differing historical antecedents and the differences in the environments in which they operate, have evolved cultures that are extraordinarily different. The environmental influences are particularly important to any understanding of the peculiar cultures that the services have developed. Even with the best will in the world to make the American military "joint," those differences will continue to shape how airmen, sailors, soldiers, and marines view war. The air force will remain a technologically driven organization. Moreover, the nature of air war, with hundreds if not thousands of aircraft launched against targets on the ground and in the air, will demand a degree of top-down organization that ground operations do not. The demands for tanker support, suppression of enemy air defenses, and the interplay between air-to-air fighters and bomb-droppers inevitably requires a mechanistic approach to military operations in the air.[35] Similarly, the highly technical nature of surface, submarine, and aviation combat in the navy push that service towards a technological, engineering approach to warfare.[36] On the other hand, both the army and Marine Corps, influenced by the nature of land combat, will be driven to a more Clausewitzian view of war.

Yet, whatever the environmental differences, service cultures also possess beliefs and traditions that play crucial roles in how they think about and prepare for war. Here, there are worrisome signs, not only within the services themselves, but within the "joint" community as well. First, as suggested above, there has been a generational change in all the services as those with experience in the Vietnam War retire. The Vietnam generation returned from Southeast Asia skeptical that technological solutions offered a means to simplify the complexities and ambiguities of war. In a profound sense, they were Clausewitzian in their outlook on the utility and conduct of war. As the 1986 edition of the army's basic doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, underlined, "Friction—the accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties, and the confusion of battle—will impede both sides. To overcome it, leaders . . . must be prepared to risk commitment

[34] The one exception to this might be the German military, where Nazi ideology came to have a greater influence over the officer corps as the war approached, and over German military effectiveness throughout World War II. In particular, see Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[35] See the discussion of the third day's mission against Baghdad flown during the Gulf War, in Williamson Murray, *The Air Campaign in the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Press, 1996), pp. 86–96.

[36] Only the shattering experience of major fleet combat in the Solomons forced the navy toward a broader, less mechanistic view of fleet operations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without complete information, recognizing that waiting for such information will invariably forfeit the opportunity to act."[37]

The new generation of officers, with the exception of the Marine Corps, has proven far more attracted by technological, mechanistic solutions to the complex problems raised by war. In fact, a considerable number of senior officers have been arguing that advances in computer technology and communication systems will allow the U.S. military to see and destroy everything in the wide expanses of a battle. Others have gone so far as to suggest that these advances will eliminate friction by allowing commanders absolute knowledge about what the enemy is doing: "The emerging system . . . promises the capacity to use military force without the same risks as before—it suggests we will dissipate the 'fog of war.'"[38]

Indeed, what appears to be occurring—especially in the air force—is a reprise of the sort of mechanistic, engineering, systems-analysis approach that contributed so much to failure in Vietnam. As the air force's *New World Vistas* suggests: "The power of the new information systems will lie in their ability to correlate data automatically and rapidly from many sources to form a *complete* picture of the operational area, whether it be a battlefield or the site of a mobility operation" (italics added). Such claims betray a general disinterest and ignorance of basic science.[39] But the navy, too, has displayed a considerable penchant for believing that technology is a "silver bullet," and its thinkers argue for something called "network-centric warfare," according to which integrated information systems can grasp everything that is happening in a vast battlespace and destroy the crucial targets on which the enemy depends. As the chief proponent of this view, Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, recently argued:

> Network-centric operations . . . create a higher awareness, and allow it to be maintained [in combat]. Such awareness will improve our ability to deter conflict, or to prevail if conflict becomes unavoidable. . . . The structural or logical model for network-centric warfare has emerged. The entry fee is a high-performance information grid that provides a backplane for computing and communications. The information grid enables the operational architectures of sensor grids and engagement grids. Sensor grids rapidly generate high levels of battlespace awareness and synchronize awareness of military operations. Engagement grids exploit this awareness and translate it into increased combat power.[40]

[37] Field Manual 100-5, *U.S. Army Blueprint for Air/Land Battle*, 1986, p. 16. The Marine Corps Manual FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, represented an even more emphatic statement of such a point of view.

[38] Adm. William Owens (former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs), "System of systems," *Armed Forces Journal* (January 1996), p. 47. See also, Thomas Duffy, "Breakthrough Could Give Forces Total Command of Future Battlefield," *Inside the Navy*, January 23, 1995; and Peter Grier, "Preparing for 21st-Century Information War," *Government Executive* (August 1995), pp. 130–32.

[39] Department of the Air Force, *New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

[40] Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare, Its Origin and Future," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, January 1998, p. 33. In Cebrowski's defense, he does at least argue for a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach to command and control. But in the world of economics, where he draws his examples, no one is trying to kill, maim, or mutilate his opponents. For a devastating reply, see Col. T.X. Hammes, USMC, "War Isn't A Rational Business," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, July 1998, pp. 22–25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This summer's war game at Newport indicated that some in the navy believe that "the great data base in the sky" will provide U.S. commanders with absolute knowledge of everything that happens in an enemy nation in the next war. Clearly, they believe that the theater commander will fight a future war the way a ship commander runs his combat center. Fog, friction, ambiguities, and uncertainties will ostensibly disappear under the searching eye and superior capabilities of technology that provides U.S. forces with an ever greater flow of data and information.[41]

Finally, even some senior army officers display such faith in technology. Two years ago a senior army general announced to the students of the Marine War College that "the digitization of the battlefield means the end of Clausewitz"—in other words, computer technology and modern communications will remove fog and friction from the future battlefield, at least for American military forces. There is clearly a major struggle within the army at present between those who follow the technological line and those who adhere to a less mechanistic view of the world.

What makes this techno-craze so dangerous is that it flies in the face of 2,500 years of history, not to mention modern science. Friction, ambiguity, chance, and uncertainty are not merely manifestations of inadequate communications and technology that U.S. military organizations in the next century may overcome, but rather manifestations of the fundamental nature of the world, where if something can go wrong, it will.

> Consider, after all, how much would have to be overturned or rejected to conclude otherwise. Among other things, one would need to overthrow nonlinear dynamics, the second law of thermodynamics, the fundamental tenets of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, and all the limiting metatheorems of mathematical logic. . . . No small task indeed![42]

Another apparent weakness in the current military cultural climate—and one that certainly did not obtain in the interwar period—is the decline of professional military education, the subject of a devastating House Armed Services Committee report of the late 1980s. To be sure, the Naval War College remains the finest institution of its kind in the world, but unfortunately the navy still resolutely refuses to send its officers to school. Elsewhere, the fact that the National Defense University seriously considered getting rid of its entire civilian faculty so that it could finance the buying of sophisticated computers suggests a general disdain for serious military education among those heading such institutions. In fact, the inclinations within the world of professional military

[41] Yet at the end of that war game, the navy's campaign had entirely failed to achieve the national objectives: despite massive bombardment by U.S. air power that destroyed the enemy's military forces and wrecked its country, the enemy remained defiant and unbroken. To learn how close to replicating the real world the war game was, see Anton Lieven, *Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[42] Barry D. Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 132.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

education reflect the attitudes of both the larger military culture and society: profoundly anti-intellectual and ahistorical.[43]

Only the Marine Corps has made a major, across-the-board effort to upgrade its entire educational system, with particular emphasis on the intellectual vitality of its officer corps outside the classroom. The commandant's professional reading list represents the most coherent and consistent effort to provide an intellectual compass that any service has ever possessed. Moreover, the marines take pains to insure that the books on the list are available in exchanges and libraries. Not surprisingly, the navy does not have a professional reading list, the air force's list is remarkable for its shortness and superficiality, and the army's list remains largely unavailable to its officer corps.

The air force manual's doctrinal approach is close to "See Spot fly; see Jane bomb."

The area of military doctrine underlines to an even greater extent the disparity between the service cultures, and has proven a crucial enabler for military forces engaged in combat throughout this century. It has provided the basic framework for thinking seriously about the business of preparing for and conducting war. The navy has only recently created a doctrine command and until this summer it was led by a one-star admiral. In contrast, a four-star general has headed the army's Training and Doctrine Command since the 1970s. The air force has also devoted considerable resources to doctrine, but the results reflect a service with few interests outside of technology (and certainly not the study of war). Its new *Air Force Basic Doctrine* is long on pictures and short on content. In the doctrinal world its approach is close to that of "See Spot fly; see Jane bomb." And in case the reader is incapable of picking out the key points, they are italicized in blue.[44]

The army represents the most important service in terms of determining where the U.S. military will go in coming decades. The mid-1980s version of manual FM 100-5 was at the time the most realistic, Clausewitzian doctrine ever written by the American military. But a subsequent version published in the early 1990s was a far less satisfactory examination of war and military operations. There is now a very good new draft of FM 100-5 being considered and reviewed by the army, but there are indications that the draft, which represents a return to the seriousness and focus of the 1986 version, has been withdrawn. How the debate within the army plays out will say a great deal about where its culture is headed.

Perhaps the most worrisome indications that all is not well with U.S. military culture are the publications that pass for what thinking is done by the joint staff. Over the past decade the joint staff has published a whole set of

[43] See Williamson Murray, "Grading the War Colleges," *National Interest*, Winter 1986/1987, pp. 12–19; and, Williamson Murray, "How Not to Advance Professional Military Education," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1997, pp. 73–77. For the current state of U.S. professional military education, see Lt. Gen. Don Holder and Williamson Murray, "Professional Military Education in the Next Century," forthcoming in *Joint Forces Quarterly*.

[44] U.S. Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document 1*, September 1997. Among the astonishing statements made in the manual is that decentralized command has not withstood the test of time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doctrinal publications. For the most part these publications are harmless, except to those condemned to read them. In their mind-numbing prose, their lack of any significant intellectual content, and their interminable laundry lists of bureaucratic concerns, they are best suited to insomniacs. They certainly do not provide much guidance to warfighters.[45] But more insidious has been the appearance of a "blueprint" for the U.S. military in the next century, published under the guidance of the joint staff. *Joint Vision 2010* supposedly provides "an operationally based template for the evolution of the armed forces for a challenging and uncertain future." Its intellectual value is virtually zero. One marine general accurately described it as a "collection of bumper stickers and advertising slogans."[46] The document posits four "emerging operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimension protection." These concepts are then tied together by information superiority to achieve "massed effects—full spectrum dominance." Not surprisingly, given the current civilian bosses in the Pentagon, the document is completely politically correct.[47] But what is really dangerous is that *JV2010* possesses a strong emphasis on the top-down, mechanistic approach to war of the McNamara era. In effect, it represents the worst aspects of the French army's culture of the 1930s without the underpinnings of serious study that characterized the French in that period.

The one oasis in the desert that is military doctrine remains the Marine Corps. Its doctrinal manuals connect with the real world and to the fact that the American military is supposed to be preparing and thinking seriously about war.

> The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. . . . It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate force with its own objectives and plans.[48]

In every respect the series of common-sense, historically based publications that have followed *Warfighting* aim to give marines a realistic and intelligent understanding of war's uncertainties, ambiguities, and horror. They could provide a model for the other services and joint staff to think about war in the next century. Unfortunately, they will not—at least not as long as the dominant cultures in those services remain unchallenged and unchanged.

One of the dangerous aspects of the current cultures has been the growing propensity to shut down debate. The air force has traditionally been a service that aimed to speak with one voice and demanded that its officers

[45] To gain a sense of the joint doctrine, consult "Joint Doctrine, Capstone and Keystone Primer," July 15, 1997; Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action, Armed Forces," February 24, 1995; and Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," February 1, 1995.

[46] *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. ii. Lt.Gen. Paul Van Riper, USMC (ret.), to the author in July 1997.

[47] For instance, "Commanders will be expected to reduce the cost of military operations, from environmental disruption in training to collateral damage in combat." *JV2010*, p. 8. "Full spectrum" quote on p. 19.

[48] *Warfighting*, pp. 1–2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

submit their writings for policy review. The current situation with regards to the army is even more disturbing. The current draft of AR 600-20, "Army Command Guidance," clearly aims to shut off any hint of debate within the army. As a recent editorial in *Strategic Review* has noted, "in effect it proscribes an officer from even holding certain views which contravene official policy, mush less from espousing them; it would cast those who even think of dissenting as belonging to extremist organizations."[49] It is well to remember that in the mid-1930s the French army commander in chief, General Maurice Gamelin, demanded that all officers submit their writings for review by the high command. "Everyone got the message," a junior officer later wrote, "and a profound silence reigned until the awakening of 1940."[50]

Conclusions

In a recent edition of *Army* a senior officer commented about his service:

> As an institution, the Army finds itself so comfortable without debate, unconcerned that . . . "the Army goes rolling along." We should remember, however, that rolling along works best in one direction: downhill.[51]

The greatest danger for the United States in the coming century is that the American military will possess self-satisfied, intellectually stagnant cultures that believe they possess the technological lodestone.

Military cultures that remain enmeshed in the day-to-day tasks of administration, that ignore history and serious study, and allow themselves to believe that the enemy will possess no asymmetric responses are military organizations headed for defeat. Certainly in comparison to the thinking and atmosphere of the U.S. military in the last interwar period, the present picture suggests that there are major weaknesses in the current cultures. Consequently, any major efforts at military reform will founder unless they address fundamental problems to which there are no simple solutions. Moreover, any serious reforms can only have long-term results over decades, not months or even years. At least the United States is presently in a period of strategic quiescence and consequently possesses some time, that most precious of factors. But how much time, and how that time will be used, remain very much open to question.

Above all, the services need to practice some profound introspection, for unless they understand themselves and how different their world views are from those of our opponents in the next century, the United States is headed for a major crack-up that could prove even more disastrous than the Vietnam War. For at a minimum, notes an eminent military historian, our strategists

[49] Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Principled Disobedience," editorial, *Strategic Review*, Summer 1998, p. 3.
[50] André Beaufre, *1940, The Fall of France* (New York, 1968), p. 47.
[51] Col. David Fastebend, "Toning Down the Silence," letter to the editor, *Army*, July 1998, pp. 5–6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> must see clearly both themselves and potential adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and limits—through humility, relentless and historically informed critical analysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weigh imponderables through structured debates that pare away personal, organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must unerringly discern and prepare to strike the enemy's jugular—whether by surprise attack or attrition, in war or in political and economic struggle. And in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the uncertainties of decision and the dangers of action.[52]

There are few indications that the American military is capable at present of engaging the world in such terms.

[52] MacGregor Knox, "Continuity and Revolution in Strategy," in *The Making of Strategy, Rulers, States, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 645.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of American Military Culture

Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?

by John Hillen

Change is characteristic of military culture because of the many influences that constantly affect the values, behavior, and beliefs that together define it. The proper question for debate is therefore not whether American military culture will change but rather *how* it should change in response to such pressures. To be more precise: What are the central tasks of the military? What legitimacy does it draw from founding documents and national laws? How does it reflect the culture of the society it serves? The answers to these questions form the context in which military culture evolves.

At the present time, a confluence of powerful and diverse imperatives is at work. Contemporary social mores and the end of the Cold War have combined to change the military's roles and missions, budgeting, organization, legal foundation, and internal disciplinary code, even as it is pushed and pulled according to political advocates' judgments as to the extent to which it should or should not reflect American society in general. (Table 1 illustrates the most important of these, listed in comparison to those of the Cold War era.) Yet within what General Douglas MacArthur once called "a welter of change and development," certain constants always apply lest U.S. military culture: 1) no longer effectively provide for the common defense; 2) lose the institutional "soul" rooted, as Don Snider suggests, in "warfighting"; or 3) accommodate demands for social change at the expense of the military's functional or legal imperatives.[1]

This panel examined all these pressures, and this report will explore all the challenges likely to shape American military culture in the future. But for several reasons the main focus here will be the social imperatives. That is because functional pressures, as Williamson Murray demonstrates, can be generally understood through historical or strategic analysis, and are adapted

[1] See Nora Kinzer Stewart's fascinating sociological analysis of the dichotomy between the Argentine and British military cultures operating in the 1982 Falklands War, *Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1991).

John Hillen is Olin Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1
Changing Pressures on Military Culture

	Cold War Military	Post–Cold War Military
FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVES		
Strategic Focus	Major wars; emphasis on Soviet threat	All manner of operations, especially peacekeeping; no overarching threat
Financial resources	Large (1960–90 average 7% of GDP)	Small (by 2002, projected at less than 3% of GDP)
Personnel structure	Large conscript/professional force, emphasizing ground troops	Small professional force, far fewer ground troops
Technological orientation	Emphasis on ground operations, heavy firepower	Emphasis on air and space operations, precision, computerization
Institutional icon	"Heroic" warrior (infantryman, fighter pilot)	Peacekeeper, hacker, information manager?
LEGAL IMPERATIVES		
Documents defining and legitimizing roles	Constitution, statutes (Posse Comitatus Act)	Constitution, statutes (Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act)
Legal code governing military personnel	Uniformed Code of Military Justice, etc. as changed by Congress or the Supreme Court	Uniformed Code of Military Justice, etc. as "reshaped" by Executive Order
SOCIAL IMPERATIVES		
Women in combat	Rigid combat exclusion	Almost all military specialties opened
Homosexuals in military	Not tolerated	"Don't ask, don't tell"
Gender-integrated basic training	Air Force only (after 1974)	Army, Navy, and Air Force
Interaction between civilian and military cultures	Cultures not as distinct; little pressure for complete uniformity	Gap widens; pressure increases to bring military in line with civilian culture

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to in "the light of day"—in clear cognizance of the strategic environment in which major policy decisions are taken. To be sure, policy decisions driving functional imperatives are always hotly debated, but all parties share a common determination to maximize U.S. security. Similarly, Congress may alter the legal imperatives of military culture at times, but it does so in order to provide better for the common defense. Social imperatives, conversely, can be profoundly "anti-functional" because they are not derived from security needs and can even at times be entirely divorced from them. Moreover, the imposition of certain social imperatives can undermine the ability of the military to carry out the tasks that alone justify its existence. At the same time, it must be said that armed forces in the service of a democracy must reflect to some degree the culture of the society they are sworn to defend. There lies the critical nexus of the debate. Exactly how does a military protect the professional culture necessary to perform its missions in the unnatural stresses of war within the legal prerogatives of its government, and yet remain responsive to and reflective of the civilian culture it serves?

Functional Imperatives

Edgar Schein, the eminent MIT organizational psychologist, states that "culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration." The result of this process can ultimately be seen in the "three fundamental levels at which culture manifests itself: observable artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions."[2] It is useful in a discussion of changing military culture to focus on values, given the vogue in government and corporate worlds in the 1990s to define an organization's "core values." Military culture, or cultures, cannot be centered on values invented in the abstract.[3] All of the conference's contributors noted how the values underpinning the world's military cultures evolved throughout history in response to the needs of men attempting to succeed in combat, that is, as a result of occupational necessity. Quite simply, soldiers need codes of conduct, values, methods, procedures, and organizations characterized by what we might quaintly term the "military virtues," including Duty, Honor, Patriotism, Courage, Discipline, Commitment, Strength, Integrity, Trust, and Resolve. While many other social, legal, psychological, and historical factors influenced the development of particular military cultures, for the most part the values of the military have been shaped by the unique requirements of its workplace, and the best test of a given military culture was whether its recruits could train and fight effectively, especially when they first came under fire.

[2] Edgar H. Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist*, February 1990, p. 111.
[3] See Don Snider's report in this cluster on the U.S. military's subcultures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It follows, therefore, that if you change the principal task for which the military prepares, you are bound to change the culture. Snider tells us rightly that "warfighting still determines the central beliefs, values, and complex symbolic formations that define military culture," raising the question of how our services might change if warfighting is no longer the primary mission. But in fact, the U.S. military throughout its history has been involved in many more Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) than in war itself.[4] Granted, many of these MOOTW had the general characteristics of war (as the old soldier's dictum goes, "there is no such thing as a low-intensity conflict if you're the guy on the ground"), but the post–Cold War shift in U.S. policy toward preparing for peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda will challenge a traditional military culture rooted in the heroic efforts of past wars.[5] Even the much ballyhooed "war on terrorism" shares more characteristics with law enforcement than traditional war. In this respect, the manifest cultural change of the Israeli Defense Force from that of 1948–82 (focused on external wars to defend the state) versus 1988–98 (focused on internal policing of the *Intifada* and other security challenges within the state) is instructive.

The Kelly Flinn affair of 1997 and other sexual scandals revealed that many Americans seemed neither to understand nor to appreciate how and why military culture was special. Editorials and opinion columns ridiculed the military ethos as an archaic manifestation of a patriarchal institution. Civilian elites (including the conservative Senate majority leader) seemed not to grasp that the military is the way it is because of what it does and where and under what circumstances it does it. As Schein has noted, what you do forms who you are, what you value, and in what you believe, and in Lieutenant Flinn's case the "what you do" entailed the dropping of bombs and missiles, possibly nuclear, in time of war. Despite the gravity of her profession, many letter writers to the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* appeared mystified that the U.S. Air Force would make a crime of widely accepted societal trespasses such as adultery, lying, and disobeying orders. This phenomenon represents the convergence of changing functional and social imperatives that challenge military culture today.

A second powerful functional imperative that determines military culture is the resources devoted to national defense. In 1998 the U.S. military establishment was funded at the lowest levels (as a percentage of both gross domestic product and the federal budget) since before Pearl Harbor. Social security, Medicare, other entitlement programs, and interest on the national debt all have a higher priority in the federal budget. Once the premier instrument of the state, the military has shrunk so considerably that in some ways its culture may revert to that of the small frontier forces of the nineteenth century. Moreover, personnel policy aims at just such a small professional force. Between 1940

[4] There are over 250 instances of the use of U.S. armed forces abroad since 1798 and only five declared wars. Congressional Research Service Report #96-119F, "Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1995," February 6, 1996.

[5] Panelist Deborah Avant competently explores many of these issues in *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and 1973 personnel policy was based on a large conscript force, and between 1973 and 1991 a fairly large professional force. But the post–Cold War shrinkage not only alters U.S. military culture on its own account, it exacerbates the friction born of the new social imperatives.

Thirdly, the way in which a military is organized and conducts its missions has a profound influence on culture. Williamson Murray noted that traditionally the United States "has had its own military style" that emphasizes logistics, overwhelming superiority, and the application of technology to problems which other states might approach differently. In particular, technology has been a singularly seductive approach for the United States since the advent of the industrial age, and this cultural trait is even more prevalent today, not least due to the military's shrinking personnel base.[6]

It is helpful to understand this in the context of the institutional icon, that figure who seems to represent the beating heart of military culture. In the early industrial age, it was the infantryman or the fighter pilot—the heroic leader. In the nuclear age, with total war unthinkable, some military sociologists predicted a shift away from the heroic leader and toward the "modern military manager." Morris Janowitz, in his seminal work *The Professional Soldier*, wrote that the complex and largely bureaucratic nature of warfare in the nuclear age would require a sophisticated knowledge of strategic deterrence, military, industrial, and economic alliances, and political warfare designed to avoid absolute conflict. Janowitz saw a narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites and noted that a complex and bureaucratic nuclear-age military would display an increasingly "civilian character."[7] But Janowitz's icon of the sophisticated manager was so tarnished by Robert McNamara's "whiz kids" and the failure of their systems analysis approach in the jungles of Vietnam that the army and marines, especially, spent the 1970s and 1980s initiating programs to reinculcate "the warrior spirit" into their service's cultures.[8]

Who or what will be the institutional icon of the twenty-first century American military? Author James Adams, one of many who have written on the military implications of the digital age, sees the computer wizard as the new icon. He writes in his book *The Next World War* that "in the new world, the soldier will be the young geek in uniform who can insert a virus into Teheran's electricity supply to plunge the city into darkness."[9] As the "Revolution in Military Affairs" seems to replace troops, tanks, ships, and planes with computers, unmanned aircraft, and satellites in the calculations of strategists, what Eliot Cohen has called "the geek-to-warrior ratio" will rise dramatically. Similarly, in the peacekeeping missions that have occupied America's military

[6] See also Williamson Murray, "Computers In, Clausewitz Out," *National Interest*, Summer 1997, pp. 57–69.

[7] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 21–78.

[8] James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); and Thomas Ricks, *Making the Corps* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), chap. 4.

[9] James Adams, *The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the Front Line is Everywhere* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the past few years, the most sought-after military specialists have been military policemen and civil affairs officers, formerly peripheral players in supporting the institutional icons of the past. Rapid change in all these functional arenas—strategy, policy, resources, organization, and technology—will profoundly affect military culture.

Legal Imperatives

Though not discussed at length during the conference, legal imperatives are critical to military culture in that they establish the legitimacy for the existence and missions of the armed forces. Legal imperatives are rooted principally in the Constitution and various U.S. statutes that spell out the roles and missions of the military, as well as the separate legal codes by which the military governs itself. While the Constitution changes little, U.S. statutes concerning military missions have recently been amended. For instance, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, with global military threats much reduced, a movement arose on Capitol Hill, led by Senator Sam Nunn among others, to have the active duty military assist in such domestic activities as the "war on drugs," civil order (as regular troops did during the Los Angeles riots of 1992), patrolling the border, and disaster relief. Some of these activities were in direct contravention of the Posse Comitatus Act that prohibits regular armed forces from assisting in civilian law enforcement. Momentum to amend that act began when Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act in 1981 to allow the military a much greater role in drug interdiction.

Nunn justified his proposals to use the military more in domestic missions by stating that the nation needed to take advantage of "the hardworking, disciplined men and women" of the armed forces. Similarly, Republican presidential candidates Robert Dole, Lamar Alexander, and Patrick Buchanan proposed in 1996 to use the military to seal porous U.S. borders and assist civilian agencies in drug interdiction. These proposals threatened in many ways the core function of the military, which in Huntington's words is "successful armed combat." Further attempts to amend legal imperatives face two challenges. First, they could well be counterproductive. The military is "hardworking and disciplined" precisely because it prepares with an uncommon sense of urgency for battlefield tasks that require those very attributes. If you remove the task, you remove the need for the culture underpinning those missions. There is a reason civilian law enforcement agencies do not have the culture of the military—it is because of what they do (or, more precisely, what they do not do). Using the military to correct the failings of other institutions would cause military culture to atrophy, denying politicians the very instrument they hoped to use for domestic tasks.[10] More dangerous perhaps, as Charles Dunlap writes, is the possibility that the changing of legal imperatives toward domestic missions will

[10] See John Hillen, "Don't Misuse the Armed Forces," *Investor's Business Daily*, Feb. 28, 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

undermine the civil-military balance and thrust the armed forces into internal affairs in a corrosive way.[11]

Legal imperatives affecting military culture have also been under challenge as a result of the recent sexual episodes. In 1997–98, the secretary of defense convened a panel to investigate whether legal provisions concerning adultery and other offenses covered by the Uniformed Code of Military Justice should be revised in "recognition that, at least in some ways—the military world should not really be so different from the civilian."[12] The impetus for these sorts of legal proposals is discussed below. What should be recognized here is that the legal imperatives shaping what the military does and how it does it are subject to change and amendment through political intervention that may be very shortsighted.

Social Imperatives

Three distinct types of social imperatives have an impact on military culture. First, there are pressures from small but vocal constituencies seeking to use the military as a vehicle for social change, or even what Charles Moskos and others have called "social experimentation." Some observers believe that these activists seek not only to further their agendas via the military, but to destroy its prevailing culture in the process.[13] One is reminded of Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder's gleeful pronouncement during the Tailhook investigation that the troubles of the navy represented "the sound of a culture cracking." Second, there are those military and public officials who abet the activists in the belief that functional imperatives have so changed the nature of war that the military can and perhaps should accommodate seemingly contradictory social imperatives. Other "accommodators" simply believe that many of the vestiges of military culture are overly authoritarian, masculine, or otherwise out-of-step with the times. Third, some reformers stress social imperatives on the military in the belief that any severe gap between civilian and military culture bodes ill for a democracy. They would push the military to adopt contemporary values, patterns of behavior, and social mores on race, class, gender, and sexual orientation so as to close the gap. While the panel spent much time discussing all these issues, the last is the most recent and most potentially far reaching, and it is to that heated topic that this paper devotes the greatest attention.

The "Agenda Pushers"

The military, being a "top-down" institution driven by authoritarian dictates, is viewed by many as an ideal vehicle for imposing social change.

[11] See Charles Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College*, Winter 1992–93, pp. 2–20.

[12] Steven Lee Myers, "Military Weighing Changes in Policy Towards Adultery," *New York Times*, July 19, 1998.

[13] James Webb, "The War on the Military Culture," *Weekly Standard*, January 20, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Truman recognized this when he fully integrated the armed forces in 1948 while much of the United States was still locked in a pattern of legal, systemic racial discrimination. The social imperatives pressuring the military today also derive from demands for equal opportunity—in this case, for women and homosexuals. Many of their advocates make no secret of their radical politics and aggressive agendas. Dr. Madeleine Morris, a Duke University law professor officially advising former secretary of the army Togo West on gender issues, wrote a 130-page law review article putting forward an "ungendered vision" of the military based in part on the model of Communist Party cells and proposed a plan for dismantling the "masculinist military construct" that encourages a "proclivity for rape."[14] This sort of unsubstantiated deconstructionist agitprop is taken seriously in much of the academic world and in activist circles, but had not previously penetrated the sober world of military policymaking.

Such unsubstantiated agitprop had not previously affected military policymaking.

By 1994, however, the equal opportunity agenda, informed by "analysis" such as that from Dr. Morris, had begun to have an impact on policy. Within eighteen months of President Clinton's election, several steps were taken that seriously challenged traditional military culture. In January 1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that he was lifting long-standing exclusion rules and opening some 15,000 to 20,000 combat and near-combat positions to women.[15] By that time Clinton had acted on his long-standing campaign pledge to eliminate the prohibition against avowed homosexuals in the armed services. This controversial move was resisted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, among others, and resulted in the enigmatic and legally ambiguous "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" compromise. Finally, although it had been tried and deemed to have failed in the 1980s, the army and navy reintroduced sexually integrated basic training. A series of embarrassing and highly publicized incidents soon occurred, sparking a national scandal worthy of investigation by two blue ribbon congressional panels in 1997 and 1998.[16]

While the military conference panel discussed these issues at length, some participants took the position that the equal opportunity changes thrust on the military do not constitute the greater problem. To them, the pressing worry is that the military might accommodate these changes by compromising its standards and the cultural values it thought necessary to meet its functional challenges. In other words, the cultural angst experienced by the military in accommodating these imperatives was somewhat self-inflicted.

The "Accommodators"

If women in combat, homosexuals in the military, or coeducational basic training damage traditional military culture, that damage would most likely

[14] Quoted in Elaine Donnelly, "Social Fiction in the Ungendered Military," *Washington Times*, April 7, 1997.

[15] See Eric Schmitt, "Aspin Moves to Open Many Military Jobs to Women," *New York Times*, January 14, 1994.

[16] See James Anderson, "Boot Camp or Summer Camp? Restoring Rigorous Standards to Basic Training," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1147, November 6, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be manifested in lesser cohesion in combat units (traditionally based on small group dynamics among males), privacy concerns, and increased incidences of sexual misbehavior. As Professor Mackubin Owens has written, these phenomena represent friction in the classic Clausewitzian sense. Both he and Don Snider note that military culture is formed precisely to overcome friction, especially in times of greatest stress.[17] However, the sources of friction normally cited in critiques of these social experiments are the double standards, reduced standards, less rigorous training, indiscipline, and reduced readiness derived from the need to accommodate females in the ranks. For instance, the report of the Commission on Gender Integrated Training led by former senator Nancy Kassenbaum-Baker focused most of its criticisms of gender-integrated basic training on the latter category of problems. That being the case, the panel suspected that the disingenuous way in which the military is accommodating the social imperatives is more problematic than the imperatives themselves. For instance, the army has known for a decade that women tend to quit basic training at a rate almost twice that of men. But rather than accepting that as the price of maintaining high standards in a demanding environment, the army lowered its standards so as to "gender-norm" the numbers. Panel members provided numerous other examples of this sort of appeasement, drawn from the Kassenbaum-Baker commission and other official studies.[18]

Clearly the pressure on the military to make these social experiments "work" reveals that the U.S. military and America's political system are not mature enough to handle "gender and sexual orientation issues" honestly and in ways that are fair to the institution as well as the individuals involved. Political and military leaders seem convinced that American society, and therefore its military, must inevitably progress on a path leading to a social order in which gender is physically and behaviorally irrelevant, in which sex and sexual orientation have no impact, and in which teenagers view each other according to a benign and respectful androgeny. This new orthodoxy is a purely social construct without any functional imperative and was justified, in the words of accommodationist Les Aspin, simply because it "is the right thing to do."[19] Three years after Aspin's decisions, when independent commissions and numerous reports found the military compromised and suffering from the way in which these changes were imposed, the majority of uniformed and political leaders *continue* to support social imperatives at the clear expense of functional ones and resort to Orwellian phraseology in their attempts to defend their new regime against the truth.[20] While many uniformed leaders showed great courage in their battlefield exploits to turn back the nation's enemies, they seem petrified before activists who might accuse them of "turning back the clock."

[17] See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "It's Time to Face the Gender Parodox," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1998, pp. 43–49.

[18] Elaine Donnelly, Testimony to the House National Security Subcommittee on Personnel, March 17, 1998.

[19] Schmitt, "Aspin Moves."

[20] Rowan Scarborough, "Did the Army tell House to Buzz Off?" *Washington Times*, August 31, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To say that the battlefield imposes its own timeless logic, including a viciously impartial meritocracy, would seem to be a simple enough proposition. But in times of peace it can be overwhelmed by social imperatives pressed by activists with a larger agenda, which accommodators in turn accept as "the will of the people."[21] Thus, a recent statement from the army's leadership that "any proposal that calls for gender segregation of both trainees and cadre violates the very foundation of the Army" led one incredulous observer to ask, "Which foundation is that? Winning wars for our nation; the will to win; 'Duty, Honor, Country'; 'There is no substitute for victory'? What specific foundation was the Army leadership referring to?"[22]

The "Close the Gappers"

In the past few years, it has become accepted and widely reported that a "gap" is growing between American society and the U.S. military. For the most part, however, these warnings pertained to those official relationships between political leaders making defense policy and uniformed military leaders in the Pentagon.[23] The civil-military "gap" as then portrayed was manifest only within the government, and mostly at its highest levels. However, since 1996, the focus of concern over this gap has broadened, and public conversation has recently magnified the gap into a "nearly unbridgeable cultural divide" between American society in general and the U.S. military establishment.[24] Dire warnings over the consequences of this gap have caused many policymakers automatically to assume that its very existence is fundamentally unhealthy in a democracy. Hence, their alarmist cries to close the gap.[25] Civilian defense officials such as Secretary of Defense William Cohen have made "reconnecting the military to society" a top priority, and prominent veterans such as Senator John McCain have publicly worried about a professional U.S. military estranged from society.[26]

Whether politically motivated by the "agenda pushers" or not, there is now an inexorable momentum to "close the gap" between the military and society without clearly identifying the nature of the gap, the extent to which it might in fact be healthy and desirable, or how such a gap might be narrowed. So instead of reasoned study and judgment, we witness a series of *a priori* assumptions to the effect that there is a fundamental, corrosive gap between the military and society, and that no democracy can tolerate a military whose culture does not mirror that of civil society. Moreover, it goes without saying

[21] In fact, all these recent changes were imposed by executive order, not congressional statutes.

[22] Col. (ret.) Michael D. Mahler, "Has the Army Lost Its Way?" *Army*, May 1998, p. 57.

[23] See, for instance, Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *National Interest*, Spring 1994, pp. 3–17 and the responses to his essay in the following issue of that journal.

[24] James Kitfield, "Standing Apart," *National Journal*, June 13, 1998, pp. 1350–58. See also Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997, pp. 66–78.

[25] See Congressman Ike Skelton, "Close the Gap Between Military and Civilian America," *Association of the United States Army News*, July 1996, p. 7.

[26] Kitfield, "Standing Apart," pp. 1355, 1357.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that under the new dispensation, if society or the military must move to accommodate the cultural norms of the other, it will be the military that is pressured to lower its standards, not society to raise civilian behavior. Finally, since no criteria establishing an "acceptable" gap have been articulated, the military will likely be under pressure to close the gap entirely, whatever ruin this may visit on the culture, ethos, and value system that justify its existence.

A gap between civilian and military culture does exist. It always has and always will so long as American society remains as it has been since 1865: a relatively unthreatened polity focused almost exclusively on the "pursuit of happiness" while its military is responsible for acting outside America's borders to preserve that basic condition.[27] The cultural gap between the two entities is not necessarily dangerous to American democracy in and of itself, but can and should exist so the military can accommodate both the society it protects and the battlefield on which it must perform. On the one hand, closing the gap for the sole sake of accommodating social imperatives can only betray the military's ability to meet the uncompromising needs of its mission. On the other hand, the gap can become problematic for civil-military relations if the military swings in the other direction and answers solely to the battlefield without being cognizant of and responsive to the mores and values of society at large.

To many observers, the values and social mores of 1990s America—narcissistic, morally relativist, self-indulgent, hedonistic, consumerist, individualistic, victim-centered, nihilistic, and soft—seem hopelessly at odds with those of traditional military culture.[28] Critics ranging from Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to pollster Daniel Yankelovich have warned of what William Bennett calls a "palpable culture decline" and "marked shift in the public's beliefs, attitudes, and priorities."[29] Even Garry Trudeau's characters in the comic strip *Doonesbury* poke fun at the nihilism of *Seinfeld*, saying the television show was "the last gasp of a self-centered, dysfunctional, arrested generation choking on the banal, irony-soaked detritus of its own popular culture . . . not that there's anything wrong with that." [30]

Clearly, American society today finds classic military values increasingly foreign. The Marine Corps instituted an extra week of recruit training focused on values precisely because the "raw product" the corps was getting from society was of a different (read lower) standard insofar as values were concerned.[31] The gap is a recurring theme in the recent book *Making the Corps*, by conference

[27] See Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) for an interesting extrapolation of this phenomenon. As writer Ralph Peters has said, in the twenty-first century America is likely to be "fat, smart, and happy" while its soldiers police the fringes of its empire to keep the conflicts that have plagued Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East as far from public concern as possible (comment to conference audience, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 1998).

[28] See especially Robert Hughes, *Culture of Complaint* (New York: Warner Books, 1993); and Robert Bork, *Slouching Towards Gomorrah* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1996).

[29] William J. Bennett, *The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 9.

[30] Garry Trudeau, *Doonesbury*, Universal Press Syndicate, April 29, 1998.

[31] See John Hillen, "Teaching Values to Beavis and Butthead," *Navy Times*, December 15, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

panelist Thomas Ricks.[32] As Ricks notes throughout his story of Marine Corps basic training, the values of contemporary society are the opposite of those needed to succeed in the unequivocal business of war: "Parris Island is the first place many of them encounter absolute and impersonal standards of right and wrong, of success and failure." The cultural juxtaposition of values in American society at large versus those in the Marine Corps manifests itself almost every day in the training of Ricks's platoon. One drill instructor, a former gang member from Los Angeles, testifies that "the Marine Corps taught me values—not just words. Honor, courage, commitment. Fidelity. Integrity. Not just using them, but actually practicing them. Out in the civilian world, those words don't even get mentioned. I'll say, 'Integrity,' and they'll say 'What kind of shit you talking? You done got brainwashed in the Marine Corps.'"

Do these and similar vignettes prove an "unbridgeable cultural divide?" Ricks believes that in a democratic society it is dangerous for a professional military to differ sharply from the society it defends, since a military that holds civil society in contempt might cease to behave as its servant. Former assistant secretary of the army Sarah Lister publicly called the marines "extremists" for standing out so differently from society. But where Ricks intimates that it would be better for society to adopt some Marine Corps values, Lister clearly wants the marines to move toward civilian values.

Gap-closing, however, is a false game. We should accept the fact that military and society can co-exist and complement each other despite different values. For, elite opinion and advocacy groups notwithstanding, the American people as a whole appreciate traditional military culture.[33] To the extent that there is a worrisome gap between civilian and military cultures, it is one of shared experience, understanding, and appreciation—especially among elite segments of American society and the military. The House of Representatives had 320 veterans in 1970, but fewer than 130 in 1994. Moreover, in 1997, for the first time ever, neither the secretary of defense, the national security advisor, the secretary of state, nor any of their deputies had ever been in uniform.[34] As Senator Charles Robb noted, "with less interaction between the civilian and military cultures, we're going to have progressively less understanding of one another."[35] This gap is a function of demographics, strategy, defense spending, and military policy. Changes in any of those variables (such as the end of the draft in 1973 or the decline in post–Cold War defense spending) will profoundly affect the magnitude and nature of civil-military interaction. There certainly is a cultural gap, but it is not one of diametrically opposed values. Much as many other professional cultures differ from each other (imagine, for instance, lawyers and doctors), military culture will differ from that of society at large.

[32] All of the following quotes are from Ricks, *Making the Corps.*

[33] John Hillen, "They'll Leave the Farm Once They've Seen Parris," *American Enterprise,* May/June 1998, pp. 82–83.

[34] *VFW Magazine,* Feb. 1997, p. 15. See also Mark Shields, "When Heroes Were Ordinary Men," *Washington Post,* August 3, 1998.

[35] Kitfield, "Standing Apart," p. 1354.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Danger in Closing the Gap

There are, of course, profound dangers for civil-military relations if the military is so different from society that it holds itself above society and unaccountable to those it serves. The symptoms, pointed out by Richard Kohn and others, are disrespect and unresponsiveness on the part of the military to civilian leaders, elements that in other countries have led to military coups. No panelists felt there was a threat of that in America, however. More likely, the gap in shared experience, understanding, and appreciation could result at the political level in an "over or under propensity to use force, civilian operational meddling, inadequate support of the military, or the imposition of policies destructive of military culture."[36] At the societal level, it could result in a sense among soldiers and civilians that they have separate fortunes, as when Prussian citizens in 1806 considered that the army, not Prussia, much less themselves, had been "defeated" by Napoleon, whereupon Prussian leaders recognized that a "gulf existed between the state machine and the . . . people."[37] However, if the military socializes its culture at the expense of functional imperatives, it can fail in the most critical way—in war. Both the initial failure of American troops in Korea in 1950 and the sorry state of the military in the mid-1970s have been traced in part to attempts by the military to mirror prevailing civilian culture too closely. Regarding the Korean debacle, which he blamed on the social imperatives behind the Doolittle reforms of 1945, historian T.R. Ferenbach wrote that "in 1945, somehow confusing the plumbers with the men who pulled the chain, the public demanded that the Army be changed to conform with decent, liberal society."[38] The changes did not appear to have detrimental effects on the U.S. military forces because "the troops looked good. Their appearance made the generals smile. What they lacked couldn't be seen, not until the guns sounded."

Can the marines hold out against the onslaught of social advocacy groups?

In the aftermath of the disaster, Ferenbach angrily wrote that "liberal society, in its heart, wants not only domination of the military, but acquiescence of the military toward the liberal view of life. But acquiescence society may not have, if it wants an army worth a damn. . . . Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand ready, if need be, to die." Similarly, attempts by the military in the mid-1970s to recruit an all-volunteer force from a society still nursing the counterculture and Vietnam syndrome led to a dramatic weakening of standards.[39] General Walter "Dutch" Kerwin was one who resisted, writing in the 1970s that "the values necessary to defend the society are often at odds

[36] See Peter Feaver, "Officers as Citizens: Politically Insulated? Politically Diverse?" Presentation to the McCormick Tribune Foundation's Soldiers and Citizens Conference, held in Chicago, Ill., May 1, 1998.

[37] See Gordon A. Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955).

[38] T.R. Ferenbach, *This Kind of War: Korea, a Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 467.

[39] See John Hillen, "The Military Culture Wars," *Weekly Standard*, January 12, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the values of the society itself. To be an effective servant of the people, the Army must concentrate not on the values of our liberal society, but on the hard values of the battlefield." Kerwin made headway: the army dropped the accommodating "We Want the Army to Join YOU!" in favor of the challenge, "Be All That You Can Be." But today, several panelists think, American society has come full circle, displaying another identity crisis, while the military, facing recruiting and retention problems, is again trying hard to look like society. Political leaders of both parties press the military to "get with it" and conform to prevailing civilian values. Thus, the army, in its never-ending effort to sell itself in the absence of conscription, stresses such incentives as financial benefits, training, and job security, as if the army were a sort of high school with a salary and fresh air. Nevertheless, enlistments decline and the army is having to accept enlistees who would have been turned away five years ago. And thanks to the trend toward feminization, the army is losing Hispanic recruits to the Marine Corps, which alone satisfies their pursuit of *machismo*.[40] Indeed, the Marine Corps still sells itself not as a place to work, but as a place to grow in honor, courage, and commitment—values little taught or even respected in much of civilian society. Small wonder that Tom Ricks found some new marines contemptuous of the society whence they came after meeting the uncompromised standards of boot camp. They had achieved genuine self-actualization, not the feel-good therapy of victimhood.

The perceived importance of answering to social imperatives often leads to the compromise of proven military standards. In those cases, as Professor Mac Owens has suggested, "the danger to the republic does not arise from any military threat to liberal American society, but from the reverse: the civilianization of the U.S. military ethos."[41] One wonders whether the Marine Corps and the shrinking combat elements of the other services can hold out against the relentless onslaught of social advocacy groups. And as Ferenbach noted in his day, modern proponents of traditional military culture cannot even look with certainty to the Pentagon or Capitol Hill for allies.

Conclusion

Social and functional imperatives are often inherently contradictory. The civil culture of a liberal democracy pulls the military one way, while the hierarchy of values needed to succeed in the unnatural stresses of war pulls it another way. The gap between the military and American society varies according to the balance between these imperatives. Currently, many people think that the gap is too large and needs to be closed. I argue instead that the gap is a fact of life: it should not be closed, indeed it cannot be closed, but managed. Such

[40] Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Faces Recruiting Obstacle: Less Macho Image," *Wall Street Journal*, July 15, 1997.

[41] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "American Society and the Military: Is There a Gap?" *Providence Journal*, March 27, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

management is difficult and takes political courage of a high order, especially in a liberal society during peacetime. Unfortunately, the peacetime "default solution," the path of least resistance for the military, is just to abandon many tenets of its traditional culture and surrender to society at large. The result is that social imperatives are imposed at the expense of functional imperatives, introducing a possibly calamitous confusion between means and ends. If the purpose of having a military establishment in the first place is to promote cozy civil-military relations, then military culture should be forcibly brought into line with civilian culture. If, however, the purpose of having a military is to provide for the common defense, then the military must nurture the unique culture developed for that purpose. "Different, but not Separate" must be the slogan guiding an effort that keeps the military responsive to society without ruining its functionally unique culture. In the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, military sociologists such as Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, and others helped to delineate the boundaries that make for healthy relations between the military and society. But they were addressing the challenges of a large conscript army during the Cold War, a genuine national emergency. In the absence of up-to-date and reasoned criteria for maintaining healthy civil-military relations in a time of peace, we are confronted by the simple demand to "Close the gap!" Thus, Senator McCain has said, "It's a fundamental principle that armed services can truly serve a democracy only if they are a reflection of that society and are impacted by the same social trends."[42] But what exactly does that mean? If society is "slouching towards Gomorrah," must the military slouch along with it? Should it go just part of the way—softening rigid codes of conduct but maintaining enough discipline and order to keep the problems that infect greater society at bay? It would be hard to imagine the ex-POW McCain approving of a military shaped by the same narcissism, relativism, and "culture of complaint" that social critics tell us characterize American society today. And yet, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton said in July 1994 that "as American society changes, the Naval service changes with it. That's not bad—that's the way it's supposed to be."

The question policymakers should be asking is not, "How can we close the gap?" but rather, "What is the cost of closing the gap?" And the answer is that sooner or later the cost will be measured in the security and well-being of the *civilian* culture which the military is mustered to defend. The military cannot, of course, violate the legal imperatives that influence its culture—they are non-negotiable. Likewise, the military dare not violate its functional imperatives lest it lose its country's wars. Therefore, if contradictions exist among the various imperatives that shape military culture, it is the social ones that the brass must find the courage to "stiff-arm." There are many today who insist that America fix the "gap" problem by abandoning the military's functional and legal imperatives in order to accommodate societal pressures. But for anyone with the least historical sensibilities, that notion is simply preposterous.

[42] Kitfield, "Standing Apart," p. 1357.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EEPS

East European Politics and Societies

Volume 12, Number 2 **Spring 1998**

A Rope Supports a Man Who Is Hanged —NATO Air Strikes and the End of Bosnian Resistance *Attila Hoare*

The Transformative Corporatism of Eastern Europe *Elena A. Iankova*

Elite Change After Communism: Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia *Thomas A Baylis*

Between Reform and Revolution *János Kis*

The Lessons of 1989: Comments on János Kis *Daniel Chirot*

Comments on János Kis *Vladimir Tismaneanu*

EEPS is published by the University of California Press for the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. Subscriptions: $36 individuals; $75 institutions; $28 students (outside North America, add $20). Send orders to: University of California Press, Journals Division, 2120 Berkeley Way #5812, Berkeley, CA 94720-5812. E-mail: journals@ucop.edu • http://www.ucpress.edu/journals

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nuclear India and Indian-American Relations

by Mohammed Ayoob

India's decision in May 1998 to explode five nuclear devices of varying yields, including a thermonuclear device, has posed the most serious challenge to the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime since the coming into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. It led to a Pakistani nuclear response, thus setting off fears of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Furthermore, it provided Islamabad with a fresh opportunity to put Kashmir on the international agenda by ruing the escalating tensions on the subcontinent even as it exacerbated those tensions by intensifying the shelling across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. Finally, the Indian decision led to a marked deterioration in Indo-American relations and mutually hostile rhetoric not heard since the American "tilt" toward Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. U.S. imposition of economic sanctions on India, triggered automatically by congressional legislation, and Washington's role in leading other G-8 countries to impose similar sanctions further damaged Indo-U.S. relations, even as Indo-Chinese tension increased because of India's invocation of the Chinese threat as a major, if not the prime, reason for its decision to go overtly nuclear.

Now that the dust seems to be settling on the Indian nuclear tests, it is time to take stock of the reasons for the Indian decision and its short- and long-term impacts on Indo-American relations. In order to do so, one must place the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons within the overall context of India's foreign policy objectives as well as examine the immediate domestic and external compulsions faced by New Delhi. For to attempt to divorce discussion of the future prospects for Indo-American relations from such compulsions and contexts would ignore the basic wellsprings of Indian foreign policy.

One must, therefore, begin by analyzing the major objectives of Indian foreign policy and how each of these objectives is related to the others. The latter is essential because most objectives are inextricably intertwined and cannot be viewed in isolation from one another. In almost all major foreign policy decisions taken by New Delhi, different objectives have to be balanced against

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations, Michigan State University. His latest book is *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Lynne Rienner, 1995), and he has published in such journals as *World Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Global Governance*, and *Foreign Policy*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

each other and the implications of individual decisions on several of the interrelated objectives have to be taken into account. Therefore, any simplistic analysis attempting to explain major Indian foreign policy decisions on the basis of just one variable, however important that variable may appear in a particular context and at a particular point in time, is likely to be misleading at best and, at worst, counterproductive.

Nation Building and Regional Predominance

It may appear paradoxical for a great nation now fifty years old, but a primary objective of Indian foreign policy remains the enhancement of basic nation-building goals. India has attempted to build a national identity on the basis of inclusive and civic, rather than exclusive and ethnic, criteria. This civic nature of Indian nationalism is currently under serious challenge from militant Hindu chauvinists who would prefer to define India's national identity in religious-cultural terms. However, the ideology of civic nationalism, termed secularism in India, continues to exercise "hegemony" in the Gramscian sense despite the coming to power of a coalition government led by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is demonstrated by the fact that the latter has had to adopt the language, if not the spirit, of Indian secularism in order to fashion a viable government in New Delhi and be seen as the legitimate party of governance.

The problem of nation building in India on the basis of civic criteria was greatly compounded by the interreligious strife that immediately preceded and accompanied independence and led to the partition of India between a predominantly Hindu but secular India and a self-consciously Muslim Pakistan. The problem of Kashmir was born out of this partition and remains a symbol of the clash between the secular self-perception of much of the Indian elite and the communal/religious self-perception of their counterparts in Pakistan. The Kashmir issue, therefore, is not just a bilateral territorial dispute between two neighbors. It is intimately linked to the self-definitions of the Indian and Pakistani states and, therefore, among other things, to the place of the 120 million Muslims within the Indian polity, barely four million of whom are Kashmiris. Indo-Pakistani relations, therefore, are intimately tied to the process of nation building in India and bridge the gap between New Delhi's international and domestic preoccupations.

However, Indian objectives are not limited to building an effective and legitimate state and fashioning a civic and territorial form of nationalism. In the perception of the Indian elite, shared widely by the political public, the Indian state is the legitimate successor to the British Raj as the strategic and political manager of the Indian subcontinent. As the preeminent and pivotal power in the region, India perceives itself much as the United States has traditionally perceived itself in relation to the Americas.[1] This vision of India's managerial

[1] For details of this argument, see Mohammed Ayoob, "India in South Asia: The Quest for Regional Predominance," *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1989–90, pp. 107–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

role in South Asia was most clearly embodied in the so-called "Indira Doctrine" formulated in 1983 during the early stages of the Sri Lankan civil war and named after then prime minister Indira Gandhi. It was propounded for the express purpose of deterring external powers from meddling in South Asian affairs in general and the Sri Lankan conflict in particular and was clearly intended to be an Indian version of the "Monroe Doctrine."[2]

The more recent Gujral Doctrine, named after former prime minister I.K. Gujral and propounded in the mid-1990s, is the more benign version of the "Indira Doctrine." It is essentially an attempt to acquire greater legitimacy for India's predominance in South Asia by demonstrating its capacity as well as willingness to act as the provider of collective good in the region. The Gujral Doctrine is based upon the premise that, so far as possible, India should accommodate the major concerns of its smaller neighbors and make concessions on issues of vital importance to them without insisting on an immediate quid pro quo for the concessions it makes.[3]

However, since the dawn of independence, India's managerial aspirations have run into headlong opposition from Pakistan, the regional "spoiler" in Indian perceptions. Pakistan's resistance to India's gaining acceptance as the managerial power in South Asia was, and continues to be, related in substantial part to the Pakistani state's own quest for legitimacy. If India's predominance in South Asia went unchallenged, that might have put paid to Pakistan's aspirations to evolve its own national identity on an ideological basis largely antithetical to the Indian secular experiment. The latter concern was important to Pakistan's ruling elites because India's secular ideology stood in sharp contrast to their attempt to build a state on exclusionist religious foundations.

External Actors in the Region

Pakistan has been able to thwart Indian aspirations to become the legitimate security manager of the region primarily because of its ability to borrow power from external patrons and thus neutralize to a substantial extent India's inherent superiority in South Asia. It was able to enter into an alliance with the United States during the heyday of the Cold War by advertising the fact that its military and political potential could help to protect Western strategic and economic interests in the predominantly Muslim but volatile Middle East and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. It was able to reinforce this image in the 1980s

[2] According to this formulation, "India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside power; if external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help." Quoted in P. Venkateshwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception," *Asian Survey*, April 1988, p. 422.

[3] For details of the Gujral Doctrine, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "India in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2, 1997, pp. 308–10. The author, a well-known academic and publicist, was reportedly the brain behind the Gujral Doctrine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by serving as the conduit for American military aid to the insurgents fighting the Soviet-supported regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan accordingly used the military and economic capability that it acquired from its alliance with the United States primarily to build conventional armed forces strong enough to challenge Indian military superiority in South Asia.

From the early 1960s onward, Pakistan was also able to enlist China's support as a result of the deterioration in Indo-Chinese relations that led to the border war of 1962. Beijing not only became Pakistan's major supplier of conventional arms but also transferred technology, reportedly including blueprints for a nuclear weapon and missile components that helped Pakistan further its nuclear weapons program and augment its delivery capacity.

Pakistan's utility during the 1980s to the United States in its proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan led Washington to turn a blind eye to the development of Pakistan's nuclear capability despite repeated warnings by the American intelligence community. By 1987 it was commonly assumed that Pakistan possessed an untested nuclear weapons capability, but it took another three years, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, and the end of the Cold War before President Bush officially recognized this fact and allowed sanctions against Pakistan to take effect.

The Pakistani capacity to borrow military power from abroad in both the conventional and nuclear arenas has, in Indian perceptions, been responsible for much of the tension in Indo-Pakistani relations. New Delhi thus holds Pakistan's external patrons largely responsible not only for thwarting what it considers to be its legitimate role in the region but also for fuelling the arms race between the two neighbors. It also holds Pakistan's allies responsible for undermining the "natural" balance of power in the subcontinent to such an extent that it emboldened Pakistan in the 1990s to plan and support the insurgency in Kashmir, including infiltration of Pakistani-trained insurgents and foreign mercenaries into the valley.

The Indian perception of the threat from Pakistan has, therefore, become inextricably tied to the Indian assessment of the extent of external support Islamabad can garner from the major powers at a particular point in time. Since New Delhi has always considered the Pakistani challenge on its own to be manageable, it has laid much of the blame for Pakistan's capacity to threaten Indian interests and aspirations in South Asia at the door of Pakistan's external great power allies. In Indian calculations, therefore, the Chinese and American factors cannot be separated from the Pakistani factor in the formulation of Indian foreign policy and are, in fact, seen as more important than Pakistan in terms of India's long-range security considerations. However, New Delhi has always made a qualitative distinction between the threats it perceives to its security from the policies of China and the United States, and the long-term implications of these policies for its interests.

The Chinese threat is perceived as more imminent and direct for several reasons, but primarily because there are outstanding bilateral disputes between India and China that reinforce the China-Pakistan axis against India. The most explicit Chinese threat to India comes from the unresolved border dispute

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between the two countries that led to the war of 1962 in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. Equally important from New Delhi's perspective, however, is China's active and deliberate collusion with Pakistan to restrain India from playing what it considers to be its rightful role in South Asia for reasons that have to do with broader Chinese concerns about a potential Indian challenge. This Chinese policy, as pointed out above, has been manifested most dramatically in its supply of weaponry to Pakistan and the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to that country.

The Chinese threat to India has also been apparent in China's support, currently muted, to anti-Indian insurgents in the sensitive northeastern regions of the country. Chinese attempts to wean away Nepal from economic and security dependence on India through such ploys as arms transfers and road construction also appear to India as part of Beijing's overall design to restrict the Indian sphere of influence. More recently, Chinese collaboration with the military regime in Myanmar, and especially reports about Chinese naval bases' being built in that country, have alarmed Indian strategic analysts and policymakers who see this as evidence of Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean close to India's maritime boundaries. The periodic belligerence demonstrated by China in regard to its claims in the South China Sea and vis-à-vis Vietnam and Taiwan also act as reminders to New Delhi of Chinese intransigence on the India-China border issue.

American policies are seen as demonstrating ignorance rather than deliberate malevolence.

India's perceptions of the United States, by contrast, are usually more benign. It is widely recognized in New Delhi that American policy is global in character and that its regional side effects are frequently unintentional. Furthermore, American policies that have deleterious effects on Indian interests are often seen as demonstrating American ignorance and naiveté rather than deliberate malevolence. At the same time, however, the United States is accused of permitting itself to be used against India by Pakistan and/or China.

Washington is also accused of not being adequately sensitive to Indian security concerns and to New Delhi's aspirations to play a managerial role in the Indian subcontinent and an international role more commensurate with its size, population, economy, and technological prowess. Indian analysts often point out that strong Indo-Soviet relations during much of the Cold War era were built not upon ideological affinity or shared mistrust of America but upon Moscow's willingness to recognize India's preeminent role in South Asia and defer to New Delhi's assessment of India's security needs. Washington's proclivity, on the other hand, was (and continues to be) to lecture India regarding the latter's "real" security requirements and more often than not equate India with Pakistan in its approach to the South Asian region.

Since the 1970s, American rapprochement with China and the increasing consideration shown by Washington to Beijing in regional and international affairs have added to Indian disenchantment with American policy. There have been two primary reasons for this Indian attitude. The first has to do with the Indian perception that the United States colluded with China to bolster Pakistan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against India, initially during the 1971 crisis over Bangladesh and then in the 1980s in the context of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Secondly, Indian policymakers and analysts are irritated by the way Washington treats authoritarian and communist China as a near equal while adopting a condescending and patronizing approach toward democratic India and belittling its security and status concerns.

The Nuclear Pivot

To the relevant Indian political public there appears to be one major variable that can help explain why U.S. policy has been so discriminatory: China's demonstrated nuclear capability and India's vacillation, until May 1998, to go overtly nuclear. The nuclear issue has thus brought together separate but interlinked perceptions in a manner that few other Indian foreign policy decisions have done so far.

It is this complex interlinking of perceptions and variables that has determined India's nuclear decision making to a large extent. The inability to capture this complex process has drastically limited the explanatory power of the two main paradigms used in the United States to analyze and evaluate the Indian nuclear decision. The first paradigm considers the current nuclear non-proliferation regime to be indisputably beneficial in nature and, therefore, treats the provisions of its component treaties, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime in particular, as sacrosanct. According to this framework, the Indian tests threaten the legitimacy of this regime and, consequently, New Delhi must be punished for this brazen act of defiance if the credibility of the regime is to be maintained. The second paradigm focuses on the India-Pakistan equation and builds on the premise that the Indian nuclear tests, followed by the Pakistani ones, have destabilized that equation and increased the likelihood of conflict and war in South Asia. Therefore, again, India deserves to be condemned and penalized for its actions.[4]

While both of these frameworks may be successful in capturing a part of the reality, especially a part of the reality after the tests, they miss the most essential constellation of factors that was responsible for the Indian decision to go overtly nuclear in the first place. It is therefore necessary to comprehend adequately the multiple Indian foreign policy objectives, strategic concerns, and security interests that lay behind the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons in May 1998.

In the event, there were two major factors, acting in conjunction with each other, that explain the Indian decision to go overtly nuclear, and one other factor which, while less important, was instrumental in determining the timing of that decision and its rapid implementation. The two primary factors

[4] For a well-reasoned critique of both these paradigms, see Muthiah Alagappa, "International Response to Nuclear Tests in South Asia: The Need for a New Policy Framework," *Asia Pacific Issues*, June 15, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were (a) India's multifaceted concerns regarding China and (b) the mounting pressure on India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the latest instrument in what the Indians consider to be the attempt by the nuclear powers to perpetuate a discriminatory non-proliferation regime and close the Indian option to go nuclear in the future. The third factor, which determined the timing, was domestic politics.

India's various security concerns vis-à-vis China, already alluded to above, have only intensified as China has launched a major military modernization program, including the purchase of state-of-the-art aircraft from Russia. In Indian perceptions, this process threatens to upset the conventional balance on the Sino-Indian border, especially since the Indian defense budget has decreased dramatically during the 1990s and thus adversely affected both the level of weapons sophistication and the degree of combat readiness of the Indian armed forces.

Qualitative escalation in Chinese aid to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs during the 1990s has also increased Indian concerns about a nuclear pincer movement against India. According to testimony before a Senate Subcommittee by Robert Einhorn, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation, it was not until May 1996 that the United States was able to get an assurance from Beijing that it was cutting off supplies of material and technology to Pakistan that were crucial for the latter to build and augment its nuclear and missile delivery capabilities.[5]

The American inability to rein in the Chinese on this issue until it was too late, combined with the increasing deference demonstrated by the Clinton administration to Chinese sensibilities, drove home two major lessons in New Delhi. The first of these was that continued "good behavior" on the non-proliferation front and reliance solely on American assurances regarding the China-Pakistan relationship was likely to lead to a further deterioration in the Indian strategic environment. This was especially so inasmuch as American restrictions on the transfer of dual-use technology to India imposed in 1974 remained firmly in place while Pakistan continued to benefit from its nuclear relationship with China. The second lesson was that the only way to get the sort of attention that the United States routinely paid to China was to demonstrate a degree of symmetry with China in the nuclear sphere. This could only be done if India went overtly nuclear and posed the same sort of direct challenge to the nuclear establishment that China had in 1964. At the same time, it was

[5] Statement of Robert J. Einhorn, deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation, before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, April 10, 1997. In the same statement, Einhorn acknowledged, "In the nuclear area, we have long had concerns about China's assistance to Pakistan's efforts to produce unsafeguarded fissile materials and to Pakistan's program to develop nuclear explosives. These concerns were especially acute in the 1980s but have continued even after China acceded to the NPT in 1992. During 1995 we received compelling information that a Chinese entity transferred a large number of custom-built ring magnets to the entity in Pakistan responsible for that country's unsafeguarded gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment program." It was not surprising that the Indians saw the Chinese commitment made to the United States in May 1996 as a case of closing the stable gates after the horse had bolted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

argued, India's demonstrated nuclear and missile capability could also serve as a warning to China and deter it from making anti-Indian moves while simultaneously forcing Beijing to reevaluate the dangers inherent in its policy of nuclear and missile collaboration with Pakistan.[6]

A final source of alarm in New Delhi was the process involved in drafting the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva during 1995 and 1996. India had been one of the earliest proponents of the CTBT. However, its growing concern that the treaty was being used to serve the goal only of horizontal non-proliferation rather than of nuclear disarmament, for which it was originally intended, was summarily dismissed by the nuclear powers. Furthermore, the Indians concluded that a devious stratagem (using Belgium and Australia) was employed by the nuclear powers to bring the draft treaty before the UN General Assembly, although technically it could not be reported to that body over India's opposition in the Conference on Disarmament. This perceived subterfuge made New Delhi even more wary of the real intentions of the treaty's promoters.

Above all, the Entry Into Force (EIF) clause, introduced into the treaty at the instance of China and Britain, made it clear that the CTBT could not take effect unless and until all forty-four "nuclear capable" countries signed and ratified the treaty. For all practical purposes, this made the treaty's entry into force dependent upon India's decision to sign and ratify it since, of the others, forty-one had endorsed the draft, Pakistan's signature was tied to that of India, and North Korea remained the "rogue" state that would have to be cajoled or coerced into signing. This alarmed New Delhi greatly because it saw the EIF clause of the CTBT as the crowning act of a strategy to isolate India and increase tremendously the international pressure on it to sign the document. A projected Review Conference of signatories to the treaty that could be held as early as September 1999 was also seen as part of a strategy to condemn India and pave the way for the application of sanctions against it by way of forcing New Delhi to sign and ratify the CTBT.[7]

The CTBT was in many ways the straw that broke the camel's back. It tied together many of the concerns that Indian policymakers harbored regarding the impact of a discriminatory non-proliferation regime on India's security interests, and it appeared to demonstrate the collusion between China and the United States to make the nuclear asymmetry between India and China permanent. But if this was the broader context for the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons, one final factor added to the urgency of the decision.

[6] For a perceptive analysis of India's assessment of the China factor in relation to its nuclear decision, see Ashutosh Varshney, "The Folly of America's Nuclear Diplomacy: US-China Relations, not India-Pakistan, Are the Real Cause for Concern in South Asia," *Financial Times* (London), August 6, 1998.

[7] For details of Indian perceptions of, and arguments against, the draft treaty, see Arundhati Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament," *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1997, pp. 239–261. Ghose was the Indian ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament when the CTBT was debated there.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nuclear Weapons and Domestic Politics

This new element was the accession to power of a BJP-led government in March 1998. When in opposition, the Hindu-nationalist BJP had been an advocate of India's going overtly nuclear. This demand had traditionally formed a part of the party's manifesto, although not its most salient one, during the past several elections. However, in India, as in other democracies that have to work on the basis of political consensus, there is no simple relationship between what appears in election manifestos and what is actually translated into policy. Indeed, numerous issues that had been given greater pride of place in the BJP's election manifesto and appealed even more to its traditional constituency were relegated to the background because of the BJP's need to form a consensus among the diverse elements within its coalition. These include the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution that enshrines the special status of Kashmir within India, the promise to build a Ram temple in Ayodhya on the ruins of a mosque demolished by Hindu mobs in 1992, and the legislation of a uniform civil code to replace the personal laws governing religious communities. Therefore, one should not assume any automatic relationship between the BJP's accession to power and New Delhi's decision to undertake nuclear tests.

While some of the urgency regarding the nuclear decision can be attributed to the BJP's desire to shore up the legitimacy of its government and its shaky coalition, most of it seems to have been related to fears among India's policy makers and the strategic community about the CTBT. The debate over whether—and under what conditions—India should sign the CTBT had preoccupied security analysts for most of 1996 and 1997.[8] Several of them had been arguing persistently that time was running out and that New Delhi had to carry out a series of nuclear tests before it was forced to succumb to international pressure and sign the CTBT from a position of permanent disadvantage. Their pleas took on greater urgency once the BJP replaced the lame duck Gujral government.

Some among the Indian strategic community advocated a strongly defiant posture and argued that India should conduct tests but in no case sign the CTBT. A few others argued that India should sign the CTBT without testing as a non-nuclear weapons state. Some respected analysts continued to hold to the earlier orthodoxy that India could retain its nuclear option indefinitely while not signing the CTBT and that, therefore, there was no reason for nuclear tests to be undertaken urgently.[9] Their position, however, was severely undermined by the EIF clause of the CTBT, which was perceived as designed to mount pressure on India to sign the CTBT quickly as a non-nuclear state.

[8] For one competent summary of the debate, see Savita Pande, "CTBT and India," *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), May 1996, pp. 157–182.

[9] For an eloquent statement of the position defending India's policy of nuclear restraint and "recessed deterrence," see Jasjit Singh, "The Challenges of Strategic Defence," *Frontline* (Chennai), April 24, 1998, pp. 13–16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this context, a consensus seemed to be emerging around the position that India should carry out a sufficient number of tests of different magnitudes and sophistication to demonstrate a credible deterrent capacity and gather scientific data in order to be able to proceed with its nuclear weapons program without further testing and then sign the CTBT as a nuclear weapons power.[10] This position was based on the assumption that a demonstrated nuclear capacity in conjunction with a modest stockpile of weapons and a delivery capacity that would eventually include Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) was the minimum needed to deter China in particular from attempting to take political advantage of India's military weakness. It was argued further that such a credible deterrent capacity was achievable within the limits of the CTBT if New Delhi successfully carried out a series of six to twelve tests of different yields before signing the treaty.[11]

As in other democracies, there is no simple relationship between election manifestos and actual policy.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee may also have been led to believe that if he did not order the series of tests quickly the opportunity may never reappear, as his government could fall at any time because of infighting among the coalition partners. This assessment was given added weight by the open secret to the effect that the earlier Congress government under Narasimha Rao had canceled a nuclear test at the last minute in December 1995 under American pressure. The head of the Defence Research and Development Organization and India's senior-most defense scientist, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, had been especially dismayed at Narasimha Rao's last-minute cancellation of the tests, and was concerned lest history repeat itself.

In all likelihood, this concern served as the primary domestic determinant affecting the prime minister's decision to order the nuclear tests. This concern was based on the assessment that a weak-kneed coalition government led by the Congress, which was likely to come to power if the Vajpayee government fell, would be railroaded by the Americans into signing the CTBT as a non-nuclear weapons state, thereby foreclosing the Indian nuclear option forever.

Living with the Bomb

There has been a clear realization that in the wake of the tests both the international nuclear context and Indian interests in regard to the non-proliferation regime have dramatically changed. As one of India's leading strategic analysts pointed out a month after the tests, "The objective of India's nuclear diplomacy has been radically transformed last month, when India declared itself a nuclear weapon power. Until May 11, the purpose was to create and sustain the option to make nuclear weapons when needed. Since mid-May, the

[10] These observations are based on the author's conversations in New Delhi in March–April 1998.
[11] Based on the author's conversations with strategic analysts in New Delhi, March–April 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diplomatic task has been to defend India's nuclear deterrent, reduce the political and economic costs of exercising India's nuclear option, and eventually gain international acceptance of its new status."[12]

Since India has clearly demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability and seems to be set on the road to acquiring a credible IRBM capacity, it is no longer interested in giving the highest priority in its nuclear diplomacy to the objective of dismantling the discriminatory nuclear regime within a time-bound framework. While still interested as a matter of principle in the elimination of nuclear weapons, New Delhi realizes that this will take a long time. In the interim (which might last decades) Indian security interests have to be ensured in a world divided between nuclear haves and have-nots, with India now falling in the former category regardless of the nuclear establishment's refusal to accord it that status currently.

That this new status carries with it certain responsibilities is clearly recognized by New Delhi. The Indian government's willingness to impose a moratorium on further testing, to signal its readiness to sign the CTBT if certain conditions are met, to adopt controls on the export of nuclear-related materials mandated by the NPT, and its offer to Pakistan of "no first use" of nuclear weapons are all indications of its appreciation that this is the case. Indian policymakers have made it clear that New Delhi will seriously consider signing the CTBT if there is adequate reciprocity from the nuclear powers, especially the United States.

The Indian stance was made very clear on August 4, 1998, when Prime Minister Vajpayee went on record in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament, as saying that, by announcing a voluntary moratorium after the nuclear tests in May, "India accepted the basic obligation of a test ban." He added further that India had also announced its "willingness to move towards a de jure formalisation of our voluntary undertaking." He went on to say that the dialogue with the United States on the issue of adhering to the CTBT had been started after "satisfying ourselves that India no longer requires to undertake nuclear explosions."[13] New Delhi, however, expects the American quid pro quo to their signing the CTBT to take the form not only of the lifting of sanctions imposed in the wake of the May tests but also, more importantly, of the easing, if not the total removal, of international restrictions imposed on the sale of dual-use technology to India.

Furthermore, India has stated clearly that it is willing to seriously join negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a commitment reiterated on August 11, 1998, by its permanent representative to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. As one Indian strategic analyst has pointed out, "The key question in relation to the FMCT is not if it is global and non-discriminatory. It is whether India has sufficient nuclear material at hand to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. . . . The very offer by the government to negotiate

[12] C. Raja Mohan, "Rethinking CTBT and FMCT," *Hindu* (Chennai), June 16, 1998.
[13] "Talks on to Arrive at a Decision on CTBT: PM," *Hindu* (Chennai), August 5, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an FMCT suggests that it is confident of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent under a worldwide ban on further production of the material."[14]

The United States, for its part, has expressed a keen interest in putting Indo-American relations back on track following the acrimony born of the nuclear tests. Washington has realized that the damage done to the nuclear non-proliferation regime needs to be repaired quickly in order to preserve the residual legitimacy and credibility of that regime. This can only be done through a serious dialogue with India that would lead to the latter's signing the CTBT and agreeing to accept at least in de facto form those provisions of the NPT essential to keep such a regime in place and strengthen its operation.

On the basis of parallel calculations, New Delhi and Washington have come to the conclusion that there is enough room for negotiations at least to narrow the differences between them, if not to resolve the dispute over nuclear testing altogether. This is indicated most clearly by the series of talks between the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbot, and the Indian prime minister's special envoy, Jaswant Singh, that have been under way since June 1998. Five rounds of talks have been held through late September, with the sixth scheduled for November 1998 in New Delhi. There have been persistent reports of late that the talks have narrowed the gap between India and the United States and it may be possible eventually to reconcile India's security concerns with America's interest in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

However, one must also recognize the major obstacles that are likely to hinder the process of dialogue and rapprochement between India and the United States. The most fundamental of these hurdles is the wide difference between the frameworks used by the two sides while approaching these negotiations. This is most clearly demonstrated by the disjuncture in the analytical and prescriptive positions reportedly adopted by the United States during the talks.

On the one hand, as a result of these talks the United States has come to accept the fact that the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons was driven primarily by its multifaceted concerns about China (including China's relations with Pakistan and the United States). On the other hand, the American prescriptive position on this issue is still primarily determined by a concern for the impact of the nuclearization of the subcontinent on India-Pakistan relations. This is demonstrated by the emphasis placed by the American side on the need for nonweaponization and nondeployment of Indian nuclear capabilities, the need to resolve bilateral differences with Pakistan with special emphasis on Kashmir, and the need for confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. American demands, therefore, seem to discount, if not totally ignore, the perceived threat from China that has been principally responsible for driving the Indian nuclear weapons program.

Similarly, the American negotiators recognize that the Indian concerns about the security implications of the CTBT for India are genuine and are tied

[14] Mohan, "Rethinking CTBT and FMCT."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially to the issue of nuclear asymmetry between India and China. Consequently, they realize that these concerns need to be addressed in such a creative way as to permit India to sign the CTBT without giving up its minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Nevertheless, America's major demands have emphasized the need for India to sign the CTBT immediately and unconditionally as a non-nuclear state and to refrain from further testing and deployment both of nuclear weapons and of missiles.

The American negotiating position also contains a demand that India should sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. However, the Americans have realized from the beginning that this is a nonstarter and their emphasis has, therefore, been on attaining the substance of this demand without directly pressurizing India to sign the NPT. At the same time, in the American view, it is clear that the NPT cannot be revised in the near future to accommodate India, Pakistan, and possibly Israel as nuclear weapon states without a major risk that the treaty and the regime it attempts to legitimize would suffer irrevocable damage.[15]

It is evident that the American and Indian negotiators perceive the issue through different lenses. The United States is still committed to approaching the problem of the Indian nuclear tests through the twin frameworks of India-Pakistan relations and the sacrosanct nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as presently constituted. The Indians focus the issue on the China-India equation and the negative implications of the nuclear non- proliferation regime, especially of the CTBT as currently drafted, for Indian security interests.

The Indian objection to the CTBT also derives from the treaty's failure to ban subcritical tests and computer simulations of tests that are likely to aid nuclear powers, especially the United States, to improve the sophistication of their arsenals while foreclosing the nuclear option for other states. This will also allow the five "legitimate" nuclear powers to freeze the international status quo in the security arena, thus giving them permanent advantage over other powers that aspire to great power status.

It should be noted, however, that there are two issues on which the Indian and American positions are reasonably close and where the gap can be bridged relatively easily. These relate to India's participating in a positive way in negotiations for the FMCT and New Delhi's providing assurances against transfer to third countries of sensitive material that can be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Both these measures are in India's long-term interests, and New Delhi has already indicated that it is willing to accept these obligations voluntarily if it is not forced into doing so from the permanently inferior position of a non-nuclear weapons state.

An American Strategy Toward India

It seems that the beginning of wisdom for American policymakers would be to realize that the nuclear issue goes to the heart of India's security and

[15] Observations regarding the American position are based on conversations with well-informed policy-making circles and analysts in Washington, August 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

status concerns, and that important powers find it impossible to disentangle status from security. They should, therefore, take heed of what the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, has written in a different context: "Real gains in arms control and disarmament depend not on what is desired or even demanded, but on what is possible as a matter of security."[16]

A future American strategy toward India will require an emphasis above all on reducing the discrepancy between China's international status and that of India as well as addressing India's genuine security concerns vis-à-vis China. The first objective can be advanced by actively promoting India's permanent membership in the Security Council while formally delinking this issue from that of India's nuclear status. The second goal can be served by a three-pronged strategy. First, it would require accepting India's need for minimum nuclear deterrence against China and deliberately leaving the definition of terms like "weaponization" and "deployment" so fuzzy as to permit India to have a credible deterrent while adopting a nuclear posture that Washington can technically accept as nonthreatening, especially to Pakistan. Secondly, Washington must pressure China to adopt confidence-building measures, especially in the arena of missile deployment, sufficient to make Indians feel less insecure. Finally, China must be persuaded to end its nuclear and missile collaboration with Pakistan and, if possible, roll back the supply of material and technology it has already provided to Pakistan.

India, in turn, must recognize that the United States has genuine concerns about the escalation of India-Pakistan tensions. The Indian offer of a no-first-use agreement to Pakistan should assuage some fears on this score. However, India must also enter into a serious strategic dialogue with Pakistan over deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles as well as about strategic doctrine in order to promote confidence-building measures and delink them from other issues bedeviling India-Pakistan relations. India should offer to start a strategic dialogue with China as well. India must also work diligently to put into place and streamline a command and control structure that would eliminate concerns about accidental or unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons.

Simultaneously, the United States must put greater pressure on Pakistan to desist from pursuing the dangerous strategy of training and infiltrating terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. This is essential because Indian patience is wearing thin, especially in the context of massacres of civilians that put tremendous domestic pressure on New Delhi to follow policies of hot pursuit and strike at terrorist bases beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir and across the border in Pakistan. It will be difficult to question the legitimacy of such Indian actions in light of recent American missile attacks on presumed terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan. Islamabad is playing with fire in this matter, and it is imperative

[16] John D. Holum, "The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament—The U.S. View," *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1997, p. 278.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it should be made to behave more responsibly in the new nuclearized context of the subcontinent.

The main sticking points in the Indo-American dialogue continue to be the lifting of economic sanctions and the removal of restrictions on the transfer of dual-use technology to India in the context of India's adherence to the CTBT. The lifting of economic sanctions will be the easier of the two to achieve. The American executive, working in collaboration with the Congress, should be able to come up with a formula for gradually easing the sanctions, if not lifting them altogether.[17] This process, driven primarily by domestic economic considerations, seems to have begun already. Removing NPT-mandated restrictions on the transfer of dual-use technology will be trickier, especially since India will in no case sign the NPT in its present form. New Delhi is also likely to make its formal signature on the CTBT contingent upon the gradual relaxation, if not the total removal, of such restrictions on technology transfer.

However, it is possible to find a formula with which both the United States and India can live while awaiting a more opportune moment to resolve these contentious issues. India has endured restrictions on nuclear-related and dual-use technology for the past twenty-five years and can wait for several more years without any great damage being inflicted on its vital interests. However, it is in India's long-term interests to work out an agreed formula with the United States by which such restrictions can be relaxed substantially in return for an Indian commitment to sign the CTBT.

In any case, the United States must reconcile itself to the fact that, as long as these restrictions continue in their present inflexible form, India will find it extremely difficult to sign the CTBT, although it may adhere of its own accord to most provisions of the treaty. Signing the CTBT without substantial concession would open the Indian government to censure by domestic political opponents, some of whom continue to be ideologically opposed to the CTBT because of its discriminatory nature. Moreover, the EIF clause of the CTBT has, paradoxically, provided New Delhi with important leverage following its decision to go overtly nuclear. Since the CTBT, as currently written, cannot come into force without India's signature, the latter can use it as a bargaining counter to extract concessions from the nuclear establishment. However, the September 1999 deadline for the Review Conference has added urgency to an Indian decision to sign the CTBT so that it can participate in the conference in order to protect its strategic interests and possibly gain recognition for itself as a nuclear weapons state. It was this combination of calculations that led Prime Minister Vajpayee to declare in his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998, that India "was prepared to bring these discussions [an obvious reference to the Strobe Talbot–Jaswant Singh dialogue] to a successful

[17] This seemed to be the general thrust of the testimony given on July 13, 1998, by Karl F. Inderfurth, assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, to the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conclusion so that the entry into force of the treaty is not delayed beyond September 1999."[18]

If the U.S. presidential visit to New Delhi can proceed without preconditions, if not in late 1998 then in the first quarter of 1999, it will ease the atmosphere a great deal and re-establish rapport between the top leaders of the two countries. Coming reasonably soon after the Clinton visit to China, it will also demonstrate to the Indians that the United States is ready to adopt a more even-handed approach to India and China. This may help to neutralize some of the negative impact of the joint U.S.-China communiqué denouncing the Indian tests that was issued in June 1998 during Clinton's visit to China. That the American president should condemn Indian actions while in Beijing was perceived by the Indians as the height of American insensitivity toward India's security concerns, especially since India had made no bones about the fact that its nuclear decision was determined in large measure by its perception of threat from a nuclear-armed China.

In conclusion, it is important that the two sides work hard to resolve their differences over the nuclear issue. However, it is even more important that the United States and India should insulate the rest of their relationship from an issue on which they may disagree for some time. This is essential in order to prevent the rest of their potentially very profitable economic and political relations from being held hostage to the nuclear issue. Only in such a course lies true statesmanship.

[18] Dileep Padgaonkar, "India Ready to Sign CTBT, Onus on Other Countries," *Times of India* (New Delhi), September 25, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Michael J. Mazarr, Editor

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

"With the passing of the Cold War, the intellectual challenge of U.S. foreign policy could hardly be greater. *The Washington Quarterly* has been consistently creative in meeting this challenge."
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies

"Once you subscribe to *The Washington Quarterly*, you won't want to give it up. For business leaders who need to follow public policy and global events, the *Quarterly* offers some of the best in-depth analysis available today."
William Schreyer, Chairman Emeritus, Merrill Lynch

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the Center for Strategic and International Studies

A premier international affairs journal, *The Washington Quarterly* is a valuable source of incisive, independent thinking about our changing world and the foreign, defense, and economic policies suited to the times. Renowned intellectuals and policymakers from the United States and overseas contribute diverse political and professional perspectives to each issue.

Select Forthcoming Articles

Adjustment, Recrimination: Franco–U.S. Relations and the New World Disorder Jonathan Marcus; *Nostalgia of Schizophrenia? Autumn Recollections of Summer Travels in Russia* Vassily Aksyonov; *Letters from Seoul: A Nation on the Edge* Moon Ihlwan; *The Shackles on the Arab Mind* Milton Viorst

1998 Subscription Information ISSN 0613-660X Individual $36; Institution $108; Student (copy of current ID required)/Retired $24. *Prices subject to change without notice. Prepayment required.* Outside U.S.A and Canada., add $16 shipping. Canadians add 7% GST. Send check—drawn against a U.S. bank in U.S. funds, payable to ***The Washington Quarterly***—AMEX, MC, or VISA number to: Circulation Department, **MIT Press Journals** Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA, 02142 Tel: (617) 253-2889, Fax: (617) 577-1545, journals-orders@mit.edu

http://mitpress.mit.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Russian Far East's Endless Winter

by Felix K. Chang

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Far East was well respected, if not feared, by many observers as a significant actor in regional and potentially global affairs. From its shores, the Soviet military could project its forces deep into the Pacific Ocean and, by the 1980s, as far away as the Indian Ocean. All that changed, however, during the 1990s, when evidence poured forth to indicate that the region was suffering from a profound economic dislocation, an awkward political estrangement from the center, and a general military demobilization.[1] Hopeful observers continue to believe that the region's abundant and varied natural resources might yet lift the Russian Far East into a more prosperous condition and Russia as a whole into a more powerful position in East Asia. But upon close examination, it can be argued that this future will arrive later rather than sooner, and require far more radical departures with the past than the region's inhabitants or Moscow's bureaucrats are currently willing to contemplate.

One expert has observed that while the power of nations is customarily measured in terms of population, natural resources, geography, political effectiveness, geostrategic position, economic and technical strength, and military might, Russian power on the Pacific has been "constrained by reliance on a single, increasingly ineffective instrument of statecraft—military might."[2] Despite its many incarnations as diplomatic hub, economic window, hazardous waste site, natural resource reservoir, and political prison, the Russian Far East (hereafter RFE) has indeed been first and foremost a military bastion from czarist times through the Soviet period. To that end, the region's economy and society were largely built to support a military infrastructure stretching from its army and

[1] For the purposes of this article, the area considered to be the Russian Far East will encompass not only the administrative district traditionally known as the Far East, but also those of Eastern Siberia and Western Siberia. The latter two districts are included because the circumstances of the Far East are so integrally linked to those of its immediate western neighbors.

[2] Charles E. Ziegler, "Russia in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Survey*, June 1994, pp. 529–43.

Felix K. Chang is an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He received an MBA from the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

navy bases in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok to its suppliers and paymasters in Moscow. To evaluate Russian power in East Asia, therefore, one must examine the region's economic and political mechanics as well as its military deployments.

Economic Dependence and Deterioration

Russians and their Cossack allies first ventured across the Ural Mountains in search of valuable furs and whatever bounty remained in the coffers of the Siberian khanates. But within a century the furs began to play out, while the hoped-for commerce with China never matched Russia's expectations. As a result, the RFE developed as a highly dependent colonial area. "Between 1892 and 1907, for example, the Amur-Ussuri lands cost the czarist government six times more in budgetary outlays than they returned in revenues. Although the Far East produced only one twenty-fifth of Russia's exports in 1910, it purchased one-seventh of its imports."[3] Under Communist rule, credits and transfers to the region helped it to develop some of the most sophisticated industries in the former Soviet Union, particularly in defense and resource extraction, but other industries as fundamental as agriculture languished. The region's economy was closely tied to the rest of the former Soviet Union and shielded from the external world in order to maximize its utilization to Moscow's benefit and insulate the population from "subversive" foreign influences.[4]

After the Cold War, however, the shrunken Russian Federation could no longer afford to lavish its far eastern provinces with credits and transfers, so that by 1992 the center's capital investments in the Far East fell to only 20 percent of the average amount during the 1980s. The region's industry suffered badly (see Table 1), and it was clear

> that the Far East's legacy of subservience to the center [could] not be so easily discarded. The region's overwhelmingly one-dimensional economy, a result of its limited role as a supplier of raw goods in the Soviet system, [proved] to be a major hindrance to development. Even more importantly, regional officials have been unable to wrest control of their resources from the center which still collects and distributes most of the profits from joint ventures. The center's tight grip over Far Eastern resources has frustrated regional officials and led to a series of counterproductive feuds over the distribution of profits.[5]

The ambiguity surrounding the relative roles of the federal, regional, and local governments has kept foreign investors away, but even worse for

[3] Peter Robison, "The Russian Far East: Prospects for Economic Development," *Stanford Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer 1995, p. 13.

[4] James Clay Moltz, "Core and Periphery in the evolving Russian economy: Integration or isolation of the Far East?" *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Mar. 1996, pp. 175–94; Mark M. Nelson, "Russian Hinterland Feels The Lure Of Asia; Moscow's Western Focus Retards East's Development," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 21, 1994; Leslie Dienes, *Soviet Asia: Economic Development and National Policy Choices* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 89.

[5] Robison, "The Russian Far East," p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1
Russian Far East Industrial Production
(percent change over previous year)

	1986-1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Amur Oblast	2.2	-6.4	-17.3	-7.4	-22.9	-18.0
Jewish Autonomous Area	4.4	-5.0	-25.4	-33.3	-29.0	-32.0
Kamchatka Oblast	2.4	-7.9	-26.9	-6.5	-30.8	9.0
Khabarovsk Krai	2.8	-1.2	-13.6	-18.2	-41.5	-23.0
Magadan Oblast	-0.2	-3.1	-8.1	-10.6	-11.6	-21.0
Primorsky Krai	2.8	-3.7	-6.9	-11.8	-29.3	-1.0
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	3.8	-2.4	-20.2	-3.9	0.4	2.0
Sakhalin Oblast	0.2	3.1	-21.8	-26.9	-10.0	9.0

Source: Roshia Sangyo Kiso Chosa: Ekonomikku Torendo, 1995 [Basic survey of Russian industry: economic trends, 1995] (Tokyo: Roshia To'o Boekikai Roshia To'o Keizai Kenkyujo, 1995), p. 90.

the RFE was the collapse of the Soviet system itself. With the dissolution of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Russian industry lost at a single stroke its access to captive markets and suppliers while Moscow began a necessary, but difficult reform program to build a market economy quickly.

For all its worthy intentions, Russia's reform strategy was problematic. As government subsidies dried up, the nascent financial system could not raise enough investment to compensate. Privatized companies were often limited in their ability to adjust, compelled as they were to observe rules on the number of hours employees worked, value of transactions, and sometimes even what purchases and repairs to make. Such legacies of the past were particularly damaging in the RFE as it tried to shift from an economy that emphasized resource extraction and heavy industry to one focused on food and consumer products.

In October 1993, Russian workers were issued 144 million vouchers to invest in capital themselves. The scheme was "democratic in its original conception and conducive to the formation of a new industrial elite." Unfortunately, workers fearful of new management often used these vouchers to buy shares in their old companies and then voted to keep their old Soviet managers. Inexperienced or inept, many of these managers continued to order raw materials and equipment, even if no money was available to pay for them, and continued to produce products, regardless of market demand. Entrepreneurs that sought to improve profitability by streamlining operations ran afoul of plant managers and local governments opposing job cuts. Companies gradually ran out of money to pay each other, their workers, and their taxes.[6]

At all government levels, tax revenue was critical to underwrite reform and spur investment. Unfortunately, tax receipts continually fell short of estimates due to widespread tax evasion and, more recently, the falling prices for oil and

[6] Steve Liesman and Andrew Higgings, "How Russia Staggered from There to Here," *Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 23, 1998; Celestine Bohlen, "Mountains of Bad Debt Stifle Russian Economy," *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

natural gas. At first, Moscow believed that the way to increase revenue was to levy additional taxes. By 1996, there were some 200 taxes in Russia. Nevertheless, Russia's chief tax collector, Boris Fyodorov, cited in August 1998 that almost 5,000 companies owed nearly $50 billion in unpaid taxes and fines. To collect that money, the government brandished hundreds of thousands of police, whereupon many underpaid and unpaid policemen began holding back tax receipts for themselves. After all, tax collection is a dangerous profession. In 1996 alone, 26 tax collectors were killed, 74 wounded, 6 kidnapped, and 41 burned out of their homes. Attempts to extract even small sums of money from needy workers have produced big waves of discontent.[7]

In 1996, 26 tax collectors were killed, 74 wounded, 6 kidnapped, and 41 burned out of their homes.

The mountains of accumulating unpaid bills and federal government spending cuts contributed to a growing nationwide inter-enterprise debt crisis. Aggravating the situation, the Russian central bank tightened money supply to rein in the rampant inflation caused by reform's sudden release of price controls. Some areas of the RFE have abandoned money altogether in favor of promissory notes, known as *vekseli*, or simple barter. Some companies do up to 90 percent of their business through barter transactions, and even local governments have accepted vodka instead of cash taxes.[8]

In lieu of tax revenues, Russia heavily relied on short-term bond financing to fund many of its reforms and its conflict in Chechnya. By spring 1998, finding a way to pay the interest and principal on that debt was of immediate importance. The government desperately needed to sell new bonds to repay old ones, but few buyers were found willing to believe that Moscow could undertake needed reforms, revive the economy, collect taxes, and pay off the interest and principal on its existing debt, let alone new debt. With almost $24 billion of government securities falling due, fears swelled that Moscow would devalue the ruble or even default.[9]

During a May bond auction, Russian officials were forced to reduce their auction price from $2.1 billion to under $1.7 billion, a cut of almost 30

[7] "Russia: Khabarovsk Power Workers Preparing To Strike Over Wages," FBIS-SOV-98-191, July 10, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "The taxman goes to war," *Economist*, Feb. 22, 1997.

[8] Sharon LaFraniere, "The Cashless Society," *Washington Post*, Sept. 3, 1998; Judith Thornton and Alexander Temkin, "The Consequences of Crisis for the Russian Far East Economy and for the Russo-Japanese Relationship," in *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors*, ed. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew Kuchins (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 314–21.

[9] "The next Russian bail-out," *Economist*, Aug. 15, 1998; Sharon LaFraniere, "Russian Banks Halt Ruble-for-Dollar Sales," *Washington Post*, Aug. 15, 1998; Michael Wines, "Russia's Markets Rally as Western Powers Discuss Rescue," *New York Times*, Aug. 15, 1998; Celestine Bohlen, "Russia's Continuing Economic Tremors," *New York Times*, Aug. 14, 1998; Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Ruble Scare: Another Blow to Major World Markets," *New York Times*, Aug. 14, 1998; Michael Wines, "Russia's Economy Takes Another Turn for the Worse," *New York Times*, Aug. 14, 1998; Daniel Williams, "Russian Banks Stop Loans to One Another," *Washington Post*, Aug. 13, 1998; "Russian Bank Imposes New Rules," Associated Press (hereafter AP), Aug. 13, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percent, in order to entice enough investors to buy the securities. Interest rates on them soared to 90 percent. Meanwhile, the Russian government tried to raise money by selling off some of its state-owned enterprises. But the level of investor confidence had fallen so low that when the government auctioned Rosneft, a major energy concern, for $2.1 billion, nobody bid. A second offer of $1.6 billion in July also failed. Similarly, an effort to sell a 5 percent share of Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas producer, was abandoned for lack of "reasonable" offers.[10]

As a result, the central bank had to raid its reserves, while the Communist-dominated Duma, alarmed by social unrest and strikes throughout the country, resisted a further 40 billion ruble ($6.2 billion) spending cut needed to contain the federal government's budget. Fortunately for Moscow, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) came through with a $22.6 billion loan on July 14. Russian short-term interest rates immediately dropped from 150 percent to 50 percent. The bad news was that the IMF insisted that Russia balance its budget in two or three years, improve tax collections, and create a system for converting rubles into hard currency through an open foreign exchange market. The Duma refused these important reforms, and Russian companies that would be hurt by higher taxes balked as well. Gazprom, which produces 95 percent of Russia's natural gas and 25 percent of the world's natural gas, was among them. As a result, bond yields quickly retreated back above 150 percent on nine-month notes, and the government was forced to cancel another bond offering.[11]

When it became known that some of the largest Russian banks could not repay major loans, the financial markets sent nine-month bonds above 200 percent and stocks sharply lower. Such a pricey borrowing environment clearly stifled economic expansion. Meanwhile, banks even stopped lending to one another and refused to sell dollars for rubles. Finally, even some sidewalk currency exchanges stopped selling dollars, while efforts to keep some of the most illiquid banks afloat drained almost $9 billion from the central bank's coffers. Under increasing strain, Russian authorities finally allowed the ruble to devalue from 6.5 rubles to 9.5 rubles to the dollar on August 17, then to 12.82 rubles to the dollar on September 3, and even more thereafter. Although such

[10] Michael R. Gordon, "Moscow Attempts Drastic Measures to Save Economy," *New York Times*, May 28, 1998; David E. Sanger, "Analysis: Washington Sees Russia Crisis as Next Phase of Asia Crisis," *New York Times*, May 28, 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Russian Oil Company Auction Draws No Bids," *New York Times*, May 27, 1998.

[11] All exchange rate calculations for 1998, before August 17, were done at 6.5 rubles = US$1; between August 17 and September 3 at 9.5 rubles = US$1. LaFraniere, "The Cashless Society"; "A dangerous bear-dance," *Economist*, Aug. 29, 1998; "Russian finance ministry cancels bond auction," Agence France-Presse (hereafter AFP), Aug. 11, 1998; Anna Dolgov, "Stock Trading Halted in Russia," AP, Aug. 11, 1998; Michael Wines, "Foreign Investors Need Good News, Top Russian Official Says," *New York Times*, July 29, 1998; Michael Wines, "Russians Hope Economy Has Reached Turning Point," *New York Times*, July 22, 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Russia's Financial Crisis Eased by New Loan Agreement," *New York Times*, July 14, 1998; Jon Boyle, "Bond auction failure forces Moscow to raid reserves," AFP, July 8, 1998; Mark Rice-Oxley, "Kiriyenko buys time, as miners, markets corner government," AFP, May 24, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a devaluation can restore a country's finances, Moscow's circuitous handling of the process further undermined confidence in Russian securities. In any event, investors in Russian domestic debt saw little chance that they would recover much more than 10–30 percent of their initial investments by early October.[12]

Meanwhile, the crisis spilled beyond the realm of finance. Urged by Russian tycoons, Yeltsin sacked Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and tried to replace him with Viktor Chernomyrdin, whom Yeltsin had derided and fired five months earlier. After two weeks of swirling debate and deal making, Chernomyrdin, a former head of Gazprom with strong links to the Russian oligarchy, was soundly rejected by the Duma. Realizing that he could not force the Duma's hand, Yeltsin nominated Yevgeny Primakov, a former foreign minister without any economic credentials. Satisfied and somewhat relieved, the Duma quickly approved Primakov. So uncertain was the situation that speculation about Yeltsin's own possible resignation initially abounded.[13]

Popular discontent spread, especially as food shortages began to appear. A poll by Russia's reliable Sociology and Parliamentarianism Institute revealed that 12 percent of Russians were ready to join a strike and 11 percent even said they supported an uprising against the government. While much of that sentiment was an immediate reaction to the devaluation and political turmoil, the poll indicated that there was considerable frustration, even among the traditionally stoic Russian people.[14]

Clearly, Moscow had little time to dwell on the travails of the distant RFE. Basic but hard-fought policies, including a tight money supply that had dramatically reduced inflation to manageable levels, were in jeopardy. Indeed, if the outlook for the national economy had become darker by late 1998, that of the RFE had become darker still.

Foreign Trade and Investment

Well situated near major international markets and well endowed with raw materials, the RFE appeared to be an ideal candidate to benefit from a post-Soviet liberalization of trade, and the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone and

[12] Genine Babakian, "Russia's creditors face payback of only 10%–30%," *USA Today*, Sept. 30, 1998; Sharon LaFraniere, "Ruble Meltdown Accelerates Russian Financial Crisis," *Washington Post*, Aug. 27, 1998; Christian Caryl, "Siberian Macaroni," *U.S. News & World Report*, June 22, 1998; "A hope and a prayer," *Economist*, May 23, 1998.

[13] "End of a road for Russia?" *Economist*, Sept. 5, 1998; "Meltdown in Russia," *Economist*, Aug. 29, 1998; David Hoffman, "Yeltsin Vows to Stay," *Washington Post*, Aug. 29, 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Bedfellows In Russia: Old Guard and Moguls," *New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1998; David Hoffman, "Tycoons Take the Reins in Russia," *New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1998; Michael Gordon, "In Russian Reformer's Fall, a Well-Connected Industrialist Triumphs," *New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Yeltsin Dismisses Russian Government, Restores Chernomyrdin," *New York Times*, Aug. 24, 1998.

[14] Mark Whitehouse and Betsy McKay, "Russia Puts Back Wages on Front Burner," *Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 25, 1998; Michael Wines, "As Ruble Falls, Moscow Unravels Faster and Faster," *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1998; "With Resignation, Russians Work Ever Harder for Even Less," *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1998; Celestine Bohlen, "Russians Expect Bad Times to Get Even Worse," *New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vladivostok Project were both launched in that spirit.[15] But high prices for energy, transport, and labor rendered Siberian products uncompetitive, and it gradually became apparent that "the reorientation strategy of the regional economy to foreign markets [would] be possible only with real state support . . . in the form of the establishment of more flexible and liberal economic regimes in the Russian Far East in the fields of taxation, customs regulations, and economic legislation."[16]

Other, more mundane, obstacles have proven equally troublesome. Since the RFE lacks a developed financial infrastructure, the availability of foreign exchange and international financial instruments such as letters of credit have been inadequate. Relatively efficient customs, certification, and licensing processes do not exist. The region's physical infrastructure is primitive, with vehicles, warehouses, and even roads in limited supply. Finally, the dearth of reliable information and statistics has made intelligent investment in the region extremely difficult. As a consequence, many Western merchants have simply chosen to remain offshore. Ironically, the RFE's largest commercial partner has now turned out to be its long-standing military adversary: China.[17]

With its ties to European Russia weakened, the RFE needed China's food and consumer products more than at any time in the past half century. Chinese traders capitalized on that demand, and their names soon filled the register of foreign companies operating in the region (see Table 2). Although smaller in capitalization than many of their Western counterparts, Chinese joint ventures have been arguably more active, and overtook the Japanese as the RFE's leading economic partner in 1992. Provincial authorities set up "border economic cooperation zones" around Heihe, Suifenhe, and Hunchun, whose commerce (not least of which involved brisk vodka trade) captured nearly half of Khabarovsk Krai's foreign trade and surpassed official metropolitan trade between Beijing and Moscow. Indeed, "in a twist to history that would have brought a sardonic smile to the face of [imperial Russia's finance minister] Sergei Witte, Beijing made a bid to build a railroad across Russian territory to the port of Zarubino, restoring 'Manchuria's' access to the Sea of Japan."[18]

By 1993, some two thousand merchants were crossing the borders each day and an estimated ten thousand Chinese workers were legally employed in the RFE, reviving the Russians' age-old fear that their very hold on the territory might soon be jeopardized. In point of fact, the RFE was much more conspicuously

[15] Vladimir Kvint, "Go East, Young Man," *Forbes*, Nov. 26, 1990, p. 234; Colin Campbell, "Quick! To Siberia! There are Fortunes to be made," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, Mar. 7, 1992.

[16] Tsuneo Akaha, Pavel A. Minakir, and Kunio Okada, "Economic challenge in the Russian Far East," in *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East*, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 67–68.

[17] Burnham O. Campbell, "Prospects for Trade and Regional Cooperation," in *The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Cooperation*, ed. Mark J. Valencia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 9–47.

[18] John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 299. See also, James Clay Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement," *Asian Survey*, June 1995, pp. 511–27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2
Number of Enterprises With Foreign Capital Participation, 1988-1994

	China	Japan	South Korea	United States	Other
Amur Oblast	95	3	3	4	11
Jewish Autonomous Area	60	1	1	2	12
Kamchatka Oblast	5	16	7	13	39
Khabarovsk Krai	209	65	45	77	108
Magadan Oblast	25	7	3	10	31
Primorsky Krai	460	90	50	110	254
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	9	3	3	10	71
Sakhalin Oblast	25	95	65	48	98

Source: Roshia Kyokuto Data Book [Russian Far East Data Book] (Tokyo: Roshia To'o Boekikai Roshia To'o Keizai Kenkyujo, 1996), p. 11.

Asian in the 1930s, with about 180,000 Koreans and 30,000 Chinese living and working there. Regarded as a threat by Stalin, most were expelled in 1937.[19]

Until the 1980s, the RFE primarily relied on Russian and sometimes North Korean labor. But the region never had a permanent population. Many Russians who came to the region were lured there by lucrative work. When that work vanished after the Cold War, an exodus of skilled labor occurred and foreign workers were needed to fill the void. Near Khabarovsk, as many as 25,000 North Koreans worked in timber camps and churned out forest products at 25 percent lower cost than their Russian counterparts.

In the summer of 1992, China and Russia signed an agreement outlining the parameters for employing Chinese citizens on Russian soil. According to the Law of the Russian Federation on Employment, local authorities were granted authority to fix the number of foreign workers in their territories and to issue licenses to domestic enterprises to import foreign workers, at a cost of 30,000 rubles per worker. Despite their slightly higher wages, Russian employers prized Chinese laborers, because they were disciplined and did not strike. When Chinese "travel" companies were organized to funnel hopeful Chinese to Russia on tourist visas, many Chinese workers illegally crossed the border and stayed. Russian claims of crime and smuggling among the migrants were common. Soon, Siberian and Far Eastern authorities were estimating that a million Chinese had settled on the Russian side of the border, and while that number is certainly inflated, it reveals the depth of Russian anxiety over Chinese migration.[20]

Authorities enacted new visa requirements in February 1994 to better regulate the flow of Chinese laborers. Project-based work was still essential, but regional officials discouraged Chinese settlement. Unfortunately for Russia, "many of these illegal Chinese were engaged in mutually profitable trade with

[19] Won Bae Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations and Chinese Workers in the Russian Far East," *Asian Survey*, Dec. 1994, pp. 1064–76; Mark M. Nelson, "Russian Hinterland Feels The Lure Of Asia; Moscow's Western Focus Retards East's Development," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 21, 1994.

[20] Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations"; Sophie Quinn-Judge and Shim Jae Hoon, "Opiate of the party," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 5, 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian citizens and enterprises. The result, in tandem with a slight reduction in access to illegal Chinese immigrants, was a dramatic reduction in bilateral trade, which plummeted to $5.1 billion in 1994" from about $6 billion the year before. Those trade levels fell "despite the influence of higher trade volume between enterprises located in interior regions and in state-to-state trade (such as arms sales)." Oddly, many Russians "do not seem disturbed by these trends, and would seem to prefer it if the many thousands of Chinese now living and working in the region would simply return home." Local media and politicians tacitly encourage these attitudes.[21] However, the forceful tone taken by RFE authorities contrasted with the conciliatory one taken by Moscow toward China, highlighting "a growing gap between the positive perception of bilateral relations in Moscow and the increasingly negative view of the local Russian Far Eastern population, which could ultimately undermine the rapprochement."[22] By the time Russia's first deputy prime minister, Boris Nemtsov, inaugurated the Zabaykal'sk frontier post across from the Chinese town of Manzhouli in March 1998, China had become not only the RFE's largest trading partner, but also its third largest investor. However, China's trade has been dominated by consumer goods, disappointing Russian officials who would prefer to see foreign investment in natural resource extraction, processing industries, and basic infrastructure development.[23]

During the early 1990s, the Tumen River delta was often mentioned as a logical location for a free economic zone. Wedged near the intersection of the Chinese, Russian, and North Korean borders, the delta was to benefit from the confluence of mutual economic interests. By 1998, after $900 million had already been invested in the project, project leaders believed that another $2–3 billion would be needed to make the project work. Even worse, there were greater problems that extended beyond money. North Korea's political isolation and economic instability were two. Pyongyang's launch of a missile over northern Japan in late August did not help. Still another problem stemmed from the fact that Chinese exporters favored the North Korean ports of Rajin and Sonbong over the Russian ports of Pos'yet and Zarubino because of their mistrust of Russian officials. Meanwhile, Primorsky Krai's foreign trade officials favored developing the free economic zone centered around Nakhodka and using Vostochny as its principal port. After all, Vostochny is the Far Eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and arguably the best managed port on the Russian Pacific. Nonetheless, the cargo traversing its docks fell from 225,000 tons per year in the late 1980s to about 60,000 tons in 1998.[24]

Some RFE advocates have urged international companies to invest quickly, citing the region's "cheap and highly educated workforce, inexpensive

[21] James Clay Moltz, "Russo-Chinese normalization," in *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East*, pp. 190–91.

[22] S. Enders Wimbush, "When China Absorbs The Russian Far East," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 25, 1996; James Clay Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement."

[23] "Russia and China open border post to increase trade," AFP, Mar. 1, 1998.

[24] "Come back in 5 years," *Economist*, June 27, 1998, pp. 42–43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

land, and abundant natural resources." But when business people encounter difficulties, these advocates oftentimes fault the foreign investors for their unpreparedness. Evidently, finding the right partner to lead one through the Russian labyrinth of bureaucratic, capitalization, and legal problems is essential.[25] What is more, the central government's hunger for revenues caused a proliferation of regulatory agencies. While many international companies are used to paying high taxes, most are uncomfortable with capricious taxes that change without notice. Scores of companies have found themselves in violation of vague regulations and compelled to pay enormous fines for violating regulations they never knew existed. Without some assurance of stability, responsible executives simply cannot invest their money in the RFE.[26]

One company missed a tax payment and was promptly fined $1 million.

As Kevin Block, general director of the Pacific Law Center in Vladivostok, summarized in 1995, "Russia doesn't have rule of law, but there are a multitude of laws and there are consequences for breaking them." And, of course, the federal or regional government "never [tells] you about a rule until it happens!" Administrative rules are often contradictory and changing, and enforcement arbitrary, inconsistent, and subject to influence. Block concluded that the main deterrents to investment have been "(1) absence of a banking system ('You can't expect businessmen to walk around with suitcases of money'); (2) lack of property rights; (3) lack of legal mechanisms for dispute resolution ('People are shot and people are blown up'); (4) crime and corruption."[27]

The experience of one telecommunications company was telling. The enterprise shouldered a tax burden of 62 percent of its gross profit, levied through eighteen different taxes. Despite hiring specialized accountants devoted to compliance, the company missed a payment and was promptly fined $1 million. Not surprisingly, foreign investment has been minimal. The Khabarovsk provincial government revealed that while "550 enterprises with foreign investment have set up in the krai since 1989," they totaled an investment of "just $177 million, including the local partners' shares." Such a paltry sum belied the provinces' incentive exempting these joint ventures from provincial profit taxes for two to three years.[28]

In an environment where legal recourse is restricted, trust between commercial partners is crucial. Unfortunately, American business executives often comment that Russians appear inherently suspicious of American intent.

[25] "The Russian Investment Dilemma," *Harvard Business Review*, May–June 1994; Vladimir Kvint, "Don't Give up On Russia," *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1994; Mark M. Nelson, "Russian Far East, Despite Its Obstacles, Appeals To Some International Firms," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 25, 1994.

[26] John J. Stephan, "The Political and Economic Landscape of the Russian Far East," in *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors*, pp. 294–95.

[27] Judith Thornton and Nadezhda N. Mikheeva, "The Strategies of Foreign and Foreign-Assisted Firms in the Russian Far East: Alternatives to Missing Infrastructure," *Comparative Economic Studies*, Winter 1996, pp. 94–98.

[28] Ibid., pp. 96–97; Alasdair Forbes, "Taiga Economy," *Asian Business*, Sept. 1996, pp. 54–58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That generates suspicions by the Americans, who feel that Russians only want their money and do not want to relinquish any control. Russians, on the other hand, "have had their trust broken so frequently in the past that they are wary of trusting anyone," explained a Russian CEO. "So they trust no one and blame everyone else for their problems."[29]

Nevertheless, Japanese businessmen from Niigata did invest. Conveniently located on the northern Japanese coast, Niigata was designated as the base for *engan boeki*, or border trade, in 1963. That special designation allowed local merchants to bypass Soviet authorities in Moscow and deal directly with Siberian trading concerns. By the early 1990s, Niigata was among the few places from which one could directly travel from a developed country into the RFE by air, with three flights each week from Niigata to Khabarovsk and two to Vladivostok. Thus, it made some sense for Niigata entrepreneurs to develop an airport terminal at Vladivostok in anticipation of increased traffic. In 1995, construction began. But once the building's shell was completed, the Japanese investors were told that all their money had been spent. More money was needed, but the Japanese had no more.[30]

A more successful Japanese venture dealt with used cars. In 1992, 9,400 cars were shipped and 4,000 in the first three months of 1993. Seamen often claimed used cars bought in Japan as "souvenirs" on their return home. Accommodating Russian customs officers permitted such "souvenirs" to pass duty-free. Similarly, Japanese customs declared the used cars as "personal export items" that did not require detailed export documentation. Thus, cars no longer suitable for Japan can be found cruising the roads of the RFE.[31]

Among the biggest investors in Vladivostok have been South Koreans. Hyundai led the way by opening a $100 million hotel and business center. Other companies wanted to develop the port of Nakhodka and possibly a Sea of Japan free economic zone. Unfortunately, these grand designs ran aground when the Asian financial crisis hammered the South Korean economy in late 1997.[32]

The financial crisis aside, Russian pride, occasionally laced with racism, cast a shadow over foreign investment, as when Russians raised "environmental issues" to camouflage their disdain for Japanese investors, Korean loggers, or Chinese and Vietnamese laborers. As one Russian official put it, "We would rather let the land go to waste than allow foreigners in." Politically and culturally, the economies of Northeast Asia have little in common with each other and foreign investment has remained insignificant, despite Moscow's hopes that it "would compensate for the decrease in national production and contribute to the modernization of production."[33]

[29] Thornton and Mikheeva, "Strategies," p. 103.

[30] Charles Smith, "Sent to Siberia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 21, 1993.

[31] Charles Smith, "Wheels of Commerce," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 21, 1993.

[32] "Rotten to the core," *Economist*, Oct. 18, 1997.

[33] Steve Barth, "Four Weddings and a Funeral," *World Trade*, Oct. 1997, pp. 58–62; Akaha, Minakir, and Okada, "Economic challenge," pp. 57–59; Milan Hauner, "Does the Soviet Far East Have a Future?" *Report on the USSR*, Mar. 3, 1989, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oil and Natural Gas

Energy resources are now more important to the RFE than ever before. The decline in federal government subsidies has left the region heavily reliant on oil and natural gas to generate hard currency. According to the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the full recoverable potential of the RFE's oil resources is roughly half that of the United States, and its gas reserves exceed those of the United States and China combined.[34] (See Table 3.)

However, finding investment capital has not been easy. During the Soviet period, oil and natural gas fields on the west Siberian plain consistently received priority. Perversely, therefore, the RFE in Soviet times actually imported up to 90 percent of its oil and coal from other parts of the country. (See Table 4.) With the collapse of communism the RFE has had the chance to develop and sell its energy to its Asian neighbors. Following Yeltsin's April 1996 visit to China, a surge of research was commissioned to study the feasibility of building a pipeline to pump natural gas from Irkutsk to the Chinese coast, whence the gas could be shipped to other parts of China, as well as Japan and South Korea. In June 1997, Russia signed an agreement with China to investigate the feasibility of exporting up to 25.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually. South Korea's East Asia Gas Company and Russia's Sidanco formed the joint venture Russia Petroleum to investigate other routes for Irkutsk gas, while Japan and Russia announced plans to examine the export of natural gas to Japan. Most studies envisioned production of 20–30 bcm each year and a project cost of $8–20 billion. To encourage such investment, Russian authorities held a conference with mainly Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean oil companies in late 1997. The most favored project was a 2,160-mile pipeline from the Kovyktinskoye natural gas fields 250 miles north of Irkutsk through Ulaanbaatar in Mongolia to Lianyungang in China's Shandong Province. Other plans envisioned extending the pipeline underwater another 770 miles to Mokp'o in South Korea and Kitakyushu in Japan. On November 10, 1997, Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed a framework agreement to lay a natural gas pipeline from Irkutsk to the Shandong Peninsula with extensions going to South Korea and Japan.[35]

A second area often mentioned for natural gas development has been Yakutsk. While 1,100 miles northeast of Irkutsk, Yakutsk's fields are larger and better known. At least three potential pipeline routes have been mapped out, but all must surmount the forbidding Dzhugdzhur Mountain Range as well as the political risk of routing pipelines through North Korea. And given that a

[34] *Eastern Energy Bloc*, [n.p.] Aug. 1991, p. 2; Craig ZumBrunnen, "Resources," in *The Soviet Far East: Geographical perspectives on development*, ed. Allan Rodgers (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 88.

[35] Ahmed Rashid and Trish Saywell, "Beijing Gusher," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 26, 1998; "Russia proposes talks on Siberian natural gas project: report," AFP, Oct. 19, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 3
Russian Far East Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, 1995[1]

Region	Oil (millions of metric tons)				Natural gas (trillions of cubic meters)			
	Discovered reserves[2]	Undiscovered reserves[3]	Large fields[4]	Small fields[5]	Discovered reserves[2]	Undiscovered reserves[3]	Large fields[6]	Small fields[7]
Amur Oblast	-	3	-	-	-	0.06	-	-
Irkutsk Oblast	262	1,721	4	2	0.57	6.40	8	1
Kamchatka Oblast	-	16	-	-	0.02	0.83	1	3
Khabarovsk Krai	-	31	-	-	-	0.18	-	1
Krasnoyarsk Krai	502	6,352	7	3	1.28	23.66	14	3
Magadan Oblast	10	97	-	3	0.01	0.37	-	2
Primorsky Krai	-	1	-	-	-	0.01	-	-
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	263	2,645	4	7	1.35	9.08	15	9
Sakhalin Oblast	433	5,279	4	31	0.87	11.46	6	34

Notes:
[1] Reserve numbers show reserves considered recoverable based on market prices from 1992 to 1995.
[2] Reserves classified according to Russian standards A, B, C1, and C2.
[3] Reserves classified according to Russian standards C3, D1, and D2.
[4] Fields containing above 10 mt.
[5] Fields containing below 10 mt.
[6] Fields containing above 10 bcm.
[7] Fields containing below 10 bcm.

Sources: V. P. Larionov, "Deposits of Natural Gas in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Current Situation and Prospects of Their Usage in the Context of the Republic's Energy Policy," paper presented at an International Conference on the Northeast Asia Natural Gas Pipeline, convened by the National Pipeline Research Society of Japan, Mar. 3, 1995, Tokyo; Keun Wook Paik, *Gas and Oil in Northeast Asia: Policies, Projects, and Prospects* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 81-92; Allen S. Whiting, "Yakutiya Gas," in *The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Cooperation*, ed. Mark J. Valencia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 111-24; *Oil and Gas in the Russian Far East*, prepared by FACTS (Honolulu), Feb. 1994, pp. 40-41, 48, 93; "Interm, Summary Report on Study of Energy Resources in East Siberia and Russia's Far East," prepared by Northern Regions Centre (Tokyo), Feb. 1993; and author's estimates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 4
Russian Energy Production
(in millions of tons)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Oil	516	462	399	354	316	307	301
Natural gas	641	643	641	618	607	595	601
Coal	395	353	337	306	271	262	255
Electricity (in billions of kwh)	1,082	1,068	1,008	957	876	862	847

Source: *Country Profile: Russia, 1995-96* (London: EIU, 1995); *Country Profile: Russia, 1996-97* (London: EIU, 1996); *Country Profile: Russia, 1997-98* (London: EIU, 1997); *Country Profile: Russia, 1998-99* (London: EIU, 1998).

pipeline to pump 20 bcm per year would cost at least $10 billion, interregional squabbles over the spoils are expected.[36]

Almost a century ago, exploration and development of Sakhalin Island's onshore oil began. But its long history of low-technology exploration has left some 40 percent of its reserves untapped. "Geological conditions are worsening and oil deposits are becoming smaller and smaller. Due to the economic crisis and critical capital equipment shortages, those oil wells in need of repair [have been] just allowed to stop production."[37] Hence, post-Soviet hopes have focused on three offshore projects, Sakhalin 1, 2, and 3, each consisting of a number of separate exploration blocks. Sakhalin 1 had its genesis in 1965 as part of a pipeline plan to funnel natural gas to Japan. Development began in 1975, but gained greater visibility when Exxon acceded in 1993 and signed a production-sharing contract in 1995. Meanwhile, Sakhalin 2 arose from a partnership between a small independent U.S. oil company and the Soviet Ministry of Oil and Gas. By 1992, it had evolved to include Mitsui, Marathon, Mitsubishi, and Royal Dutch Shell. After Sakhalin 3's bidding round, Mobil and Texaco entered the offshore development area, though negotiations on production-sharing contracts have stalled since then.[38]

Getting any of these ambitious projects off the ground has been difficult, and the reasons lie in Russia's attitude toward foreign energy investment, its unstable economy, and the international energy market.

[36] "Missiles Away," *Economist*, Sept. 5, 1998; Sheryl WuDunn, "North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory," *New York Times*, Sept. 1, 1998; Serguei Koudasov, "Natural gas from Russia imperative for future of Korean economy," *Business Korea*, Apr. 1996, p. 53; Allen S. Whiting, "Yakutiya Gas," in *The Russian Far East in Transition*, pp. 111–24; Keun Wook Paik, *Gas and Oil in Northeast Asia: Policies, Projects, and Prospects* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 221–31; Victor L. Mote, "The South Yakutian Territorial Production Complex," in *The Soviet Far East: Geographical perspectives on development*, pp. 163–84.

[37] Murakami, "Energy production," p. 110.

[38] "Where there's a well . . ." *Economist*, Nov. 15, 1997; Michael R. Gordon, "The Gusher That Wasn't In Russia," *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1997; "Exxon Updates Appraisal Work Off Sakhalin," *Oil and Gas Journal*, Dec. 2, 1996, p. 40; Paul Klebnikov, "The Seven Sisters Have a Baby Brother," *Forbes*, Jan. 22, 1996, pp. 70–75; Keun Wook Paik, *Gas and Oil in Northeast Asia*, pp. 207–20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Many Russian officials appear to believe that they should exercise inordinate influence over the terms of any agreement to develop energy resources. They discount the exploration and production risks that are associated with international oil and natural gas development, and demand terms that are intolerable even for international companies accustomed to paying high taxes, royalties, and concessions to state-owned oil companies. As one manager summed up, "They see it as 50-50: We put up the oil, you put up the money. Well, that's not really 50-50. We're taking all the risk."[39]

In December 1995 Yeltsin signed legislation that ended provisions favoring international oil companies. "The new law was an expression of resource nationalism in the country. Earlier drafts of the legislation exempted foreign investors from customs duties but this privilege was eliminated against the background of heavy tax burdens on domestic producers. The final legislation also eliminated protection against unilateral changes in response to the international market condition." The new law also made contracts deemed strategically important subject to Duma approval, thus making foreign ventures vulnerable to the vagaries of Russian politics, not to mention Russian tax collectors, regulators, and courts, if any dispute should occur. Nonetheless, Alexander Natalenko, the deputy natural resource minister, reproached foreign oil companies for their insistence that all investments take the form of production-sharing contracts, which seek to fix profits, taxes, and responsibilities. But companies would happily accommodate the delays and difficulties such contracts entail if that could ensure that the terms would not be arbitrarily changed.[40]

The aggressive financiers and industrialists that populate Russia's current economy have not helped the situation. Their machinations have occasionally doomed good projects. For instance, Amoco won the right in 1993 to explore and develop the huge North Priobskoye field with an estimated 4.2 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Amoco was to pay a hefty signature bonus as well as billions of dollars in royalties, profit taxes, and pipeline tariffs throughout the project's life. Financing and production costs were to be evenly split between Amoco and Yukos, a private Russian oil company, and the final cost, including operating expenses, was estimated at some $86 billion. Then an obstacle emerged. "Yukos was acquired by Menatep bank, which, like other powerful Russian financial institutions, [was] trying to build an empire. Snapping up newly privatized assets and speculating on government securities [took] money. And that . . . made Menatep reluctant to sink its capital into the development of the North Priobskoye oilfield." When Menatep accordingly tried to get Amoco to absorb the entire investment cost, the project stumbled badly, and Amoco promptly "slashed its non-Russian staff in Moscow from twelve executives at the start of 1997 to seven."[41]

[39] Robison, "The Russian Far East," p. 32.

[40] Ibid.; James P. Dorian, "The present situation and future problems of energy production in the Russian Far East," in *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East*, p. 114.

[41] Michael R. Gordon, "From Gusher to Trickle: Oil Boom in Russia Fails to Materialize," *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Possibly the greatest problem facing RFE oil and gas development in the late 1990s has been the price of energy. Oil has been too plentiful, and the Asian financial crisis has slowed the economies of many countries, reducing their demand for energy. Since oil companies plan their production schedules well in advance, oil has continued to flow on to the market even as Russia has actively sold its oil to raise hard currency. So market prices for oil drastically dropped from eighteen dollars a barrel in 1997 to eleven dollars a year later.

Accounting for over 40 percent of its export revenue in 1997, oil has been Russia's most important commodity. Hovering around ten-year lows, the price of oil has had a significant impact on the country's economy. Moscow admitted that the value of its oil exports in the first half of 1998 decreased about 46 percent from 1997. Nationally, the oil price drop was anticipated to lower Russia's gross domestic product growth from an expected 3.7 percent to between 1.2 and 2.5 percent, according to Chubais in March 1998, and even that is optimistic. A return to recession is more likely. The lower prices have made international oil companies less willing to explore for more oil, especially in areas where risks are high. For the RFE, whose energy infrastructure has become increasingly creaky without continued investment, that did not bode well.[42]

Coal

Since the early 1990s, coal miners in the RFE have gained more attention by striking than by working, since they have played an important role in shaping national events, including power struggles at the center. In 1991 strikes by Siberian miners were instrumental in the Russian Congress's decision to grant emergency powers to Yeltsin and approve the June 1991 election of a Russian president. Vehement miners had also helped to persuade Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to reverse his 1990 "shift to the right," and "during the failed putsch of August 1991 . . . miners once again came to the aid of Yeltsin and the pro-democracy Russian leadership."[43] While many of them have since changed their opinion of Yeltsin and his stewardship of Russia, the collective voice of miners from the RFE is as resolute as ever.

However, even the hardiest coal miner could not deflect the economic forces sweeping Russia. Economic reforms exacted an enormous toll on the country's inefficient industries, and even during the 1980s, Soviet planners reluctantly recognized that Russian coal production was simply not competitive

[42] Michael Wines, "Despite Loan Plan, Russian Stocks and Bonds Fall Again," *New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1998; Deborah Pasmentier, "Gazprom gas monopoly: a state within the Russian state," AFP, July 2, 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Russian Economy Threatened by Drop in Oil Prices," *New York Times*, Mar. 20, 1998; Michael Specter, "Siberia: A Promised Land of Frozen Milk and Honey," *New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1998; *Country Profile: Russia, 1998–99* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit [hereafter EIU], 1998), p. 28.

[43] John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 107.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with European coal. By the late 1980s, only 15 percent of the RFE's subsidized coal mines were technologically comparable with their Western counterparts.

When Russia first welcomed foreign investment into once-restricted industries, some international companies believed that they could revive the country's flagging coal industry. After all, coal can be found in great abundance throughout the RFE and much of it is mined near large markets such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Some estimates peg the region's coal reserves at twice those of the entire United States. As a result, Japanese investors quickly signed an agreement to prospect for coal in Yakutia in the early 1990s. But these investment plans, battered by the prevailing conditions of the RFE, have amounted to little, and the region remains a net importer of coal from European Russia and Western Siberia. The nationwide inter-enterprise debt crisis, high tariffs on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and a lack of manpower have all contributed to the failure of teetering mines. After an initial coal-restructuring loan from the World Bank, a second was needed only a few years later in 1997. The conditions on the two loans were clear. The money was to be used to close down unprofitable mines and reorganize those that remained.

Simultaneously, the living conditions of miners and their families rapidly deteriorated. Typically residing in single-industry towns, miners frequently had no paychecks, no electricity, and no food. In some areas, money became so scarce that it was abandoned as a medium of exchange. As the miners' early enthusiasm for market reforms faded, they became increasingly agitated at Moscow's apparent unresponsiveness to their plight. Even when money was available for distribution, there was rarely enough since miners' unions, regional governments, and corrupt officials siphoned off their shares before it reached the general population. As a result, miners went on strike to demand unpaid wages from the central government, even though Moscow had divested itself of most mining companies through privatization. Miners staged public demonstrations and, when that failed to produce the desired result, held extended hunger strikes—a humbling experience for miners who were once adorned with special privileges and lauded as the backbone of the Soviet Far East.[44]

Among the most recent strikes occurred in May 1998 with the miners claiming that the government owed them some 3.7 billion rubles ($569 million) in back pay. On the other hand, Moscow maintained that it had already distributed 1.6 billion rubles through May and dedicated a total of 5.7 billion rubles to the coal industry for the entire year, but reiterated that it would close scores of unproductive mines in the Kuznetsk and Vorkuta basins. This time, miners took additional measures to ensure Moscow's attention: they blocked railroad tracks. In the RFE, railroads are frequently the only means of transportation across the expanses of barren terrain between cities. Movement of food and other supplies, not to mention national defense, is dependent upon rail lines. Thousands of unpaid civil servants, doctors, and teachers joined the miners

[44] James Brooke, "Russia Far East Weighs New Era's Pros and Cons," *New York Times*, June 14, 1996; Junichi Namiki, "East Siberia and Russian Far East Energy Projects: A Policy Option for Japan and Asia in a Transnational Period," Program on U.S.–Japan Relations, Harvard University, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the railroad tracks, especially in the Kuznetsk Basin and in the far north near the Arctic Circle.

Near Anzhero-Sudzhensk, a large rail junction just northwest of the Kuznetsk Basin, miners blocked up to fifty freight trains. A few days later, several hundred more miners occupied a railroad section in the Kemerovo coal region of Western Siberia, stopping thirty-two more trains in the first hour. To the east, miners in Buryatia blocked a line adjacent to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Sympathetic miners as far away as the southern Rostov region struck and closed the North Caucasus Railroad.[45]

Moscow grew so concerned about the impact of the rail paralysis on the Russian economy and on national defense that First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Sysuyev was dispatched to meet with the striking miners. The deal that was eventually forged included "special anti-crisis measures," involving financial relief and employment help for displaced miners and helping them find new work. But the heart of the deal required the central government to immediately pay back most of the miners' unpaid wages by July 1 and to punish those who had embezzled or mismanaged wage and pension funds. When the strike ended, the Railroad Ministry reported that it had lost about 420 million rubles ($64.6 million). Even then, some miners remained unconvinced of the government's sincerity and remained on the tracks near Inta.[46]

As the deal's final points were hammered out, Russia's potentially powerful Security Council sternly warned miners that they would face criminal charges if they continued to block rail lines. The threat was not to be taken lightly, since in times of national crisis the Security Council can wield extraordinary powers, and Yeltsin himself warned the miners that they would be held responsible for their actions.

Meanwhile, local RFE politicians, concerned about their own popularity and survival, were quick to placate both sides. Kemerovo Oblast's governor, Aman Tuleyev, walked a fine line with his public statements. He loudly opposed the railroad blockades, which hurt other industries in his territory and held up 167 railcars containing hazardous materials. He cautioned that the situation was "so tense that no pleas to the striking miners from the local authorities help." But in a sop to the miners, Tuleyev firmly supported their demands for unpaid wages and went so far as to suggest that Moscow should at least double the promised 5.7 billion-ruble allocation for the year.[47]

[45] "Russia: Strikes Cost Railroad Ministry 420 Million Rubles," FBIS-SOV-98-146, May 26, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Miners in Russia's Buryat Republic Strike for Wage Payments," FBIS-SOV-98-142, May 22, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Siberian Miners Disrupt Railroad," FBIS-SOV-98-141, May 21, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Buryat Republic Coal Miners Join Strike in Russia," FBIS-SOV-98-140, May 20, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russian coal miners block railways," UPI, May 15, 1998.

[46] "Russia: Sysuyev Announces Steps to Help Kuznetsk Coal Field," FBIS-SOV-98-142, May 22, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Russian Deputy Premier Tries To Resolve Crisis in Mining," FBIS-SOV-98-142, May 22, 1998, Moscow Interfax.

[47] "Russia: Kemerovo Governor 'Totally Unsatisfied' With Crisis Package," FBIS-SOV-98-142, May 22, 1998, Moscow Interfax; Jon Boyle, "State of emergency in Siberia a fresh challenge to Kiriyenko," AFP, May 20, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nevertheless, many miners had still not been paid by the beginning of July. They contended that only a seventh of the promised 1.6 billion rubles ($246 million) had actually been disbursed, and went back on strike despite official threats. Trains bound for the west Siberian bottleneck of Anzhero-Sudzhensk were forced to make detours as wide as 625 miles. By July 5, eighteen trains were stranded on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. A day later, that number doubled. Concerned about their own enterprises and industries, local officials and trade union leaders from Tomsk, Barnaul, and Novosibirsk grew increasingly anxious to end a blockade that was costing businesses in those cities about 12 million rubles ($1.8 million) each day. So Moscow sent Sysuyev back to bargain with the miners. "Sysuyev told a meeting of mining union representatives and industry leaders that the government had cleared its debt to striking miners, transferring in the last two months 730 million rubles [$112.3 million] to the region for the mining industry." Sysuyev blamed regional leaders for the delays in payment, since funds issued by the federal government pass through regional authorities for general distribution.[48]

Buoyed by the success of the miners in the western portion of the RFE, miners in the eastern section struck in late July to protest their own unpaid wages. Nearly a month earlier, the governor of Primorsky Krai, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, had hoped to forestall any further unrest by rescinding a resolution passed by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy to shut down the unprofitable Nagornaya and Tsentralynaya mines in the town of Partizansk. Unfortunately, miners from Partizansk, just a few miles north of the major ports of Nakhodka and Vostochny, did strike and blocked the tracks leading to these ports from the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Local residents joined them. Only after intense pressure from the Interior Department, Federal Security Service, and the chief prosecutor of Primorsky Krai were most miners persuaded to leave their pickets by August 4.[49]

Meanwhile, on Sakhalin Island, another group of miners struck on July 26. To emphasize their point, fifty miners used their cars to block rail access to a local power plant that supplies electricity to most of the island. Soon thereafter, 350 more miners joined them on the tracks. As a result, forty railcars

[48] "Russia: Russian Miners Plan To Resume Rail Blockade," FBIS-SOV-98-170, June 19, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Kemerovo Governor Says Miners May Repeat Protests," FBIS-SOV-98-159, June 8, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russian miners continue rail blockade," UPI, July 6, 1998; "Miners' Trans-Siberian railway blockade has cost two million dollars," AFP, July 10, 1998; "Unpaid Russian miners cut trans-Siberian rail routes," AFP, May 19, 1998; Vladimir Isachenkov, "Yeltsin Moves To Pacify Miners," AP, May 26, 1998; "Miners block 18 Trans-Siberian goods trains over wage arrears," AFP, July 5, 1998; "Siberian miners end blockade of Trans-Siberian railroad," AFP, July 19, 1998; "Russia: Sysuyev Addresses Kuzbass Miners," FBIS-SOV-98-200, July 19, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Sysuyev Refuses To Meet With Miners Until Blockade Ended," FBIS-SOV-98-188, July 7, 1998, Moscow Interfax.

[49] "Russia: Partizansk Miners Lift Railway Blockade in Russian Far East," FBIS-SOV-98-220, Aug. 8, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Maritime Territory Miners To Blockade Railway to Nakhodka," FBIS-SOV-98-219, Aug. 7, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; Russia: Miners in Russia's Far East End Hunger Strike, FBIS-SOV-98-219, Aug. 7, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; Russia: Governor Rescinds Resolution To Close Mines in Primorye, FBIS-SOV-98-167, June 16, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

filled with 4,000 tons of "coal were stranded on the tracks leading to the plant." To continue operations, the power plant's management struggled to stretch out the four-day reserve of coal it had inside the plant. Needing some 2,000 tons of coal daily to function normally, the Sakhalinenergo plant was forced to reduce the amount of power it could produce. Thus, Sakhalin's power shortage soared to seventy-five megawatts, or a full third of the island's summer needs. As the blockade continued, electricity to all but the island's hospitals and water-pumping stations was suspended.[50]

For a second time, Moscow threatened to remove the miners by force. "There are laws and they will be applied," proclaimed Kiriyenko, emphasizing that the railroads were critical to the national economy. The timing of Kiriyenko's threat suggests that it was aimed at the striking miners on Sakhalin. But when Sakhalin Oblast's governor, Igor Farkhutdinov, sent seventy policemen to clear the tracks, hundreds of local residents rallied to support the miners. Outnumbered, the police were told to withdraw. Even after the miners relented on August 4, the residents who had joined them remained on the tracks for another day.[51]

Of course, these have not been the only demonstrations by Russian miners. Nor have these activities been limited to the RFE. Nor are the politically minded miners liable to limit their demands to "Pay us our wages!" By the summer of 1998 they were calling for Yeltsin's resignation or impeachment due to his inability to cope with the country's economic problems. Goaded by Russia's Communist Party, they appealed to the Duma to begin the process.[52]

Electricity

As coal production intermittently ceased due to strikes and blockades, Russian power companies struggled. The price of fuel for power plants has gradually increased in many areas of the RFE due to the vagaries of the region's rail operations, but even higher prices did not ensure delivery. As a result of

[50] "Russia: Sakhalin Governor Rules out Using Force on Rail Pickets," FBIS-SOV-98-217, Aug. 5, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Striking Coal Miners May Grind Sakhalin's Economy to a Halt," FBIS-SOV-98-209, July 28, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Sakhalin Coal Miners Block Power Plant Fuel Supply," FBIS-SOV-98-208, July 27, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Miners block power plant in protest of wage delays," AFP, July 26, 1998.

[51] "Russia: Sakhalin Miners' Strike Committee Lift Picket Lines," FBIS-SOV-98-220, Aug. 8, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Police Decide To Take Measures Against Sakhalin Miners," FBIS-SOV-98-218, Aug. 6, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Ministry Warns of Criminal Cases Against Sakhalin Strikers," FBIS-SOV-98-217, Aug. 5, 1998, Moscow Interfax; Michael Wines, "Russia Starts to Feel Pain as Miners Block Rails," *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1998; "Russian Premier vows to lift miners' railway blockade," AFP, July 31, 1998; "Russian premier warns striking miners," UPI, July 31, 1998.

[52] Michael Wines, "Russia Starts to Feel Pain as Miners Block Rails," *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1998; "Russian miners take director hostage over pay claim," AFP, July 30, 1998; "Russia: Mining Regions Demand Yeltsin Resignation, Support Lebed," FBIS-SOV-98-191, July 10, 1998, Moscow Interfax; "Russia: Protesting Coal Miners Urge Duma To Impeach Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-98-170, June 19, 1998; Moscow Interfax; "Duma Debate on Coal Industry Crisis Reported," FBIS-SOV-98-142, May 22, 1998, Moscow Sovetskaya Rossiya; "Russia: Protest Actions 'Snowballing'; Kemerovo Promised Help," FBIS-SOV-98-140, May 20, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Widespread Support for Miners' Demands Noted," FBIS-SOV-98-140, May 20, 1998, Moscow Pravda.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the power industry's own unrestrained ordering, the amount of debt owed by some electric companies to coal enterprises rose dramatically during the early 1990s. Compounding the problem, federal and regional governments sharply slashed their funding for state-run agencies. Since these entities still represented a large segment of the RFE's economy, many agencies were simply unable to pay for the electricity they used. Chief among them is the Far Eastern Military District. Electric companies have thus been squeezed from both ends.

Primorsky Krai. The rapid privatization of the fuel and power industries in Primorsky Krai, together with the absence of market-based discipline, has led to some undesirable effects. Dalenergo, the regional electric monopoly, has plagued the region with periodic power outages since 1993. Even without the concurrent financial crisis, the mismanaged electric company "cannot collect its accounts, service its debts or pay for its fuel [and] lack of electricity alone has been enough to make ordinary life difficult in Vladivostok, and economic growth impossible."[53]

When the financial crisis deepened in the RFE during the autumn of 1997, workers in the power industry went unpaid. About 500 workers held a hunger strike at a power plant in Primorsky Krai to protest. After Dalenergo and the Primorskaya district power station failed to pay for their last shipments of coal, the Primorskugol coal company halted further coal deliveries on September 15. As a result, however, Dalenergo was forced to shut one of its two 200-megawatt power generators to conserve what coal remained in its winter reserve bunkers. The closure merely aggravated the conditions caused by another strike at a power station in Vladivostok, which shut down five of its eight boilers and took another seventy megawatts offline. "Only the Artyomovskaya heat and power station [remained] operating at full capacity but it cannot provide energy for the entire territory." The power outages that already beleaguered Primorsky Krai grew longer, and left the half-million residents of Vladivostok without electricity or hot water for three days.[54]

A major electricity transfer was needed to bring relief to Primorsky Krai. Power from Amur Oblast in the north had to be conducted through Khabarovsk and finally to Vladivostok. The controlling directorate of the Vostokenergo company increased its transfer of electricity from Amur's power grid to Primorsky to some 500 megawatts. To satisfy this new requirement, Amur's Zeyskaya hydroelectric power station increased its load considerably. All told, the quantity of electricity shunted to Primorsky amounted to nearly 20 percent of all the energy generated in Amur Oblast.[55]

[53] "Rotten to the core," *Economist*, Oct. 18, 1997; Denis Dyomkin, "They Wanted To Make Things Better," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Aug. 14, 1996, pp. 21–22.

[54] "Russian Miners End Coal Delivery to Power Stations," FBIS-SOV-97-258, Sept. 15, 1997, Moscow Interfax; "Blackout in Russian Far East worsens," UPI, Sept. 9, 1997; "Quiet flows the Don—and almost all else," *Economist*, July 12, 1997.

[55] "Russia's Amur Boosts Power Supplies to Primorsky Krai," FBIS-SOV-97-260, Sept. 17, 1997, Moscow Radio Rossii Network.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, just as Primorsky Krai's power predicament appeared to end, workers at the Zeya hydroelectric power station, one of the RFE's largest, went on strike for back pay. "The power station [had been] working at peak capacity, and the equipment, which [had] gone without [maintenance] for many years, [was] on the verge of being put out of commission." Unfortunately for Primorsky, this power station had been relied upon to compensate for much of the electricity deficit caused by the territory's own electric company strikes.[56]

After some strong cajoling, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy managed to return most electric companies to normal operations for the winter. For the first time in a long time, Dalenergo provided its customers with uninterrupted service throughout the winter months. However, a solution to the inter-enterprise debt crisis remained elusive. Attempts in Vladivostok to "[increase] the proportion of hard cash used to pay for energy, [switch] collection of funds from end-users to the regional energy joint-stock companies, [merge] a power station with its fuel supplier" and abolish concessions for individual customers had all met with varying degrees of failure.[57]

Since the underlying problem was never resolved, it resurfaced by the spring of 1998. As customers stopped paying electric companies, those companies in turn stopped paying for coal. And none of them could pay their employees. By May 1998, the average energy worker in Primorsky Krai was owed between five and seven months' wages. The Primorskaya power station called a strike on May 21, in spite of federal threats of prosecution, and miners from nearby Luchegorsk followed suit on June 2. In a desperate gambit to extract payment, some electric companies have resorted to punishing delinquent customers by choking off their electricity. By May, 445 debtors in Primorsky Krai defaulted on some 280 million rubles ($43.1 million) payable to the local electric company. As a result, the company has been turning off their power. Massive shortages recurred throughout Primorsky Krai. On July 3, Dalenergo cut off electricity to its debtors and plunged several cities in Primorsky into darkness to remind its customers of the need to pay their debts. Among the company's biggest deadbeats were the Russian Pacific Fleet, the Far Eastern Military District, the police department, the fire department, the courts, the tax authorities, and the chief prosecutor's office, who collectively owed about 1.1 billion rubles ($169 million). To make matters worse, workers at the Artyem heat and power plant, the Partizansk power plant, and one of Vladivostok's heat and power plants went on strike three days later.[58]

[56] "Power Workers Strike in Russian Amur Region," FBIS-SOV-97-273, Sept. 30, 1997, Moscow Radio Rossii Network.

[57] "Energy 'Cold War' Divides Far East City, Region," FBIS-SOV-98-042, Feb. 11, 1998, Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

[58] "Russia: Maritime Unions Urge End to Prosecution of Strikers," FBIS-SOV-98-196, Jul. 15, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Primorskaya Power Station To Cut Supply to Debtors," FBIS-SOV-98-141, May 21, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russia: Third Power Plant on Strike in Russian Far East," FBIS-SOV-98-187, July 6, 1998, Moscow NTV; "Russia: Far East Region Company Cuts Off Power To Warn Debtors," FBIS-SOV-98-184, July 3, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Authorities in Vladivostok declared a state of emergency. Electricity was allocated to sections of the city for less than three hours at a time. Public transportation virtually ceased as the city's fuel stocks were exhausted. However, the city could not replenish those stocks since its bank accounts were frozen. These afflictions had political overtones when overlaid on the struggles between the mayor of Vladivostok and the governor of Primorsky Krai. Vladivostok's mayor, Viktor Cherepkov, accused regional leaders of "arbitrary rule, corruption and lawlessness." Vladimir Rud, the vice governor and chief of the region's energy commission, was angry in turn because Cherepkov spent "huge amounts of money on building underground walkways without paying for energy consumption in the housing and municipal services sphere."[59]

Still more ominous was the revelation that not even Russian military, naval, or border installations were immune. About 30–40 percent of Dalenergo's electricity goes to these customers. During the electricity problems in the autumn of 1997, Dalenergo said that it would disconnect some "vital military installations," which had been using electricity without payment, despite a presidential decree banning such measures against facilities responsible for national security. The Russian submarine fleet was especially affected, given the large amounts of energy required to recharge its boats' batteries.[60]

Finally, the RFE's rueful electricity situation did nothing to encourage foreign trade or investment. The often-promoted Nakhodka Free Economic Zone is periodically deprived of electricity, leaving cranes swinging idle. Commerce at the port of Vanino was suspended in late July 1998 when miners blocked the local coal-driven power station's supply route. Almost simultaneously, Khabarovskenergo, the large Khabarovsk-based electric company, cut power to the port after its border station failed to make its payment. Inasmuch as its own workers were demanding six months of unpaid wages, Khabarovskenergo believed it had no alternative. Ten merchant ships were left at their berths because the station's communications and navigational equipment could not be used to guide them out of the harbor.[61]

Chita Oblast. Nor has the electricity predicament been isolated to the eastern section of the RFE. The electric company Chitaenergo, providing nearly 50 percent of all the power consumed by the Chita region's 1.3 million inhabitants, has labored under many of the same problems as Dalenergo. Debtors owe the company and its subsidiaries almost 80 million rubles ($12.3 million), and workers from its main heat and power plant, unpaid for three months, struck in October 1997. When weather forecasts predicted extremely cold temperatures, Chita's governor decreed a state of emergency, and ordered Chitaenergo to restore service and pay its workers. Where the money to do all this would come from, of course, was unknown.[62]

[59] "Fuel shortage brings transport to standstill in Vladivostok," AFP, Mar. 3, 1998; "Energy 'Cold War' Divides Far East City, Region."

[60] "Blackout in Russian Far East worsens," UPI, Sept. 9, 1997.

[61] "Vladivostok port shut down for failing to pay electricity bill," AFP, July 29, 1998; "Russia: Khabarovsk Power Workers Preparing To Strike," FBIS-SOV-98-191, July 10, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS.

[62] "Workers declare strike at major Siberian power station," AFP, Oct. 16, 1997; "Energy Crisis Brings State of Emergency To Chita Region," FBIS-SOV-97-303, Oct. 30, 1997, Moscow ITAR-TASS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Following a strategy pursued by other RFE electric companies, Chitaenergo resorted to disconnecting some of its customers in an effort to force payment. Even military bases in the Transbaikal Military District, deep in arrears, had their electricity turned off each week in early 1998. A shutdown in February forced a border garrison to spend a "huge effort and great material expense" to restore normal operations. A week later, a helicopter regiment near Nerchinsk had its power cut during combat training maneuvers, possibly putting men and equipment in danger.[63]

Alternative energy. As the need for electricity in many parts of the Russian Far East became dire, local authorities began to search for other means of power generation. Some found no alternatives. After running out of fuel on Kamchatka, residents were simply forced to wait until 26,400 tons of oil were delivered from customs storage to their regional power plants. Others were fortunate enough to strike deals with international companies to build efficient power plants. In what many consider to be a boon for local residents, Mitsui agreed in late March to participate in a $3 billion power plant project in the RFE. "The project involves five high-efficiency power generators with capacity ranging from 240,000 to 1.1 million kilowatts each, and the Japanese trading house [would] provide financing and the latest technology." In less fortunate areas, however, more creativity was required. Near the renowned Zvezda ship repair works in Bolshoi Kamen, local leaders laid plans in late 1997 to convert an inoperable nuclear-powered reconnaissance ship, the *Ural*, into a power plant to meet the needs of the 100,000 people living nearby.[64]

Transportation

When Sergei Witte formulated his blueprint to connect European Russia to its outposts on the Pacific coast in the late 1800s, he had many objectives in mind. Among the most enduring of these were to gain access to abundant natural resources, develop a reliable conduit to East Asia, and improve Russia's ability to defend its far eastern territory. The Soviet Union amended that list during the Cold War as it sought to disperse its heavy industrial and military targets throughout the region. All the while, czarist and Communist transportation officials sought to minimize the investments that would have to be made.[65]

The natural answer to Witte and his successors was the railroad. While Arctic coastal and riverine routes were available, both had to be severely curtailed

[63] "Russia: Siberian Helicopter Base Hit by Power Cut During Training," FBIS-UMA-98-042, Feb. 11, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service.

[64] "Russia: Kamchatka 'Energy Emergency' 'Settled' by Fuel Shipments," FBIS-SOV-98-100, Apr. 10, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Mitsui in Russian power plant project," AFP, Mar. 30, 1998; "Aging Russian warship to be scrapped for nuclear power plant," AFP, Nov. 4, 1997; "Russia: Nuclear Warship Could Be Used as Power Source in Far East," FBIS-SOV-97-261, Sept. 18, 1997, Moscow Interfax; Tsuneo Akaha, "Environmental challenge in the Russian Far East," in *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East*, p. 125.

[65] Robert North, "Transport and Communications," in *Siberia: Problems and Prospects for Regional Development*, ed. Alan Wood (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 130–57.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

during the winter. Roads proved too costly to construct and maintain. As late as the 1980s, the RFE had the fewest roads per area in any part of the former Soviet Union, including the republics of Central Asia.[66] The worst impediment to any infrastructure development is nature. The permafrost's annual cycle of thaw and freeze easily buckles roads, railroads, and runways alike. Heavy snowfall causes rivers to rise dramatically in the spring, wearing down bridges. A World Bank study estimated in 1991 "that because of these natural obstacles, as well as the region's relatively high labor costs and taxes, an average infrastructure project in Primorsky Krai costs about eight times more than in a comparable region in the Third World."[67]

Undeterred, Witte pushed ahead with the Trans-Siberian Railroad and it was a monumental Russian achievement. Still relied upon as the key artery of the RFE, the railroad became something greater than simply a mode of movement; it shaped how the region was settled. During the Soviet period, the railroad facilitated the development of sizable, but widely spaced cities across the landscape.[68]

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 demonstrated the strategic importance of a complete and functional Trans-Siberian Railroad and its importance has only grown over the century since, despite its evident shortcomings. In order to satisfy the engineers' desire to build south of the permafrost belt, the railroad had to be constructed close to the Mongolian and Chinese borders. Considering the strategic importance of the line, a parallel line further to the north was obviously beneficial.

Two other reasons emerged to support a second line to the north. First, a second line would relieve some of the increasing capacity pressures on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. During the 1950s and 1960s, migration to the Soviet Far East was encouraged. As more people settled there, more food and supplies needed to be delivered to them. The cities where they worked often were heavily focused on a single industry. This caused severe problems when balancing trains and freight loads traversing a single railroad, because every city required vastly different raw materials for its particular industry. Secondly, another line would facilitate mineral and forest product development further to the north, since few all-weather roads were built in those areas.[69]

That second line, which became known as the Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad (BAM), linked Krasnoyarsk and Nikolaevsk. Imperial Russia's Railroad Ministry laid out the original blueprint for the project soon after the Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed. In the 1930s, Soviet planners dusted off the old plans, but construction did not begin until 1974. At the time, the BAM was designed

[66] Victor L. Mote, "The Communications Infrastructure," in *Siberia and the Soviet Far East: Strategic Dimensions in Multinational Perspective*, ed. Rodger Swearingen (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 30–73.

[67] Peter Robison, "The Russian Far East," p. 34.

[68] Steven G. Marks, *Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850–1917* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 117–226.

[69] North, "Transport and Communications."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to relieve about 10–20 percent of the freight carried by the Trans-Siberian Railroad.[70]

Arguably as daring as the Trans-Siberian Railroad's engineers,

> the BAM builders had to cut through seven major mountain ranges, build nearly four thousand bridges and culverts (nearly a hundred and fifty of which were more than three hundred feet long), bore fifteen miles of tunnels, construct seventy million square feet of shops and housing, and move about a billion cubic feet of earth in a climate cold enough to shatter steel in winter and wet enough to rot everything in summer. Near Lake Baikal, the northern tip of which the BAM would skirt, repeated earthquakes had raised cliffs almost fifty feet high and opened cracks sixty feet wide. Just in the western half of the BAM route alone, these earthquakes triggered an average of 350 avalanches and landslides a year. East of the earthquake and avalanche zone, permafrost that reached as deep as a thousand feet created ground ice up to fifteen feet thick in winter; in summer, the frozen subsoil's inability to absorb thawing ice and snow created bogs that bred hordes of mosquitoes and gnats.[71]

The project was also financially challenging. In order to entice enough people to endure the harsh living and working conditions of the RFE, Moscow had to offer railway workers two and a half times their normal wage. By the early 1980s, work on the BAM had slowed, and Soviet leaders rushed army engineers into the field to finish it. However, the BAM did not become truly operational until 1992 when the North Muya tunnel east of Lake Baikal was finally opened. Unfortunately, hasty construction in a region of extreme environmental conditions led to problems. After only a few seasons of permafrost thaw and freeze, several sections of the BAM have had to be reconstructed. Once expected to carry as much as 35 million tons of freight per year, the BAM carried only 1 million tons in 1990. Further, due to construction delays, what mining had existed near the BAM's route moved northward by the time the railroad was completed. As worldwide demand for the RFE's raw materials softened in the late 1980s, some observers even suggested that the $18 billion railroad may have been unnecessary.[72]

Other problems ensued when Gorbachev raised rail tariffs throughout the RFE, causing traffic and revenues to plunge. Railroads became increasingly unprofitable and sometimes failed to pay their debts and workers. Tariffs were eventually lowered in the summer of 1998, but shippers were soured by the wave of strikes and blockades, and supplemental fees for cargo protection, as workers found that blocking the rails was the only way to obtain back wages.[73]

In hopes of maintaining efficiency in the face of such travails, railroads in the RFE began using longer trains and hauling heavier loads. But that strategy caused new problems. Heavier trains increased the failure rate of expensive

[70] Stephan, *Russian Far East: A History*, pp. 265–66; Mote, "The Communications Infrastructure."

[71] W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Conquest of a Continent: Siberia and the Russians* (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 388–89.

[72] James P. Dorian, "Minerals and mining in the Russian Far East," in *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East*, pp. 105–6.

[73] "Sorry for this delay of 100 years," *Economist*, June 27, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wheel bearings and damaged sections of rail not designed to bear such loads at high speeds. That forced many trains to slow down. Secondly, the longer trains needed longer passing loops and sidings, but without enough money for routine maintenance, railroad officials were unlikely to fund any new structures.[74]

Nevertheless, Russian dreams of building a "landbridge" across Eurasia to compete effectively with seaborne shipment between Europe and Asia still survive. Some argued that a container could be shipped via rail from the RFE to Western Europe in under twenty-eight days compared to thirty to thirty-nine days by sea. But by 1998, only 100,000 containers of the 3 million transported annually between Europe and Asia were moving by rail. Meanwhile, others have even dared to envision connecting the BAM across the Bering Sea to a Canadian line that ends at Fort Nelson in British Columbia.[75]

Shipping to the Russian Far East takes knowledge, patience, creativity, and an armed guard.

In practice, delivering a shipment to the RFE takes knowledge, patience, creativity, and sometimes an armed guard. The U.S. consulate in Vladivostok recommends that shippers not even consider sending cargo from the typical entry points of Moscow and St. Petersburg to the region. Rather, ocean transport is by far the more reliable means of shipping goods to the Far East.[76]

Maritime transportation in the RFE involves not only oceanic, but riverine shipping. Unfortunately for international commerce, most of the RFE's rivers flow north into the Arctic Ocean rather than east into the Pacific. Furthermore, river traffic is frequently problematic due to the shallow depth of the water, rocky river bottoms, winter ice, spring floods, and summer droughts. Squandered Soviet investments did not help. Instead, they sometimes created bottlenecks with little storage space for inbound cargoes and not enough vessels for outbound ones. Among the truly useful rivers, the Amur is navigable from Chita to the Pacific coast, though the bulk of the traffic moves from Blagoveshchensk to Nikolayevsk.[77]

Therefore, most Russian leaders pinned their hopes on improving foreign trade through the RFE's Pacific ports. To some observers, legendary Vladivostok represents the best prospect for export-led commerce based on oil, mining, and forestry products. However, cynics contend that the city's development would depend too heavily on bribing the right people. Moreover, regional power outages have often left ships in Vladivostok stranded at anchor.[78]

[74] North, "Transport and Communications."

[75] Nigel Holloway, "Fantasy express," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Sept. 25, 1997; "Russia: BAM Chief on Attracting Investors, Cargo," FBIS-SOV-96-165-S, July 13, 1996, Moscow Gudok.

[76] Toby B. Gooley, "International shipping: Shipping to the wild, wild, East," *Traffic Management*, Jan. 1996, pp. 69A–71A.

[77] Robert N. North, "The Far Eastern Transport System," in *The Soviet Far East: Geographical perspectives on development*, pp. 185–224; Mote, "The Communications Infrastructure."

[78] Michael Fabey, "Shipping to Northern Asia," *World Trade*, Oct. 1997, pp. 64–66; Paul Klebnikov, "Russia-on-the-Pacific," *Forbes*, Mar. 27, 1995, pp. 85–90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In any case, Nakhodka and Vostochny had already eclipsed Vladivostok, at least in terms of commercial traffic. Vostochny had 48.3 percent, Nakhodka 29.6 percent, Vladivostok 12.7 percent, and Vanino 9.4 percent of oceanic cargo passing through RFE ports in 1990. However, low productivity plagued operations. Industry observers rated Vostochny's productivity as half that of Oakland and only a third that of Los Angeles.[79] On the bright side, Vostochny showed what some operational efficiency, worker training, and modest capital investment could do. A joint venture between the Port of Vostochny, the American shipping company Sealand, and an Australian concern turned a defunct port into a functioning one, despite equipment failures, small container yards, poor shore communications, and shortages of "water, electric power, and [legal remedies]." But high tariffs, strikes, and blockades as well as the general Asian economic slowdown made the venture untenable. The port's container traffic declined from 120,000 containers in 1993 to 30,000 in 1995.[80]

Aside from functioning ports, the other necessary element for oceanic commerce is merchant ships. The region's aptly named Far Eastern Shipping Company, privatized in 1994, has labored under the weight of social obligations inherited from the Soviet period, despite paring its workforce from 60,000 to 17,000. The company maintains several kindergartens, hospitals, and housing complexes while paying a tax rate of over 40 percent. Under such burdens, it was no surprise that the company had scant money left over to maintain its fleet of 169 cargo ships and nine icebreakers, half of which were over twenty years old. To raise money to fund two new ships, the company's directors unilaterally issued more stock without consulting their stockholders, effectively diluting their holdings by half.[81]

As one Western shipping manager lamented, "Moving freight through customs at any one of the thousands of key transit points—seaports, riverports, airports, highways—meant endless headaches brought on by interminable delays, extortionists, petty thieves, and small-minded bureaucrats."[82]

Food, Poverty, Waste

Unlike Western Siberia, the RFE never enjoyed the kind of investment necessary to make the region self-sustaining. From the beginning, the resources developed there by the czar's voevodas were principally intended to service the rest of their empire. The Soviets likewise failed to develop food resources and concentrated on heavy industry instead. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the subsidies, incentives, and discounts doled out to the region had

[79] Pamy J.S. Arora, "Transportation," in *The Russian Far East in Transition*, pp. 125–45; Stephan, *Russian Far East: A History*, pp. 266-67.

[80] Thornton and Mikheeva, "Strategies," pp. 85–88, 116.

[81] Jeffery Lilley, "Sink or Swim?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 20, 1994.

[82] Michael Fabey, "Shipping to Northern Asia."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all but vanished, and the heavy industries pampered by the communists had lost their relevance.

Agriculture. Since the first pioneers settled Yakutsk, Russians have scoured Siberia for a reliable source of sustenance, and indeed, the Russian descent on the Amur Basin in 1643 was triggered in part by reports of "corn and grain [growing] in fertile valleys." The Chinese resisted, but finally, in the 1850s, Russia managed to extend its dominion over the lower Amur and expanded agriculture to the areas adjacent to the Mongolian and Chinese borders.[83]

In the twentieth century, Soviet collectivization of agriculture resulted in typical inefficiencies, but the end of communism revived the hope that the RFE might become self-sufficient. Instead, when a collective disbanded, its shares were evenly distributed among all of its workers, and what emerged from the process was a system of private collectives in which land ownership, profits, and losses were still shared equally, giving no one in particular an incentive to excel in farming. To make matters worse, youth from the villages used their new freedom to leave the distant Far East, leading to a shortage of labor. By the late 1990s, RFE agriculture was in evident distress.[84]

An added pressure is the fact that the region's crops must be harvested promptly, because the growing season is so short that even carefully tended crops can rot in the field. Bringing crops to mills and shipping them to markets requires a relatively efficient transportation network. Unfortunately, as we know, road and rail transport in the RFE has become so miserable that recently, tracked personnel carriers have been drafted into the harvest. Delivering supplies to farming towns can be equally difficult. After a recent flood, Russian workers in one private collective lived without clean water for two months.

Russian economic reform has yet to clarify or codify property rights. As a result, small ventures cannot use their land as collateral for loans—a particularly difficult circumstance for entrepreneurial farmers. Without money, they cannot afford seed or equipment. And so the RFE, "with its short growing season and inefficient collectivized agriculture," continues to "import virtually all of its fruits and half of its meat and dairy products. Because of this dependence on imports, a basic food basket of 19 items sells here for 63 percent above the national average, according to a recent survey by the newspaper *Izvestia.* But to please farmers in western Russia, Yeltsin's government raised tariffs on imported food by about one third [in 1995]."[85]

Commercial fishing. Fishing has been one of the few industries in the Russian Far East that has performed reasonably well, despite a lack of ship maintenance and underpaid or unpaid crews. Many fishermen, of course, achieve that remarkable feat by exporting at least twice as much fish as they ever admit to federal tax authorities. Twenty-five percent of the world's fish is harvested in Russia and 70 percent of that comes from Pacific waters. The fishing industry

[83] Stephan, *Russian Far East: A History,* pp. 26–50.

[84] Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations," p. 1069.

[85] James Brooke, "Russia Far East Weighs New Era's Pros and Cons," *New York Times,* June 14, 1996; Thornton and Mikheeva, "Strategies," p. 100.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is particularly important in Kamchatka Oblast, where it employs over half of all workers. But in recent years, the cost of transporting catches to population centers in western Russia has become prohibitive.[86]

What is more, Russian fishermen have to contend with foreign fishing trawlers that illegally sally into Russian territorial waters and scoop up huge catches of fish, substantially lowering stocks in the Sea of Okhotsk. These poachers hail from all around the world, including Bulgaria, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Panama, Poland, and Taiwan, and have taken advantage of the reduced Russian naval presence in the northwestern Pacific. On the Kamchatka Peninsula, Russian resources dedicated to protecting its regional waters from poachers comprise only five patrol boats, four of which did not arrive until November 1993. In any case, lack of clear government guidelines to ensure compliance with fishing agreements has allowed this industry to pass out of Moscow's control.[87]

Endeavoring to clarify matters, First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov signed a pact with the Japanese foreign minister in February 1998 that formally permitted Japanese trawlers to fish within a twelve nautical mile zone around the disputed Kuril Islands. In the past, Japanese fishermen have come under fire from Russian patrol boats or been forcibly detained. During a major campaign to crack down on foreign poaching in August 1994, seventy-seven Japanese were captured. (Coincidentally, two days after the pact was signed, Japan granted Russia $1.5 billion to build housing for the resettlement of Russian military personnel.)[88] Some Russian fishermen, however, charge that the treaty was a sellout by Moscow, since in the virtual absence of supervision, foreigners could exceed their quotas by five or six times even as Russian fishermen are restrained by domestic quotas and hamstrung by the termination of state subsidies. On May 26, however, Russian authorities chose to act when a Chinese trawler was caught illegally fishing in the Bering Sea off the Kamchatka Peninsula. First spotted by a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and shadowed by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, the Chinese vessel tried to escape. But a Russian patrol boat intercepted it and, after warning shots elicited no response, fired directly into the ship. Two Chinese fishermen, including the captain, were killed and three others wounded. In late July, Russian authorities prepared to sell the ship to cover the damages the Chinese may have caused.[89]

[86] "Rotten to the core," *Economist*, Oct. 18, 1997; Michael Specter, "Pristine Russian Far East Sees Its Fate in Gold," *New York Times*, June 9, 1997; Akaha, Minakir, and Okada, "Economic challenge in the Russian Far East," p. 63; Mark M. Nelson, "Russian Hinterland Feels The Lure Of Asia; Moscow's Western Focus Retards East's Development," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 21, 1994.

[87] Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, "Fisheries," in *The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Cooperation*, pp. 147–82.

[88] "Japan grants 1.5bn dollars for Russian army housing," AFP, Feb. 23, 1998; Laurence Peter, "Russia, Japan sign landmark fishing deal off disputed islands," AFP, Feb. 21, 1998; Akaha, Minakir, and Okada, "Economic challenge in the Russian Far East," p. 63.

[89] "Russia: Russia To Sell Chinese Poachers' Ship as Compensation," FBIS-SOV-98-216, Aug. 4, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service; "Russian Gunboat Kills Fishermen," AP, May 26, 1998; "Russia: Further Details on Shooting of Chinese Poachers Off Russia," FBIS-SOV-98-146, May 26, 1998, Moscow NTV; "Russian fishermen call for Sea of Okhotsk to be declared Russian," AFP, May 21, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian fishermen see their future prospects as bleak. Gennadi Devyatkin, head of the local administration in central Kamchatka, bemoaned that those in the territory are "forgotten by the federal government. Forgotten except when they want our fish. We are a colony and Moscow can only take from us. At least in the old days they would give us back enough to survive. Not anymore though."[90]

Poverty and unrest. Even before the first crippling miner strikes and blockades, workers throughout the RFE were agitating for unpaid wages. In Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, 2,000 people marched in front of the regional administration's offices in April 1998. At Khabarovsk, industrial picketers demonstrated in front of government buildings. Air traffic controllers in Yakutsk struck after not being paid in four months. In May, thousands of teachers struck to protest unpaid wages and working conditions from Chita to Kamchatka, and joined some 200 scientists from research and technical institutes in Primorsky Krai to block rail traffic in Vladivostok. A month later, more than 15,000 public workers blocked main roads and railway lines in Vladivostok. The demonstrators, many of whom were once employed by the city's defense industry, demanded unpaid wages and Yeltsin's resignation. By August, the city's ambulance workers threatened to strike as well. Union leader Nicolai Kostiyukov asserted that the government owed civil servants in Vladivostok 1.5 billion rubles ($230 million) in back pay. Combined with miners' strikes in May and June, the city of Vladivostok was brought to a virtual standstill.[91]

It is hard to imagine the people of a recent global power searching for meals.

It is hard to imagine the people of a recent global power reduced to searching for their next meals. But inasmuch as 50 percent of the RFE's food and consumer goods must be imported via an unreliable and expensive distribution network, and wages often go unpaid, daily life in the RFE has become, at best, a struggle. "Coddled under the Soviets, the Far East received salary bonuses, special supplies, and an inordinate amount of military bases and defense industries. . . . With more mineral resources than Australia, residents of the Far East expected in 1991, after the fall of Communism, that foreign investment would pour in from Japan and South Korea." But that investment never materialized, as the federal government cut orders to the region's defense industries. Those housing and social subsidies that remained were often dis-

[90] Michael Specter, "Pristine Russian Far East Sees Its Fate in Gold," *New York Times*, June 9, 1997.

[91] "Siberia Air Controllers Strike," AP, Aug. 20, 1998; "Russia's Regions Stage Protest Rallies," FBIS-SOV-98-099, Apr. 9, 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Thousands of teachers take to streets over wage claims," AFP, May 20, 1998; "Russia: Far East Ambulance Drivers Announce Wages Strike," FBIS-SOV-98-216, Aug 4. 1998, Moscow ITAR-TASS; "Russian defense workers demand wages," UPI, July 8, 1998; "15,000 public workers block access to Vladivostok over pay," AFP, June 23, 1998; James Brooke, "Russia Far East Weighs New Era's Pros and Cons," *New York Times*, June 14, 1996; "Discussion of Importance of Arms Trade With China," FBIS-UMA-96-104-S, Mar. 25, 1996, Moscow Nezavismoye Voyennoye Obozreniye; Steven Erlanger, "Russia's Workers Pay Price As Military Industries Fade," *New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tributed inefficiently, with better-off households receiving more subsidy than those with lower incomes.[92]

Hence, the level of poverty in the Primorsky region is almost twice Russia's average, and in 1993 five percent subsisted at a level less than one-third that of the official poverty line. Conditions have since deteriorated further, so much so that local authorities decided to lower the poverty line. When nonpayment of state salaries stretched into 1996, the portion of Primorsky Krai's 2.3 million people who earned less than the official poverty level climbed from 36 percent in January to 46 percent by June. Ration cards have been needed. Some companies that failed to pay their workers opened bars where workers could buy vodka on credit against their unpaid wages. Unsurprisingly, the incidence of accidents on the job has increased.[93]

In Chita Oblast, where pensions have not been paid for three months, 75 percent of the population lives below the official poverty line. With over 56 percent of the local industrial enterprises deep in debt, unemployment has soared. Enterprises that once seemed to be able to survive even the most difficult circumstances have failed. Gold mines and forestry companies have shut down because of high rail tariffs. Local residents simply refer to their condition as "the economy without money."[94]

Unless conditions improve, there may not be many people left in some areas of the RFE. Settlements turned into ghost towns as 167,000 people fled the Magadan Oblast in 1992 alone. On the Kamchatka Peninsula, 1,600 of Milkovo's total population of 20,000 migrated out of the community in 1994. Milkovo, "which used to construct two new apartment blocks per year, has built only one half-finished shell since 1991. It receives electricity for only seven hours of each day." At the southern end of the peninsula, "thousands of residents in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy had no heat for nearly three weeks [during the winter of 1994], despite temperatures that plunged well below freezing." Fuel shortages have rippled across the region, periodically forcing industry and commerce to come to a halt.[95]

Meanwhile, the Russian mafia has penetrated the Russian Far East and in some areas operates with greater effectiveness than the local government. More often, crime and corruption have become synonymous with democratic

[92] Christian Caryl, "Siberian Macaroni," *U.S. News & World Report*, June 22, 1998; "Siberian Business Report," FBIS-SOV-97-195, July 14, 1997, Moscow Interfax; James Brooke, "Russia Far East Weighs New Era's Pros and Cons," *New York Times*, June 14, 1996; Justin Jenk, Carl H. Michel, Valerie Margotin-Roze, "The Russian Consumer Revolution," *McKinsey Quarterly*, 1995: 2, pp. 35–46.

[93] James Brooke, "Russia Far East Weighs New Era's Pros and Cons," *New York Times*, June 14, 1996; "A world away," *Economist*, Sept. 11, 1993.

[94] "Famine Said To Have Started in Chita, Pskov Oblasts," FBIS-SOV-96-201, Oct. 15, 1996, Moscow Moskovskiy Komsomolets.

[95] *Country Profile: Russia, 1997–98* (London: EIU, 1998), p. 19; Robison, "The Russian Far East: Prospects for Economic Development," p. 22–23; Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History*, p. 289; Celestine Bohlen, "In Old Soviet Outposts, the Future Looks Empty," *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and free-market reforms. Nationalist and authoritarian remedies to chaos and crime are ascendant. Prosecution of Chinese has been particularly vigorous.[96]

Wasted resources. A region in such dire economic straits might be expected to husband its resources. However, that has not been the case for the RFE, which lacks the resources or the patience to be efficient. As a result, much of the region's abundant natural resources are wasted.

Fully 91 percent of Russia's fluorspar, 49 percent of its lead, 95 percent of its tin, 37 percent of its tungsten, and 14 percent of its zinc originate in the Far East. In addition, 20–25 percent of the world's diamonds are mined there. In 1992 alone, the region's rivers and rocks yielded 146,000 kilograms of gold. Despite the large quantity of minerals mined, only about half of what could be extracted is actually removed due to inefficient mining practices. Regretfully, abnormally high losses occur during transportation, storage, and processing. Excessive mining has led to premature exhaustion of many reserves. Considerable amounts of valuable raw materials are left as tailings at mining sites.[97]

Forestry has declined markedly, and production of timber, paper, and cellulose fell by 64 percent between 1990 and 1996 due to the lack of investment and excessive harvesting. Much of the most valuable wood was cut and a huge percentage of that was wasted. While 73 percent of Primorsky Krai is forested, the mixed coniferous forests were decimated by clear-cutting, which, combined with permafrost, can turn verdant forests into permanent swamps. What is more, some 50–70 percent of the logs cut down are wasted during processing and shipping, a percentage several times above world standards. Forest fire prevention has ceased. In May 1998, fires tore through an area near Khabarovsk, destroying up to 62,000 acres of vegetation. Another 543,000 acres were ablaze by August. In Khabarovsk Krai alone, 494,000 acres of forest burned to cinders. To combat the flames across some 124,000 acres, financially strapped authorities could only put 1,000 firefighters, ten helicopters, and two planes into the field. And if that were not enough, the same floodwaters that coursed through eastern China in the summer of 1998 washed over the RFE, inundating seventy towns and destroying sixty bridges.[98]

Conclusion

The state of the RFE's economy has not benefited Russian power in Asia. It has provided the country with no levers to support its military estab-

[96] "Chinese counterfeiters arrested in Russia," AFP, Dec. 23, 1997; Stephen Handelman, "The Russian 'Mafiya,'" *Foreign Affairs*, Mar./Apr. 1994, pp. 83–96.

[97] Evgenii B. Kovrigin, "Problems of resource development in the Russian Far East," in *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East*, pp. 70–73, 80–84.

[98] "Fire devastates evergreen forest in Russian far-east," AFP, Aug. 14, 1998; "Forest fires tear through Russian far-east," AFP, May 20, 1998; "100,000 hectares of Russian taiga destroyed by fire," AFP, July 26, 1998; Vladimir Pechkourov, "Russian Far East Beckons to Asia," *Asian Business*, May 1996, p. 18; Robison, "The Russian Far East: Prospects for Economic Development," p. 27; "Floods block Trans-Siberian railway," AFP, Aug. 13, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lishment or forge new economic ties to neighboring countries. If anything, the region continues to be dependent on the center, which is embroiled in its own travails. Foreign trade and investment remain problematic, since "many Far Easterners consider any projects that export Russian resources an unpatriotic selling of Russia's patrimony. In a region whose only economic asset is its resources, that is not an especially useful outlook." Meanwhile, its traditional industries have failed. One 1996 study, estimating competitiveness at world prices, found that four of the region's industries—food processing, forest products, light industry, and chemicals—actually had a negative added value. As one observer commented, "the small shops and sidewalk hawkers that populate the cities may not be a great new way of life, but a demeaning way to survive."[99]

Among the highest hurdles to development in the RFE has been the continuing political dispute between the region and the center. At the heart of that dispute is tax collection. "Although Far Eastern trade autonomy has grown rapidly, the region [has] not received a corresponding level of independence in managing its own resources. Most hard-currency profits are still collected by the center, which must evaluate and approve all large investments in the region. . . . Political power in the region depends to a large extent on cultivating influential patrons in the central bureaucracy, since the center still controls the Far East's resources, its most important, and lucrative, economic asset."[100]

For the moment, however, regional leaders have shelved their arguments over resources in favor of requests for immediate financial succor. Indeed, "In Amur Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, and Primorskii Krai, regional governors have appealed to Moscow not for help in expanding trade, but for increased domestic subsidies. This behavior, consistent with conservative trends in Russian politics more generally, suggests a return to a belief that the answers to current problems lie in a return to past policies."[101] While regional leaders are probably unconvinced that these past policies can truly solve their problems, they are mainly concerned, at the time of this writing, with finding shelter from an economic winter without end. If asked to choose, residents of the Russian Far East would probably shun further bold economic reform in favor of a period of peaceful quiescence.

[99] Judith Thornton, "Structural Change in the Russian Far East: The Implications for trade and factor markets," *Atlantic Economic Journal*, Sept. 1996, pp. 208–27; Robison, "The Russian Far East: Prospects for Economic Development," p. 30.

[100] Akaha, Minakir, and Okada, "Economic challenge in the Russian Far East," pp. 67–68; Robison, "The Russian Far East: Prospects for Economic Development," p. 33–34.

[101] Moltz, "Russo-Chinese normalization," pp. 190–91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rise of Russian Anti-Imperialism

by Henry E. Hale

The economic meltdown of 1998 has thrown into question not only Russia's financial future but also the entire course of its foreign policy. Political chaos has seemingly enveloped the nation, and Russian policy threatens to turn along with every revolution of the government's personnel door. Given the severity of the crisis, many have begun to predict the worst, warning that Moscow's desperate politicians will seek to divert attention from their domestic debacle by lashing out at their newly independent neighbors. Indeed, whenever the words "Russia" and "Near Abroad" appear in the same sentence, they tend to conjure up visions of imperialism and political subversion, and the current crisis is expected to make things even worse.

Yet Russia has not, in fact, invested much effort in "reintegrating" the former Soviet space. Instead, powerful, market-oriented political forces have consistently led Russia to torpedo every good chance it has had to reunify some of the newly independent states (NIS). For this and other reasons, Russian politicians across the ideological spectrum have been increasingly calling for Russia to focus not on state-driven integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but instead on a market-driven process which might be called "natural integration." What is most striking about this foreign policy trend is that these patterns of behavior have been *structural* and have persisted despite many changes in top government personnel and political atmosphere.

There is good reason to believe that this ingrained resistance to imperialist urges will withstand the ongoing political and economic crisis despite the fact that the King of the Integrators, Yevgeny Primakov, has now taken over the reins of the Russian government. This positive outcome, however, is less likely if the international community reacts to Russia's crisis by throwing up its hands in despair, letting Moscow's corrupt capitalists stew in their own pungent juices. Instead, we must seek new forms of active engagement that strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in Russia. This primarily means the promotion of macroe-

Henry E. Hale is a research associate at the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and a visiting professor in the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at the European University at St. Petersburg, Russia. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, funded by the Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard. The views expressed here are the author's alone.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conomic stabilization and the development of private enterprise as top-priority goals, even if social stability may require an emergency spending spree. In fact, we might take advantage of the Primakov government's new emphasis on reviving Russian industry by directing aid towards market-driven joint ventures involving firms from both Russia and other newly independent states. As recent developments in the Caspian Sea oil dispute show, the strategic inclusion of Russian firms in NIS projects can powerfully influence Russian policy in a positive direction.

The Logic of Economic Anti-Imperialism

Russian politicians disagree mightily over how the former Soviet states should reintegrate, but a basic logic has driven Russia to follow an essentially consistent policy pattern despite important changes in government personnel. First, when Gorbachev initially decreed that Soviet republics hold their own elections back in 1990, Russia's leaders were suddenly forced to respond to the narrow interests of their own republic's population. Even relatively conservative Russian politicians found electoral profit in calling for the economic sovereignty of Russia, a concept which meant sharply curtailing Russian subsidies (largely in the form of underpriced energy supplies) to the other Soviet republics. This Russian policy, as much as any other factor, was responsible for the demise of Gorbachev's USSR.[1] Today, Russian voters are happy to talk about "integration" only so long as they do not have to pay for it, a fact of which Boris Yeltsin has been well aware.

Second, the imperatives of radical marketization powerfully reinforce this frugality. One of the fundamental preconditions for successful reform is the achievement of macroeconomic stabilization by cutting inflation down to negligible levels. Yeltsin's first post-independence reformist team, led by acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar, sought to get a tight grip on monetary and credit emissions. After some initial wavering, the second team, under Viktor Chernomyrdin, also proved its anti-inflationary credentials. After Chernomyrdin's sudden dismissal in the spring of 1998, the young Sergei Kiriyenko continued the traditional prime ministerial commitment to reining in inflationary pressures during his short stint in office, opting to reform the Russian tax system rather than print money to solve his country's fiscal woes. Fiscal conservatism and the fear of inflation appeared to become embedded in the key economic ministries that Yeltsin and his supporters have staffed from 1990 until the crisis of 1998.

The implication of all this has been that any Russian efforts to reintegrate the former Soviet space had better not involve heavy expenditures because funding will not be forthcoming. This is critically important for two reasons.

[1] See Henry E. Hale, "Statehood at Stake: Democratization, the Ethnic Security Dilemma and the Collapse of the USSR" (Ph.D. dissertation in political science, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1998).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Initially, the other CIS states have typically demanded some form of Russian subsidy as the price for reintegration. Secondly, the twelve CIS states are at widely varying stages of reform. Countries that still administer large parts of their economies and have not gotten their budgets under control would threaten Russia's efforts to keep its own economy stable should reintegration occur. This is because Russia would be forced to sustain government-dependent industries until they are privatized and would also have to take on the debt obligations of the fiscally unsound partner state, in addition to the general nightmare of having to face all of the problems involved in the initial transition process all over again in these regions. Russian government officials directly responsible for finance and economics, therefore, have had strong incentive to oppose major integration initiatives with most CIS countries.

The Ruble Zone failed, and it was Russia that pulled the plug.

To be sure, important political forces within Russia have yearned for the restoration of some kind of union in the former Soviet space. Yevgeny Primakov was well known for such views as foreign minister, and he and his likeminded colleagues will probably continue to undertake initiatives designed to pull the newly independent states closer together now that he has become prime minister. Russian leaders may even derive political benefit from promoting such policies. But Russia's post-Soviet history shows that once these efforts reach the point at which substantial integration is possible, the government officials charged with protecting the Russian economy have every reason to abort them. Ministers of finance and the economy typically do not involve themselves in the daily running of foreign policy, which is why costly integration initiatives are undertaken in the first place. But once they do intervene, Russia's pre-crisis record reveals, their veto sticks. Indeed, they have operated from behind the scenes to stymie every major Russian effort to reunify its Near Abroad.

The Ruble Zone of a New Type. A clear example of this phenomenon occurred in the early fall of 1993, when Russia was on the verge of reestablishing almost complete economic control of five former Soviet republics that wished to continue using the Russian ruble as their primary currency. After a long and complicated series of negotiations, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Armenia signed an agreement with Russia designed to create the "Ruble Zone of a New Type." In return for the right to use the Russian ruble, these countries had actually agreed to unify their monetary systems with Russia's. This entailed not only abiding by Russia's credit, emissions, and banking policies, but also by its economic, budget, trade, and customs policies. Each republic subsequently signed a bilateral agreement with Russia that laid out its individual responsibilities.[2] If Russia were eager to restore its formal dominance, this was a golden opportunity. Politically, the time also seemed right since the radical

[2] See "Nursultan Nazarbaev: 'Segodnya nam luchshe podchinit' sya Rossii, chem MVF," *Ekspress* (Kazakhstan), Oct. 15, 1993; "Soglasheniye o prakticheskikh merakh po sozdaniyu rublevoy zony novogo tipa," and "Soglasheniye ob ob'edinenii denezhnoy sistemy Respubliki Kazakhstan s denezhnoy sistemoy Rossiyskoy Federatsii," *Sovety Kazakhstana*, Oct. 23, 1993. See also *Moscow Times*, Nov. 4, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

free-marketeer Yegor Gaidar had less than a year earlier been replaced as prime minister by Viktor Chernomyrdin, a representative of the powerful energy lobby, which is often thought to favor reestablishment of Russian hegemony in the region.

Yet the Ruble Zone of a New Type failed, and it was Russia that pulled the plug. The most basic problem was that after the Soviet collapse, the Ruble Zone had become an important hidden source of Russian subsidies to the other republics. According to one estimate circulating within the Russian government at the time, Russian cash transfers to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan ranged between 45 and 70 percent of these republics' gross domestic product, or almost their entire salary funds. Most of their claims for cash supplies were aimed at enabling the payment of wages.

The Ruble Zone of a New Type was, in fact, an effort by Russia to cut off these subsidies by forcing republics to put up collateral for cash supplies, which were treated as loans. But even this tightening of control could not guarantee that the other republics in the zone would reduce deficits, and their failure to do so would still have obliged Russia to "create" money in the envisioned unified economic space. In addition, reformers (urged by Western technical advisors) worried that Russian enterprises would continue to provide goods to other republics, even if the latter could not pay, and count on their lobbying strength to gain reimbursement from Moscow if necessary. Such sources of subsidy and macroeconomic destabilization were perceived as dangerous precisely because they were very difficult to control, as one internal report prepared for the Russian government argued. As a result, by early November 1993, Russia made it clear that there would be no Ruble Zone of a New Type, despite the widely heralded agreements and the loudly trumpeted progress toward an "Economic Union" in the CIS. Faced with this "fiscal veto," the embittered republics were forced to launch their own tenuous currencies.

The Russian-Belorussian Union. After the formal collapse of the Ruble Zone, a long series of negotiations culminated in the bilateral Russian-Belorussian Union Treaty of April 1997. The two sides had reached an agreement on monetary union three years earlier, in April 1994, but once again the effort was repeatedly delayed by Russian government officials responsible for macroeconomic stability (led by Gaidar, who made a brief governmental comeback as economics minister, and his successor Aleksandr Shokhin).[3] By the fall of 1994, Shokhin and his allies had convinced Yeltsin that no monetary union was possible without some sort of political unification, and even then, not until Belarus brought its rate of inflation down to that of Russia. Opinion polls showed that most Russian citizens were unwilling to bear significant costs for the sake of either political or economic integration with their neighbors.[4]

[3] See, for example, *RFE/RL Daily Reports*, no. 70, Apr. 13, 1994; *Monitor* (Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 5, 1995.

[4] *RFE/RL Daily Reports*, no. 70, Apr. 13, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During his tough race for reelection in 1996, Yeltsin sought to outflank his hard-line opponents by reviving efforts to reintegrate the former Soviet space. This initially produced an agreement to create a "Russian-Belorussian Community" and called for the eventual "unification" of their currencies and economies but left unspecified how this would take place. After Yeltsin won reelection and regained his health, he ceremoniously signed the Russian-Belorussian Union Treaty, but by then, fiscally conservative forces in his government had gutted the agreement, removing all practical content. On the eve of the signing, the Russians forced the Belorussian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, to pare down the original seventeen-page document to a mere three-page draft. Self-satisfied remarks from Boris Nemtsov, one of two Russian first deputy prime ministers in charge of economics, strongly suggested that he and his team had again vetoed real CIS integration by removing any clauses that might commit Russia to unwanted expenditure or surrender control over the marketization process. The new document was "much more thought-out than before," declared Nemtsov. Yeltsin himself made clear that it was in part financial articles that had been deleted, and stressed that the treaty did not now involve monetary union.[5] While Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was reported to have favored the union, he does not appear to have fought hard to save it. Predictably, virtually nothing of note has happened since the signing.

The Failure of Russian Bully Tactics

My argument is that key elements in Russia's government and society have strong incentive to veto costly Russian ventures in the Near Abroad initiated by other governmental forces. This is not to say that these other governmental forces will never initiate such ventures. In 1993 and 1994 Russia made several "coercive" efforts to restore its hegemony in neighboring regions. Yet what is striking is how halfhearted, undersupported, and unsuccessful they have been.

Manipulating communal conflicts. Many observers have been alarmed that Russia has openly or tacitly encouraged ethnic conflicts within the newly independent states, presumably to force them to reintegrate with Russia and grant it concessions, especially military ones.[6] Assuming that these charges are true (and this is not always clear), such policies have not been very productive.

Consider Russia's manipulation of conflicts within Moldova, where intervention appeared to produce the most palpable success. By covertly supporting the Transdniestrian rebels and then intervening at a time of its own choosing, Russia obtained de facto independence for the Slav-populated Transdniestria region. Moldova soon reversed an earlier decision not to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yet this has been a mixed blessing for

[5] *Reuters*, Apr. 2, 1997, from David Johnson's Russia List (hereafter DJRL), an electronic listserve source.

[6] One of the best and most lucid such pieces is: Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, *Back in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass.: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Yeltsin administration, as Transdniestrian forces reportedly supported Vice President Rutskoi and the Supreme Soviet in their battle with Yeltsin after the latter abrogated the constitution in September 1993.[7] While some claim that Russia forced Moldova to abandon notions of "reunification" with Romania, recent analysis shows that Moldovans had given up these ideas before the Transdniestrian conflict flared up.[8]

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, too, may look like a Russian "success" at first blush. Local chaos born of a lost war did remove the most virulent anti-Russian regime (that of Popular Front leader Abulfez Elchibey) from power in Azerbaijan, and, as with Moldova, prompted it to join the CIS. Closer inspection, however, reveals these gains to be chimerical. While the conflict removed Elchibey, it brought to power one of the most wily and talented politicians of the former Soviet era, President Geidar Aliev, who has galvanized strong domestic support in Azerbaijan and been no great friend to Russia. He has ensured that his country's CIS membership is superficial at most. In fact, a CIS calling card may even enhance his ability to influence Russia's CIS policy by improving his access to the Moscow power structures in which he was once a dominant figure (indeed, a Soviet Politburo member). He has refused to allow Russia to base its troops in his country and has kept Russia at bay by only judiciously cutting it in on the development of local oil fields.

Russia's manipulation of the Abkhazian conflict was marginally more successful and forced Georgia to join the CIS *and* to host Russian military bases. As a side benefit, this conflict has simultaneously endangered one of the more promising Caspian oil pipeline routes that could compete with Russia's own route. Beyond this, however, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has refused to be a Russian pawn and has actively sought to orient his small state to Western commercial and strategic interests. Georgia has lobbied effectively enough to become the preferred export route for Azerbaijan's vast oil reserves and received the explicit backing of the United States, American oil companies, Azerbaijan, and other important players.

Russian-speaking populations. In mid-1993, Russia began to apply heavy diplomatic pressure on certain former Soviet republics to grant their Russian populations greater status. Russia demanded not only that the Russian language be given official status equal to that of the "native" languages, but also that ethnic Russians there be given the right to hold a Russian passport as well as the passport of the country where they lived.[9] Dual citizenship, claimed members of one ethnic Russian organization in Kazakhstan, would achieve the de facto integration of the CIS even if the independent states themselves did not recognize it as such.[10] While this pressure never involved violence, Russia's bullying served

[7] Ibid., p. 64.

[8] Kate Litvak, "The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign Policy," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, June 1996, pp. 213–29.

[9] See Martha Brill Olcott, "Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: The Demographics of Ethnic Politics," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Mar./Apr. 1995, pp. 24–28, p. 26.

[10] Interview with regional leaders of *Lad*, April 1994, Kazakhstan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primarily to alienate these republics.[11] Only Turkmenistan granted its tiny Russian population the right to dual citizenship, although Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did elevate the formal status of the Russian language to that of "official" language of the state, a small symbolic Russian victory.[12]

Mobilizing the energy weapon. According to many accounts, Russia was determined to pressure Ukraine by "showing" it to be a hostage to Russian energy supplies. This, it is said, was designed to convince Ukraine to stop resisting meaningful integration efforts in the CIS and persuade Kiev to give Russia a greater share of the Sevastopol-based Black Sea Fleet. Russia's parliament went even further, declaring that Sevastopol was a Russian city and ordering Russia's constitution to be amended accordingly.[13] Most Russian leaders were convinced that these policies had at last succeeded when in 1994 the reputedly "pro-Russian" Leonid Kuchma defeated "nationalist" incumbent Leonid Kravchuk in Ukraine's presidential elections. The disillusionment was all the greater, therefore, as Russia came to realize that Kuchma was not moving his country into tighter relations with Russia but would continue to push Ukrainian independence and reject all important initiatives for economic reintegration.

GUAM. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the four states on which Russian pressure has reputedly been most severe have recently mounted the greatest challenge to Russia from *within* the CIS. To many Russian policymakers, the CIS was supposed to be a vehicle for Russian domination—yet in October 1997, Moldova teamed up with Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan to establish a "southern" bloc of states known by the acronym GUAM. While GUAM remains a loose association that is "not directed against any one country," it is clearly aimed at undercutting Russia's dominance within post-Soviet Eurasia in at least three ways.[14] First, its members all talk about the need to orient their economies and polities towards the United States and the West. Second, GUAM's clearest specific goal is to ensure an export route for Caspian Sea oil that is safe and carefully circumvents Russia, as part of a larger project to create a "New Silk Road" or "Eurasian Corridor." Third, the GUAM states are slowly but surely bringing up the topic of security cooperation, to the apparent exclusion of Russia, although savvy politicians do not admit the latter claim. GUAM may at last reverse one of the great ironies of post-Soviet international relations: while the new states are clearly better off dealing with Russia together, they associate the term "multilateral" with the USSR and thus have played into Russian hands by insisting on negotiating with it individually (and hence with much less leverage vis-à-vis their huge northern neighbor).[15]

[11] For an example of the form this bullying took, see "I. Karimov utverzhdaet, chto v Uzbekistane u russkoyazychnogo naseleniya problem net," *Izvestia*, Nov. 18, 1993, p. 3.

[12] Bhavna Dave, "National Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1996, pp. 51–72; *Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan*, Kaleidoscope series (ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1998), available in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database.

[13] *Vedomosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 1993, no. 29, p. 1794.

[14] See, for example, Liz Fuller, "Introducing the Other GUAM," End Note in *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol. 1, no. 169, Part I, Dec. 1, 1997; *Turkistan List*, Dec. 19, 1997.

[15] Indeed, one of the goals of a united Europe is to compete with the U.S. on a more equal footing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this is to say that if Russia *has* been pursuing a policy of malevolent intervention in the Near Abroad, and there is evidence to suggest that it has, then this policy looks to be backfiring. Even the short-term gains appear to be slight, as suspicions of a negative Russian role in regional conflicts have won Russia few friends there. In the longer run, this policy appears to be driving away the very states Russia cares most about. Reports of Russia's adventurism also do not help its leaders obtain respect and vital economic support in foreign capitals.

Before the financial and political crisis of August 1998, all evidence suggested that Russia was moving away from any *coercive* strategy to reintegrate the NIS. Four sets of recent events were strengthening the anti-imperialist forces within Russia, making the fiscal veto less necessary in the first place. The initial factor was the above-mentioned accumulation of evidence that assertive policies have been more damaging than beneficial to Russian interests. Second, Russia's debacle in Chechnya disabused all but the most rabid hardliners of the notion that brute force is a viable option, as has been amply documented.[16] The real dagger in the imperialist heart was the third factor: the realization that even when Russia did find itself in a position to achieve serious integration with CIS states, political forces *within Russia itself* proved instrumental in undermining it. Finally, the process of marketization, however botched and incomplete, created a powerful clique of commercial interest groups that have viewed macroeconomic stability as the key to their future prospects. This new business sector has proven its political might by getting Yeltsin reelected in 1996 and is a force with which any future Russian government will have to contend.[17] The collective weight of such evidence has caused even conservative politicians to doubt that substantial reintegration will occur any time in the near future and to start considering a longer-term perspective.

The New Move to "Natural Integration"

These trends prompted Russians of many political stripes before the August 1998 crisis to place their hopes on a market-driven process of "natural integration." The basic logic was that since Russia's economy was one of the strongest and certainly the largest in the CIS, its growth would draw the other republics to it in order to share in its prosperity and sizeable market. Russia had also experienced the most rapid accumulation of private capital in the CIS, giving Russian financial-industrial groups (FIGs) a major opportunity to move into other CIS markets, investing and linking them more closely to Russia.

Natural integration consists of two parts. The first is to promote concrete joint economic projects involving specific Russian and NIS firms. This is largely

[16] For a good analysis of the implications of the Chechen experience, see Anatoly Lieven, "Russia's Military Nadir: The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle," *National Interest*, Summer 1996, pp. 24–33.

[17] *Washington Post Foreign Service*, Aug. 28, 1998, p. A1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what Abraham Becker has termed "micro-integration."[18] Thus, when Yeltsin called leading bankers together and ordered them to stop feuding over the spoils of Russian privatization in September 1997, he also urged them to invest actively in the Near Abroad so as to promote the integration process. So far, the FIGs registered to do business in the CIS have not been very active, but natural integration is recognized as a long-term strategy. It is telling, then, that one of the greatest of these financial-industrial tycoons, Boris Berezovsky, became executive secretary of the CIS with strong Russian backing in April 1998.[19]

It is, of course, stretching reality to talk about a unified Russian policy.

This aspect of the natural integration strategy had some potential because almost all CIS members are receptive to the creation of joint ventures with Russia. Joint ventures involve specific projects and, as such, do not tend to be as politically charged as talk of a "new union." In addition, these projects promise tangible results and can revive ailing industries that pose major social problems for both Russia and the other states. Uzbekistan, recently one of the most vehemently separatist states in the CIS, has embraced major joint ventures with Russian partners like Ilyushin and Gazprom to produce airplanes and to pipe gas.

Another aspect of the natural integration strategy is to break down barriers to trade among the newly independent states. Russia's recent efforts have primarily been in this direction. One of the most visible and damaging barriers has been duplication in the value-added tax which cut into intra-CIS trade in 1997, particularly trade between Russia and Ukraine.[20] Russia has also invested much effort in creating free trade zones and customs unions in post-Soviet Eurasia. Accordingly, ideas of monetary union have been put off until well beyond the year 2000.[21] Berezovsky has also sought to use CIS structures to achieve stability in Eurasia's key hotspots, something that is certainly necessary for trade and economic cooperation to flourish.

It is, of course, stretching reality to talk about a unified Russian policy. As noted above, the essence of Russian CIS policymaking is precisely its disunity. The key point made above was that powerful economics-oriented forces within Russia tend to intervene to reverse policies made by pro-integration forces in the same Russian government. The key point here is that even these pro-integration forces have been scaling down their immediate objectives, moving away from coercive methods and adopting a much longer time horizon. Largely for this reason, Russia had initiated settlements of outstanding political issues with its neighbors before the financial crisis hit. The most prominent example is its 1997 treaty with Ukraine, in which Russia gave up a great deal of potential

[18] Abraham S. Becker, "Russia and Economic Integration in the CIS," *Survival*, Winter 1996–97, pp. 117–136.

[19] *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol. 2, no. 92, Part I, May 15, 1998.

[20] For a history of this Russian-Ukrainian problem, see "Boris Yel'tsin i Leonid Kuchma skrepili dogovor krov'yu," *Kommersant-Daily*, no. 198, Nov. 18, 1997.

[21] *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol. 1, no. 136, Part I, Oct. 10, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leverage and which promises to defuse the tension in relations between the two states. Natural integration requires the building of trust, and trust must be earned.

Speculating on the Future

The critical question now becomes: Will we look back on 1998 as a watershed for Russian revanchism, the year that Moscow overcame its inhibitions and embarked on an aggressive course to reintegrate its old imperial dominion? If the last ten years (let alone the past ten months) have taught us anything, it is not to make predictions about Russia. If we must test fate and try to foretell the future of Russian foreign policy, the scaled-down lesson is to have a healthy appreciation for historical contingency. In this light, it is striking just how stable Russia's "fiscal veto" on CIS integration has been. Dating back to Russia's first democratic elections in 1990, top officials responsible for the economy have consistently sacrificed integration on the altar of fiscal stability. The policy has endured several critical changes in leadership, most dramatically from Gaidar to Chernomyrdin, who was viewed as anything but a budget hawk when he first arrived on the scene. Indeed, the latter first joined the government as a concession to the more "conservative" opposition. Although first deputy prime ministers Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais were the muscle behind the push for macroeconomic stability in 1997, these policies also held firm before them under figures such as Aleksandr Shokhin in 1993. This seems to be one instance where a political office, due to the anti-inflationary incentive structure that accompanies it, seems to matter more than the person that holds it.

The major financial crisis that first shook Russia's pubescent polity in the spring of 1998 will have mixed effects. On one hand, it has increased the power of eager integrators like Primakov and has propelled pragmatic "centrists" like Yuri Maslyukov into the limelight as the economic gurus of the hour, preaching the virtues of the printing press as the only way to stave off a social revolution. The crisis has also severely wounded Russia's budding capitalist class, heretofore the social muscle behind the anti-imperialist policies. Russia's economy has also lost much of the gravitational pull on which proponents of natural integration counted. In addition, the crisis is likely to tempt some Russian politicians to try to salvage their careers through a heroic war of CIS reintegration, since desperation may drive them to ignore the odds against their success.

On the other hand, there is good reason to expect anti-imperialist forces to remain strong in Russia despite these worrisome trends. With the economy so fragile and young banks and markets on the brink of ruin, ministers in charge of economics will be in no position to allow costly ventures save those aimed at relieving the suffering of ordinary citizens in an effort to ward off a social explosion. The failure of past aggression, the overwhelming public apathy towards foreign affairs, and the presence of strong, media-savvy anti-imperialist forces within Russia itself all indicate that jingoistic appeals are unlikely to sway the hearts of voters. While his government may not be long for this world,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Primakov's initial appointments suggest that even his team will prove unwilling to pay the price of CIS integration. Initially, for the critical post of finance minister, he has retained Mikhail Zadornov, who championed tight budgets in the same job under both Kiriyenko and Chernomyrdin. It is also very significant that Primakov's first appointment for deputy prime minister responsible for finance was Aleksandr Shokhin, the man who as deputy prime minister and minister of economics helped lead Russia's anti-imperialist forces in killing the Ruble Zone of a New Type and the Russian-Belorussian monetary union initiatives in 1993–94. It must also be remembered that newly reappointed Central Bank chief Viktor Gerashchenko, scorned as the "world's worst central banker" by pundits a few years ago, acquiesced to the demise of the Ruble Zone of a New Type in late 1993, saying that it was much easier to run Russia's own economy without a common CIS currency.[22] Appointments such as Zadornov's and Shokhin's certainly suggest that fighting inflation and protecting Russia's reforms still remain higher priorities than reintegrating the CIS,[23] and the history of Gerashchenko underscores the power of Russia's anti-imperialist logic.

We should not expect, however, that the anti-imperialists will oppose every sort of integration. Indeed, the experiences of the European Union and NAFTA show that both business and parts of governments are likely to push for enhanced economic ties among the CIS states. But this is to be expected—both Russia and the newly independent states have the potential to prosper greatly from economic cooperation. The key, then, is to ensure that Russia's emerging business class does not collapse but grows and diversifies, and that it develops an interest in mutually beneficial ties with the NIS as opposed to exploitative ones. While the West cannot control Russia's behavior, wise policy may tip Moscow's political scales in the desired direction.

Implications for American Policy

The world community has vital interests at stake in former Soviet Eurasia, a region rich in both natural resources and weapons of mass destruction. If imperialist forces gain the upper hand in Russia, they would threaten not only global access to potentially vital energy reserves in the Caspian Sea basin, but also the balance of power and stability from Europe to the Pacific. The task of the developed nations is to do everything possible to ensure not only that the ex-Soviet states are strong enough to resist Russia but to ensure that the kind of Russia they face no longer needs resisting. This can be done by promoting the development of market-oriented forces within Russia, supporting the creation of joint ventures in the ex-Soviet empire that involve Russian partners, and

[22] See *Moscow Times*, Nov. 4, 1993.

[23] Shokhin unexpectedly resigned over a disagreement with Zadornov, but the priorities of the government have apparently remained intact.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

helping to build up the economies and polities of the states themselves, relaxing Western and Asian trade barriers that hurt their efforts to reorient their economies.

Initially, the West and Asia must continue to aid Russia directly in ways explicitly designed to strengthen political forces there that have interests in cooperative, not exploitative, relations with other CIS states. This means promoting policies that encourage fiscal discipline in Russia, since these will by extension discourage costly imperialist actions. This is by no means to deny the need for a social safety net in Russia or for an industrial policy there, but it is to say that tolerance for big deficits and fiscal slack more generally can have bad foreign policy implications. In addition, we can recognize that policies promoting market reform in Russia will create and strengthen socioeconomic groups that will back macroeconomic stability in the political arena. The West and Asia have both noted the need to promote marketization in Russia for the material sake of its people, but it is important for security reasons as well. Well-timed advice, both public and private, may go a long way towards these ends, since it may lend credibility to those Russian voices that are most wary of inflation's ill effects—although to be credible coming from the West, such advice must be sensitive to Russia's political and moral need to avert a social uprising by finding a way to pay its workers. We must go further, however, providing targeted aid designed specifically to reward such fiscally sound investments as building up a taxation infrastructure. If Russia is politically bound by its own past mistakes to print money to pay off its long-suffering workforce, we must resist the urge to write off Russia in our frustration. If, after undertaking such an inflationary policy, the government shows a sincere willingness to pursue the structural reforms necessary to restore macroeconomic stability and fiscal balance, we should spare no effort to support it in these aims. In addition, since political competition for votes undergirds the political strength of the anti-imperialists, the international community must continue to make support for Russian democracy a top foreign policy priority.

Secondly, the West should directly support joint ventures that include a Russian partner and at least one partner in a newly independent state.[24] The new Russian government, with its emphasis on rebuilding domestic industry, should be very receptive to such aid. It goes without saying that supported ventures should be well-structured, market-oriented projects, and not simply opportunities for Soviet-era industrial cronies to meet for a few drinks every once in a while. By virtue of its proximity and economic potential, Russia is inevitably going to play a major economic role in the CIS region. To create joint market-oriented ventures is to encourage Russia to play precisely the role we want it to. Thus, if a business with a powerful presence in Russia also has a strong interest in trade with Kazakhstan, it will oppose policies designed to destabilize Kazakhstan in the Russian political arena. And if this business has political patrons in Russia, they, too, will have an interest in ensuring friendly

[24] I am grateful to Michael Ochs for suggesting this implication of my general argument, although I bear all responsibility for any faults in the way it is developed here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and stable Russian relations with Kazakhstan so as to share in the greatest possible amount of wealth.

Recent developments in Russia's Caspian Sea oil policies dramatically demonstrate the power and importance of such leverage. The collapse of the Soviet Union left five states vying for control of immense oil reserves under the Caspian Sea, reserves which potentially rival Siberia, the North Sea, and maybe even the Middle East. Most of these resources are estimated to be off the shores of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. These countries, not surprisingly, have argued that the Caspian Sea must be divided into sectors, one for each littoral state, and have begun to develop "their" resources with the help of Western capital. Iran and Russia, drawing the short straws in the energy lottery, have argued that the "sea" is more properly defined as a "lake," in which case, under what they call international practice, all resources within it should be considered the *joint* property of every littoral state. Russia's Foreign Ministry thus declared as illegal all efforts to develop Caspian Sea oil without the involvement of Russia.

Azerbaijan's Aliev has implicitly understood the logic outlined above and included a Russian company in most of the key production-sharing agreements for the development of "his" Caspian oil fields. Strikingly, Russian companies, including such giants as LUKoil, have been clamoring to get a piece of this action. This produced the odd spectacle of the Russian Foreign Ministry's declaring Azerbaijan's deals invalid and unlawful at the same time that its own companies were eagerly participating in Azerbaijan's division of assets. As would be expected from the argument posed above, the Foreign Ministry did not make any serious moves to curtail its own industry's actions. The oil companies were certainly not hurt by the fact that former prime minister Chernomyrdin was regarded as the chief patron of Russia's energy sector. In fact, Russia has slowly but surely relaxed its "malevolent" claims on Caspian resources, and it does not take a specialist in Russian politics to conclude that its oil companies' interests had something to do with this. First, in late 1996, Russia announced that it would reduce its claim to co-ownership of the whole of the Caspian Sea to a claim that only the middle part of the sea (the "donut hole") should be considered the joint property of all littoral states.[25] In late 1997, Russian sources indicated that even this watered-down policy was to be altered, and by 1998 it abandoned this policy altogether, agreeing to a sectoral division of resources beneath the Caspian Sea.[26] The latest milestone in this process was erected in July 1998 with the agreement signed by Kazakhstan and Russia to divide the seabed and all the resources contained therein, leaving only the water itself subject to joint governance.[27] Having dropped its claim to a share of the underground resources off Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani shores, Russia has

[25] See "Pozitsiya Ashkhabada izmeneniy ne preterpela," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Mar. 11, 1997.
[26] See *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol. 1, no. 142, Part I, Oct. 20, 1997.
[27] *AFP*, July 6, 1998, in *Turkistan-Newsletter, BUSINESS*, vol. 98, no. 109, July 8, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emphasized a related but secondary argument that the main export pipeline should pass through its territory as opposed to that of Turkey or Iran.[28]

This example demonstrates how giving Russia a piece of the action can produce tangible results in foreign policy, moving it away from conflictual policies toward ones oriented to mutual gain. What should be encouraged, of course, is not a policy of letting Russia horn in on other countries' projects, fostering a sort of protection racket, but a process whereby other countries, too, are granted shares in key Russian projects that may affect them (for example, Russia's efforts to develop its own Caspian Sea resources or to provide transit for them). A good principle for Western and Asian foreign policy, therefore, would be to include Russia in a manner that is likely to promote cooperation and subvert interests in conflict and confrontation. Russian shares do not have to be controlling in any way—they need only be large enough to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation. Indeed, there is no particular reason why this policy should be limited to Russia, since there are certainly other states in the region that could stand to learn a lesson or two on the benefits of cooperation.

Finally, the developed countries of the West and Asia should support the economic and political development of the newly independent states lest they become too dependent on Russia. Such support would include opening up our own markets to goods from the ex-Soviet republics, giving them as many opportunities as possible to prosper in the international arena.

Conclusion

It should be clear that powerful political forces within Russia have incentive to veto costly efforts to reintegrate the CIS states despite the ongoing financial crisis. At the same time, Russian leaders are increasingly confronting the failure of their more malevolent policies in their Near Abroad. This failure is most starkly reflected in the emerging possibility that the CIS, under the influence of GUAM, may become a forum for *opposing* Russia instead of embracing it. The developed West and East have a strong interest in supporting political forces in Russia that will oppose coercive policies vis-à-vis its newly independent neighbors and that will promote cooperation and mutual gain. Critically, these forces can be *created*, not just supported, by international assistance carefully targeted to aid the anti-imperialists. The global community can promote market reform and budget responsibility, thereby strengthening the position of fiscal hawks in the Russian government who will pull the financial plug on costly imperialist ventures. More concretely, the West and Asia should actively support the creation of joint market-oriented ventures that include

[28] Competition over pipeline routes is to be expected in any case, although it is intriguing to consider that LUKoil *itself* might not object too vociferously to the main route's circumventing Russia if LUKoil is worried that Russia may want to upset the flow of oil in an effort to pressure Azerbaijan for political reasons. Likewise, it suggests that LUKoil would be a force against the political use of the pipeline should it wind up going through Russia, since such politicking may come at the expense of Russia's own oil barons.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partners from Russia and at least one newly independent state. Russia's recent abandonment of claims on Caspian Sea oil vividly demonstrates how economic actors will and can promote cooperation in foreign policy when they themselves see the profits that result. The durability of this "fiscal veto" on Russian imperialism suggests that, with proper international support, it is likely even to outlast President Yeltsin. A key to diplomacy in post–Cold War Eurasia, therefore, is to ensure that important political forces have a financial stake in peace and cooperation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize in History for 1986



. . . THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH

A Political History of the Space Age

WALTER A. McDOUGALL

"Exhaustively researched, brilliantly conceived, and beautifully written"—*New York Times Book Review*

This highly acclaimed study explores the space race from the faint beeps of *Sputnik I* to the heart-stopping achievements of *Apollo 11*. Drawing on published literature, archival sources in both the United States and Europe, interviews with key participants, and important declassified material, McDougall presents the stories of the U.S., European, and Soviet space programs as fascinating examples of comparative public policy. McDougall argues that the Soviet Union made its way into space first because it employed the world's first "technocracy." Discussing the political leadership of Khrushchev, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, he makes clear why the United States quickly developed its own version of state-driven technology, how it succeeded, and what it cost—materially and morally.

"[A] boldly conceived, elegantly written, and unfailingly provocative history of the new age of space."—*Science*

"Once every decade or so, a book comes along that stands by itself as a remarkable contribution to the literature of a field. Such a work is Walter A. McDougall's . . . *the Heavens and the Earth*."—*Technology and Culture*

$19.95 paperback

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Hampden Station, Baltimore, Maryland 21211
1-800-537-5487 • www.press.jhu.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germans On Their Future

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

As it began, so is our century drawing to a close, with Germany once again the economic powerhouse and geostrategic hub of Europe. What is remarkable is how quickly this happened, how unbidden and unanticipated: the toppling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989; the reunification a year later; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in late December 1991; a resurgent impetus to West European integration in 1992; and NATO enlargement, which was approved in July 1997 and will be formally consecrated in April 1999 on the occasion of NATO's fiftieth anniversary. This chain of events has profoundly affected Germany's situation, resulting in immediate benefits and even brighter long-term prospects.

For the first time since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949 and the painstaking process of creating democratic institutions, the German elite must look beyond the continuing task of state building and deal with a set of formidable new problems. The security concerns that dominated Bonn's outlook and led to its usual acquiescence to Washington's preferences on foreign policy and defense issues are now of secondary importance, and the mindset formed in a divided and dependent Germany that had little room for independent maneuver vis-à-vis a powerful Soviet Union and its East German satellite requires serious recalibration in Europe's changing environment.

German political elites are beginning to discuss their future, but mainly in establishmentarian settings such as research institutes and academic journals. Since all of them are government financed, adherence to the reigning consensus is expected—and generously rewarded. Though this does not exclude dissent or criticism, it sets de facto parameters that civil servant employees tend not to exceed. The dependency of the foreign policy/security community is reinforced by the traditionalist, hierarchical, and bureaucratized character of German institutional life. There are ways to operate within this confined environment that are tolerated by government, accepted by members of the policy community, and still conducive to a growing and thoughtful literature on relevant issues.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein is a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His published works include *Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia*, coedited with Stephen Blank (Duke University Press, 1997), and *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State*, with Nicolai Petro (Longman, 1997).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, when an institute or journal wants to air a sharp critique of some aspect of official policy, it may arrange to have a foreigner provide the contrarian perspective. That said, it is still important to pay close attention to the writings of Germans themselves on Germany's foreign and defense policies in the era ahead. Transitions are in the making. We need to understand better Germany's role in a Europe that may well be on the threshold of revolutionary socioeconomic, and perhaps even political, transformation.

During a recent two-month research stay in Germany to learn how Germans view their future in an evolving Europe, I met with politicians from the major parties, government officials, policy analysts, journalists, and academics. Each of the more than thirty interviews was at least one hour in duration; half of them were closer to two hours. The coverage of particular issues varied according to the interest of the interviewee. What I seek to present here are the principal positions and dissenting interpretations that emerged from these discussions.

Europeanization as Germany's National Interest

On the question of Germany's general foreign policy goals all the respondents believe that Germany's consistent course in foreign policy since the 1950s has been guided by a quest for security and stability within the European framework. To this day, Germans are comfortable discussing foreign policy and security issues only in the context of "European" or multilateral approaches and solutions. They are wary of any formulation that might imply a revived nationalism, and virtually none of them spoke in terms of "the national interest"—a suspect term. The main characteristics of Germany's European orientation are reconciliation with France, West European integration, close cooperation with the United States, both bilaterally and within NATO, friendly relations with all nine countries on its borders, and good relations with Russia, though this has become less urgent since reunification and Russia's economic decline under Yeltsin. A return to a "Germany first" outlook is not even considered a remote option, despite occasional disconcerting rumbles from the marginalized extreme Right.

The Europeanization of German foreign policy is extensive and multifaceted. Germany strongly supports the network of interlocking economic, security, and political organizations that includes the European Union (EU) and the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Council of Europe, the Western European Union (WEU) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Parliament, and NATO, whose continued paramountcy is likely but not as inevitable as during the Cold War. Through this pervasive multilateralism, Germany is working to strengthen European institutions and consensual policy-making processes. As avid joiners whose pronouncedly "European" orientation often contrasts favorably with the transparently nationalistic positions of France and Great Britain, Germans play prominent roles in all European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations. What seems to underlie their behavior is a commitment to functionalism, a creed that ascribes transformative qualities to cooperation in specialized areas or activities of an economic, social, military, environmental, scientific, or juridical character. This increased interaction, its proponents postulate, will eventually lead, somehow, to political union or, as one skeptical journalist described it, "integration on the sly."

Several respondents stressed the centrality of "civilian power." In their view, Germany's constitutional democracy made possible the agreement on foreign policy that dominates the political arena and avoids traditional balance-of-power behavior. The existence of a stable political consensus enhances the leadership's management of foreign policy. Thus far it has been very much the handiwork of a succession of independent-minded, determined civilian helmsmen following a "European" course: Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl, in particular. Acting on their own, they pioneered and persisted, keeping the career civil service and professional military from wielding anything like the influence they once did, and relying instead on a trusted adviser or two.[1]

"Germans have little to say about the future. They are shy of the vision thing."

But the past remains an uncertain guide to the future and the consensus that permitted the basic continuity in foreign policy for more that forty years may not be indefinitely sustainable. With the introduction of the Euro as the EU's common currency on January 1, 1999, and its intended intensification of West European integration, for example, the pressure will mount for clear-cut positions on the conflictual policy choices inherent in the move toward European monetary union. For instance, will the newly created European Central Bank (ECB) function as an independent, transnational institution or as quasi-adjunct to sovereign states? Will it require member governments to live up to their commitments to keep national budget deficits below the threshold of 3 percent of GNP? Will it foster or attenuate the impetus toward a single currency and a single market by the year 2002? The paucity of thinking about dilemmas and alternative futures could quickly create problems that might seriously undermine integration and arrest the advance toward a "European" identity. One long-time commentator on defense issues noted: "Thus far, Germans have had little to say on the subject of the future. They are shy of the vision thing." Electoral politics may force the elite to consider alternative policies.

Europe: A Destination with no Autobahn

In discussions of Germany's foreign policy priorities and main dilemmas, without exception all those interviewed identified the need to deepen EU

[1] For example, Joachim Bitterlich has been Chancellor Helmut Kohl's gray eminence at least since 1987. "Joachim Bitterlich, Europe's Quiet String-puller," *Economist*, May 23, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

integration. This was considered intrinsic not only to Germany's continued Europeanization, but also to its reconciliation with France. Over the next generation, stressed one former high-ranking official, Franco-German cooperation was of paramount importance: "Recall: whereas Germany and the United States were enemies twice in a generation, Germany and France were enemies for more than a thousand years, hence the significance of their developing friendship."

European integration could, respondents believed, surmount the weaknesses of the nation-state system that caused two world wars. Much has already been achieved in creating a common trade and commercial community. A giant step will be attempted when EMU introduces the Euro and phases out all other currencies over a three-year period. To make this possible, Chancellor Helmut Kohl took a calculated risk, when, in early May 1998, he succumbed to French pressure and agreed that the first president of the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank would "voluntarily" step down after four years of his eight-year term: Wim Duisenberg of the Netherlands will turn over leadership for the next four years to France's candidate, Jean-Claude Trichet. None of this sat well in Germany. Already uneasy over the plan to abolish the Deutschmark, Germans worry about the soundness of the Euro and the ECB.

With Chancellor Kohl and his generation of Europeanists soon to pass leadership to a generation that is less francophile and less enthusiastic about full integration,[2] a number of questions worried those interviewed: How do we pass on our policy to the next generation? What needs to be done to strengthen the shared sense of mutual interdependency? And how will integration contribute to solutions of the EU's socioeconomic problems, that is, unemployment, illegal immigration, disparities in welfare policies and costs, and coping with non-indigenous ethno-religious minorities?

Officials are bullish on EMU, with Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel hailing it as "the modernizer of Europe," destined to create a true "partnership of equals" (between the European Union and the United States).[3] One journalist was confident that in five years "perhaps as much as 40 percent of the world's currency reserves will be held in Euros" and the EU will be a major global actor. Most interviewees, however, thought EMU would be a success, but were less extravagant in their expectations. They saw it as Germany's supreme effort to bind itself irrevocably to France. To this end, at Maastricht in December 1991 (where the treaty mandating a European Central Bank and common currency was signed), Chancellor Kohl gave way to then-French president François

[2] According to a prominent German newspaper editor, one poll showed that while 54 percent of Germans consider the French their best friends in Europe, "60 percent believe that this friendship is 'something that exists only in the minds of politicians.' Among the respondents under 30, the rate is even 77 percent." "Estrangement on the Rhine," Foreign Broadcast Information Service/Western Europe (hereafter referred to as FBIS-WEU), number 97-189, July 8, 1997, from *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 4, 1997.

[3] "U.S.-German Conference Seeks to Define 'Intellectual Leadership' for the 21st century," *This Week in Germany*, March 27, 1998, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mitterrand's insistence that monetary union take precedence over political union, which was deferred for an unspecified period.

Euroskeptics disparage the accord cobbled together at Maastricht. They argue that the member states (twelve at the time) believed that political union was a necessary concomitant to monetary union and that national electorates would be supportive only if such a far-reaching transformation was embraced. Anything less would expose EMU to charges of being undemocratic and illegitimate, an unnatural offspring of the Brussels technocrats.

Despite doubts as to its efficacy, most respondents see EMU as inevitable. Shrugging off invitations to speculate on the difficulties likely to be encountered in the initial stages, they dwelt instead on the psychological and political importance of what is transpiring. By implication, failure was too intolerable to contemplate—it would signify nothing less than disillusionment with the European idea and a return to the nation-state mentality. For the moment, the mordant musings of Winfried Muenster, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*'s economic commentator and a Eurocritic, exemplify the prevailing mood:

> What is clear is that what seemed inconceivable at the time of Maastricht is now happening: a currency is being created for a Europe that does not exist yet. This means that this currency cannot last, does it not? It can! Chancellor Kohl does not give a damn about the insights of Maastricht. If the situation requires it, he will preach the opposite: back then, the political union was a precondition for EMU. Today, the Euro is a precondition for the truly united Europe.
>
> Doubts are un-European, and thus inappropriate.
>
> Believing is a European citizen's first duty.[4]

Optimists hope ("believe" would be too strong a term) that a successful Euro will nudge the EU toward greater political unity. Pessimists consider this Euro-wistfulness. In the absence of political will to forge a tighter political-security community, a common currency will influence monetary and economic policy, but not foreign policy or how the EU relates to the international system. In these circumstances, noted one respondent, Europe may go the way of Japan. That is, it might possess a strong currency, but a weak government with little political influence beyond its immediate region. For despite the great distance thus far traversed by EMU, Europe has little to show in the security-political realm on such matters as common procurement policy, common defense production, or common defense planning.

All of this is doubly disappointing to many of the respondents, since in addition to EMU, Maastricht called for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). But nothing happened for several years, apart from a series of vague declarations. Then, on September 1, 1994, Dr. Karl Lamers, a member of the Bundestag, published a memorandum, "Reflections on European Policy," which

[4] Winfried Muenster, in "Where is the European Idea?" FBIS-WEU-98-061, March 2, 1998, from *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 1, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

argued for decisive Franco-German steps toward creating a "federal state" and pushed the French to expound on their conditions for political union. A member of Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Lamers is the party's foremost thinker on foreign policy issues, widely respected and intellectually formidable. In his memorandum, he expresses fear that the EU is in danger of becoming "a loosely knit grouping of states" restricted to certain economic concerns, a narrowly conceived free trade zone. Convinced that Germany's security and future lie in an expanded and deepened European identity, he seeks a system that combines "control over Germany by its partners with control over these partners by Germany." The key to enhanced European integration is to be found in strengthening the "special relationship" between France and Germany:

> If Germany puts forward clear and unequivocal proposals, then France must make equally clear and unequivocal decisions. It must rectify the impression that, although it allows no doubt as to its basic will to pursue European integration, it often hesitates in taking concrete steps towards this objective—its notion of the unsurrenderable sovereignty of the "État nation" still carries weight, although this sovereignty has long since become an empty shell.

There must be a debate, wrote Lamers, on the long-term contact of "a common foreign and security policy."[5]

According to respondents well acquainted with the many searching discussions of the Lamers Memorandum in foreign policy circles in Germany and other countries of Western Europe, "so far, we have never had a fundamental dialogue with the French on the main issues." French analysts apparently take Lamers' point that political unity can assure France against a hegemonic Germany, but they say that to transfer sovereignty to a supranational organization is contrary to the national traditions of France, which insists on retaining the right to decide what its options should be.

EMU and CFSP present dilemmas for the Germans who would not want to have to choose between France and the United States. Admittedly, neither do they altogether dislike the mediatory cusp on which they are often placed: between placating the French and deferring to the Americans, the Germans have thus far been able to sustain the uncertain course toward European integration. They appreciate France's psychological need to feel equal to the United States and its aim of strengthening Europe as a counterweight to the "arrogant Americans." However, unlike what many Americans believe, the Germans consider that France is really more pro-French than anti-American, and will not play the part of "vassal" in any U.S. script for "partnership" with Europe. France uses Germany's desire to further the European idea in order to exercise its own leverage in dealing with Germany, knowing full well that Western Europe might accept a French leadership role, but never a German one. Hence Germany's concessions to gain French support for incremental

[5] Karl Lamers, "Reflections on European Policy," CDU/CSU-Fraktion des deutschen Bundestages (Bonn, September 1, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advances to further European integration. Thus far, the Germans have successfully maneuvered between the French and the Americans without alienating either ally.

The absence of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy remains the key to American influence. Nowhere is this more apparent, noted a number of respondents sympathetic to the French position, than in NATO. If the alliance is to continue, its main purpose must not be merely to keep the United States in Europe, but rather to evolve into a genuine transatlantic partnership. "The United States is so used to a commanding role," said a prominent analyst at a leading research institute, "that it acts as if the alliance is still what it was during the Cold War. Western Europe bears more than 80 percent of the costs, but it is the U.S. that holds more than 80 percent of the top posts. There must be a European-U.S. partnership within NATO."

That Washington has consistently mishandled Paris, as on the matter of NATO's Mediterranean Command, was a point frequently made. In December 1995, President Jacques Chirac had signaled France's readiness to return to NATO's Military Command for the first time since 1966, subject to some modifications in NATO's structure. He thought, in particular, that NATO's Southern (Mediterranean) Command should be headed by a Frenchman. Germany's Defense Minister Volker Rühe initially backed the French, but found himself overruled by the chancellor's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which succumbed to pressure from Washington.

Several German analysts admitted that any American president who sought to place the U.S. Sixth Fleet under a foreign admiral could expect strong opposition from the Pentagon. So much more was this the case with a president who lacks credibility with the military. Still, argue the Germans, the issues could have been handled more diplomatically if Washington really valued its French connection. How to keep the United States committed to NATO and, at the same time, strengthen NATO's "European" dimension without weakening the U.S.-German relationship is the dilemma for the German leadership.

Limiting an Enlarged NATO

All those interviewed looked upon NATO enlargement as a favorable development for Germany. The leadership lobbied hard for it, primarily to end Germany's status as a frontline state. With the addition of Poland and the Czech Republic (as well as Hungary, which does not border Germany), Germany feels more secure. Now, of the nine countries on its borders, seven are NATO allies (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, and the Czech Republic), and two are friendly neutrals (Austria and Switzerland). Defense Minister Rühe was a forceful proponent from 1993 on, in contrast to Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who, according to one Bundestag member, did "not understand what enlargement was about."

Rühe was described as smart, ambitious, and very effective in bringing order to the Ministry of Defense. In addition to "building stability" along

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany's eastern border, Germans expect the membership of Poland and the Czech Republic to bring an end to their carping about Germany's past and lead instead to cooperation in looking to the future: "Reconciliation is an act that requires reciprocity," said one academic. NATO enlargement helps finalize the transformation of the German-Polish relationship. Bilaterally, the two countries had previously signed treaties recognizing the Oder and Neisse Rivers as their border and the rights of minorities in each other's countries, and Poland's entry into NATO formalizes their mutual journey from enemy to ally. Moreover, Rühe has been instrumental in organizing "the Weimar Triangle" of Germany, Poland, and France, which is a prestigious symbol for Poland and reassuring to France, since it signifies a German interest in having France more engaged in Central and Eastern Europe. He believes the addition of the three new members is "exporting stability," because with enhanced security they are less likely to persist in agitating for rectification of past injustices, imagined and real, by their neighbors.

None of those interviewed expected NATO enlargement to have any adverse consequences for Germany's relations with France. To be sure, they conceded, simple geography suggested that Germany would enjoy advantages in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) more tangible and immediate than would France, including market access, cheap labor, and financial-industrial penetration. And a few would have preferred concurrent admission of the new NATO members to the EU, so as to facilitate NATO's transformation from an organization of collective defense to an organization of collective security, to allay Russia's anxieties over NATO's military expansion, and to stimulate greater efforts in other CEE countries to prepare themselves for admission in the future. But notwithstanding the strong support for the first *tranche* of NATO enlargement, most respondents opposed the admission of any additional members during the next decade, although a few did argue for rapid inclusion of the Baltic states. They were dismissive of Russia's objections. Two analysts said Russia's criticisms were "a tempest in a teapot," to be soon forgotten, and that what happens in the Conventional Force Reduction Talks in Europe (CFE) would prove far more important to the institutionalization of security on the European continent.

The divide between the pros and the cons on admission of the Baltic states was pronounced: the former argued that it would foster stability in Europe and that Russia would come to accept the result; the latter were concerned that a second *tranche* would complicate the negotiation of security issues with Russia, dilute Washington's readiness to undertake Article Five obligations to consider "an armed attack against one or more" NATO members as "an attack against them all," and weaken the coherence of NATO's core security community.

A former influential foreign policy adviser considered the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary justifiable, but worried that an "enlargement of enlargement" would spawn uncertainty rather than stability and repolarize the European continent for no valid purpose. In his view, security in Europe cannot be assured without the participation of Russia, which today is weak and no threat. If dealing with Russia once again becomes a source of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

divisiveness in the West, he fears the result will be to arrest rather than advance European integration.

For the most part, German respondents postulated strategic and political imperatives as the primary determinants impelling the U.S. policy of enlarging NATO, and not the reasons offered by the Clinton administration, namely, to promote democracy and free markets. Two underlying U.S. motives particularly struck them: the search for a rationale to retain NATO in order to consolidate the U.S. hegemonic position in Europe, and the transformation of NATO into a more malleable instrument to wield in "out-of-area" crises. With the end of the Cold War, the logic behind NATO had to be reinvented, lest the alliance go the way of all previous alliances when the threat that gave rise to them disappeared. To justify their pro-enlargement stance, many in the U.S. Senate seized on Russia's "potential" for again posing a threat, in part because there do still exist deep-rooted suspicions of Russian imperial ambitions, but in part because an anti-Russian animus plays well electorally among potentially active ethnic groups. It is important in this regard that alone among the ex-Soviet republics, only Russia has no ethnic constituency in the United States that feels emotionally enough attached to the old country to lobby strongly for closer ties.

For the United States to retain its preeminence in Europe, it had to appear to embrace a "European" agenda. Few in Western Europe wanted NATO enlargement, but none could resist U.S. pressures for advancing democracy to Central and Eastern Europe and endorsing these countries' "return to Europe." Given the mythology surrounding the "sellout" at Munich in 1938 and Yalta in 1945, and the residual guilt over what might have been done at different times for victims of aggression, West European rejection of those whom the United States sponsored for the first *tranche* of NATO expansion was politically impossible. Yet few Germans thought the United States had a long-term policy in Europe other than strengthening its own domination of NATO. If there had been a desire to advance the integration of Europe, went the argument, the U.S. would have insisted that the three new members of NATO be admitted to the EU at the same time, or even earlier, but this was never considered by the Americans. The only enlargement the United States was interested in was NATO's.

Clearly attuned to *Realpolitik*, German analysts understood the U.S. decision to take advantage of Russia's weakness to further its own interests. Economic motives were present, but believed to be secondary to geostrategic factors. Enlargement guarantees a U.S. presence in Central and Eastern Europe, thereby lessening Germany's influence, and thus makes the small countries of the region more secure in their relations with both Germany and Russia. Indeed, it also inhibits the development of a special German-Russian relationship. There was general agreement with Rühe's comment that NATO would have become extinct like a dinosaur had the United States not acted assertively to expand the alliance and invest it with new responsibilities.

Some, however, were uneasy at the thought of another, even more precipitate, enlargement, this time to encompass the Baltic states. The argument

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was premised as follows. The United States is not as strong as it believes. While its military capabilities are impressive, the utility of its military power is attenuated in periods of peace by its variable political will and erratic diplomatic skill. Thus, after first promoting the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which foolishly put Russia on a par with Kazakhstan, Estonia, and other weak members of the former Soviet Union, the United States abruptly superseded PFP with NATO enlargement, without enunciating any clear-cut strategic purpose or timetable. While generally comfortable with the first *tranche*, a former important government official, several current Bundestag members, and two influential journalists worried about being suddenly confronted by an American decision to expand NATO further and being forced to go along with it. They also fretted about the continued credibility of Article Five of the NATO treaty, and what the U.S. plan for conventional and nuclear deployments would be in the event of a new polarization in Europe sparked by Russian ire over the admission of the Baltic states to NATO.

All those interviewed admitted the German government would eventually follow the American lead, but they were concerned about the effect on Europe of a military enlargement divorced from economic and political integration. They believe that NATO, to be durable, needs more than strong structures; it needs an underlying sense of common destiny.

On Russia: No Push to the East

The prevailing view of the state of German-Russian relations is that they are good, but not growing. Nor is this status quo likely to alter much in the foreseeable future, given Germany's absorption with EMU and other aspects of EU integration, the socioeconomic problems of East Germany's transition, and the absence of any serious disagreements between Bonn and Moscow. Economically, moreover, Germany does not rely as much on Russian energy or raw materials and German firms have not found Russia's investment climate attractive. Indeed, they prefer to maintain a low profile while American businesses try their hands at seeking profits in the increasingly inhospitable Russian environment.

On the diplomatic level, Germany practices damage-limitation. Through high-level summits and active economic, military, and cultural ties, it hopes to insulate German-Russian bilateral relations from Russia's interaction with NATO and the United States, and thereby minimize the friction that stems from NATO enlargement. Nevertheless, the view was widely shared that German policy toward Russia is not well thought out and that it is very much hostage to German-American relations. There was anxiety, too, over the tendency to personalize relations between Germany and Russia, as evinced, said one senior analyst, by the inordinate focus on insubstantial Kohl-Yeltsin summits and the narrow range of Russians who are regularly invited to conferences and seminars. "The Arbatovs, the Karaganovs, the Yavlinskys are articulate, interesting, reasonable, but they have an agenda, namely, to keep alive the notion of Russia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a great power. If we accept their assessments as accurate depictions of Russian reality, we could lose sight of turbulent undercurrents that are far less benign and manageable."

There was general agreement with the veteran diplomat who negotiated with Moscow during the Brezhnev era that Russia's elites are suspicious of NATO enlargement—and even of the West. In his judgment, U.S.-led policy is isolating Russia, instead of binding it to Europe. The Russia-NATO Founding Act of May 27, 1997, intended as compensation for Moscow's acceptance of enlargement by presumably giving it a say on NATO issues, is little more than another forum for papering over political differences. He cautions that the Russians will not swallow a second *tranche* encompassing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as easily as they did the first.

A number of military analysts also doubt that the Russian General Staff is indifferent to NATO enlargement, and attribute its inaction to incapacity to do otherwise: no money, lack of resources, an eroding military capability, half-hearted reforms, arrested modernization. Included in this group are those who believe the future of CFE agreements will be more significant in defining the character of German-Russian relations. They laud Defense Minister Rühe's fostering of high-level exchanges of officers and lobbying for the purchase of Antonov military transports in order to open links to Russia's military-industrial complex. In a discussion at one of the research institutes, another respondent downplayed efforts to generalize about Russia: "There is no authoritative Russian government, only small cohorts of tentatively aligned individuals operating in fluid, weak institutional settings." In such circumstances, he noted, it is impossible to ascertain whence will come a credible or coherent Russian policy.

A prominent specialist on Russia believes it will remain of "primary political interest," but only of "secondary economic interest." The Bonn bureaucrats prefer dealing with Moscow to courting the East Europeans. They are lukewarm toward reconciliation with Poland and disdainful of the Czechs, a result of poor chemistry between Kohl and Vaclav Klaus, and of lingering irritation arising from vestigial Czech and German claims and counterclaims.[6]

None of the Germans thought a revived Rapallo-type relationship was in the cards.[7] With its newfound sense of security, commitment to European integration, attachment to NATO, export-oriented economy, and democratic character, Germany is wedded to the West. Like Russia, it lost its former neo-imperial option in Central and Eastern Europe. "Going it alone" makes no sense, not for Germany and not for the United States, which, they contended, by its leading role in enlarging NATO has for the first time in its history committed itself in peacetime conditions to the defense of Europe and thereby relinquished the option of withdrawing from the continent.

[6] On July 17, 1998, Vaclav Klaus was replaced by Milos Zeman as prime minster of the Czech Republic, after his party fared poorly in the June 1998 parliamentary elections.

[7] This is a reference to the 1922 Rapallo Treaty in which Weimar Germany and the new Soviet Union established close ties, much to the consternation of the British and French.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Primacy of Domestic Policy

In an interview with the Munich *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Foreign Minister Kinkel said, "An efficient domestic policy is the precondition for the capability to act in foreign policy."[8] No more than an exercise in boosterism, his comments did not mention a single issue with foreign policy implications. By contrast, all respondents spoke trenchantly on domestic problems that would inevitably have an impact on Germany's foreign policy.

The most commonly mentioned problem impinging on Germany's ability to play a crucial role in the integration of Europe related to efforts to integrate the two Germanys. In 1990, in his eagerness to shepherd East Germany back into the German fold, Chancellor Kohl oversold unification, telling the German people that not only would most of them be better off but that no one would be worse off. Almost a decade later, his promise is far from realization, notwithstanding the transfer of upwards of $300 billion into former East Germany. Only former chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke to the necessity for sacrifice by all Germans in order to redress the inequities of the period of Soviet/communist rule and bridge the political, economic, cultural, and psychological divide.

Today it is West Germans who dominate the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and the interior: in short, the "Wessies" control foreign policy. The impact of forty-five years of totalitarian rule and centralized economic planning cannot be reversed in a generation, even less so in a decade. Few of the 18 million Germans living in the east have migrated to the west, and many are angry and bitter at their second-class status. A scientist working in the Berlin suburbs at an institute that employs several Ph.D.s from East Germany tells of different salary scales, different work ethics, and different modes of social behavior. A telling commentary on the virtual absence of social mobility comes from a scientist working in Potsdam: "In 1994, in the city of Berlin, more than 99 percent of the marriages were of West Berliners to other West Berliners and of East Berliners to other East Berliners; only 1 percent involved "mixed" marriages. East Germans cannot resist an occasional dig at the "Wessies" (as they call the West Germans): "What's the difference between the Wessies and the Russians?" goes the joke. "At least we could get rid of the Russians."

If nationalism has a major revival in Germany, it will probably manifest itself first in former East Germany, where the roots of democracy are thinly implanted and where multiculturalism and the tolerance that usually typifies it are not much in evidence. While not completely disagreeing with this thesis, one East German thought that when West Germans talk to Americans they tend to blame nationalism and extremism on East Germany, whereas in fact the situation is more fluid. He believed that the uneasiness that might rekindle a strong nationalism has multiple facets: fear of the Euro, attachment to the Deutschmark, opposition to loosening citizenship laws, and persistent unemployment. In the same vein, an astute media producer dwelt on the relationship

[8] "Kinkel: Indulging in Self-Contemplation Harms Bonn's Image Abroad," FBIS-WEU-97-228, August 16, 1997, from *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 16, 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between a strong democracy and cultural diversity: where democracy is weak, the introduction of nontraditional cultural influences can have disruptive political consequences, hence the emergence of "skinhead" violence in former East Germany is no accident.

Concomitant with the problem of attempting to acculturate East Germans to the more "European-oriented," diverse, and open, but individualistic consumer society found in West Germany is an unemployment problem almost as serious as the one in 1932 that helped bring Hitler to power. For the moment, the five million unemployed (25 percent in East Germany) are more a psychological problem than an economic one, because thanks to generous welfare benefits few are living in poverty. But a solution is elusive. The rate of job growth, already low, is impeded by a restrictive, high-priced labor market, overregulation of business, too little entrepreneurial risk-taking, and a subculture of cheap foreign labor. EMU is not expected to reduce Germany's unemployment, at least not in the short term, even if it proves to be successful.

No one was eager for Germany to become a polyglot country of immigrants.

The situation is particularly difficult in former East Germany where over 50 percent of the unemployed are under the age of twenty-five, and few in this cohort have ever had a steady job. Their alienation has become a matter of growing concern in elite circles ever since the local elections in the state of Saxony-Anhalt in May 1998, when the extreme right German People's Union (DVU), campaigning on an antiforeigner platform, unexpectedly captured 13 percent of the vote. A former television journalist and educator expressed confidence in German democracy and cautioned against overreacting. He noted that elections have taken place on schedule, that the main political parties share a broad consensus on democratic values, and that those parties continue to attract the support of the more than 80 percent of the Germans who vote—a voter turnout, in other words, almost double that of Americans. In such a setting extremists will have a hard time breaking the democratic mold. "Admittedly," he acknowledged, "Germany has also been lucky in that no charismatic demagogue has appeared on the political stage."

Still, the growing number of non-German residents may impel the leadership to redefine the parameters of their democracy, particularly if future elections reveal xenophobia to be a correlate of unemployment, abandonment of the Deutschmark, and appeals to nationalism. A key question—can Germany's democracy flourish without becoming multiethnic and multicultural—was one my respondents chose not to probe. A number said they did not think Turks or Muslims could ever assimilate; the majority expressed optimism that the necessary adaptation would come in time but were vague as to how or when; and, interestingly, none was eager for the prospect of Germany's becoming, like the United States, a polyglot country of immigrants.

Legal aliens now constitute almost 9 percent of Germany's population of 81 million. Of these 7.3 million, more than 2 million come from Turkey,[9]

[9] *Facts About Germany* (Frankfurt am Main: Societats-Verlag, 1996), p. 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but only 160,000 ethnic Turks have acquired the right to vote. Reformers in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) are trying to liberalize citizenship laws, but the alacrity with which bipartisan support has materialized for toughening laws and procedures dealing with "asylum seekers" and illegal immigrants suggests that the status quo may prevail indefinitely.

A former politician, still highly respected, said Germany is weaker than it seems from the outside. He saw little likelihood of any far-sighted legislation to address the problems noted above, or to undertake the much-needed reforms of higher education, small business operations, and trade unions. Today's "political class" was not, he mused, as capable as the one that led the country in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and this "insufficiency" will remain until a new generation takes over from "the class of '68," which is now coming to power. He had no doubt that Germany needed to look inward before it could hope to be influential abroad.

What Germans Want from America

In order to strengthen the German-American relationship, the following changes were what my respondents would like to see in U.S. policy and diplomacy. First, the United States should think and behave as a partner. The Cold War is over, and NATO must be transformed from a hegemonic alliance to one that more nearly reflects genuine partnership between Europe and the United States. A respected political commentator for a major newspaper expounded forcefully on points that were frequently made:

> There will be no backsliding from Germany's orientation toward Europe and commitment to European integration. That being said, the United States government should realize that Germany is more pro-American than any country in Europe, except Great Britain. It should stop hinting at a desire for a 'special relationship,' as Ambassador John Kornblum did soon after assuming his post in Bonn, when he declared that the United States preferred to deal with Germany on a bilateral basis rather than in the EU framework. The United States should stop trying to make Germany its 'Fifth Column' in Europe and respect Germany's role of loyal friend, albeit one whose core concerns center on Europe's integration. The United States must accept the EU as an entity, and not as fifteen members to be played off, one against the other. It is not unnatural for the West Europeans to aspire to cooperation that would permit them to hold their own in competition with the U.S. in aerospace, automaking, electronics, banking, and so forth. They want to be treated like transatlantic partners. Where there is competition, let the marketplace decide; where there are policy disagreements, let them be decided by negotiation, not *diktat.*

The Germans sharply criticized the U.S. attempt to develop a special relationship with Germany. They saw it as Washington's way of trying to weaken the German-French relationship. Continuing on this tack, they insisted, would weaken NATO. But at the same time, they were not averse to Germany's enjoying a special relationship with the United States akin to that of Great Britain.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A former official said the end of containment and the shared threat that gave rise to it means that a convergence of views between the United States and the West Europeans on key policy issues must be reforged. For alliance cohesion to hold firm, a searching reappraisal must take into account the different generational outlooks on security, the centrality of integration to West European elites, the asymmetrical response to globalization, the ambiguities of NATO enlargement, transnational approaches to crime, drugs, and terrorism, dissonances in the alliance occasioned by violent tribalism in the Balkans, Russia's continuing decline, and strategies for coping with tensions in the Middle East and Africa. NATO has hardly begun to refashion consensus on these issues.

Secondly, the Germans want the Americans to consult with them regularly. Their aims (which they viewed as synonymous with the EU's) often differ from those of the United States and require recognition and respect on divisive issues such as Iraq, Iran, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Libya. Timely consultation would avoid regrettable recriminations.

> The United States must not steamroller or stampede. It must not try to make Western Europe do whatever it wants, under the perennial threat to rethink U.S. commitments to Europe's defense. This is a no-win tactic. Nor should there be a repeat of the embarrassing spectacle of a U.S. senator shouting at German officials—'Who stands with us?'—such as occurred in February 1998, at the annual conference in Munich of German and American officials, where visiting congressmen demanded that Germany support the U.S. position on Iraq—or else.

My respondents considered it quite unforgivable that Chancellor Kohl, who immediately assented to the U.S. request for permission to use German bases in the event of hostilities with Iraq, had not been forewarned by the U.S. government about what it wanted. The details of what transpired at Munich are widely known in German political circles—and resented. To their credit, in commenting on this incident, Germans acknowledged that consulting with Western Europe is not always easy. The EU's inability to develop a common foreign and security policy and the failure of individual governments to think through their positions early enough to engage Washington in meaningful policy dialogue make consultation a frustrating process.

Thirdly, many wanted the United States to devote more attention to Germany. They lamented the passing of a generation of Americans who knew Europe and played vital roles in nurturing Germany's democratization and development: "U.S. policy was wise and far-sighted, one of the great successes of American diplomacy." But these days few congressmen visit, and those that do tend to be en route to somewhere deemed more important. They are all too often uninformed and uninterested. They lecture or "preach" and then leave, unaffected and without any greater understanding of the country, its people, problems, and culture. One scholar who lived in the United States for several years acidly deplored the failure of Americans to learn from the German experience in urban planning that has enabled them to create safe and livable cities, rich in culture and served by efficient mass transportation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All were generous in praise of America's creativity and openness, and in crediting the importance of their experience in the United States to their subsequent lives and careers. Perhaps the ultimate encomium came from a professor in Berlin. With the capital soon to move from Bonn to Berlin, I asked him what, given the opportunity, he would request of the president of the United States. He answered, "Induce U.S. airlines to introduce non-stop flights between Berlin and Washington."

Epilogue

On September 27, 1998, after sixteen years in office, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was defeated in his bid for an unprecedented fifth term. Not only was his party beaten but he himself lost his seat in the Bundestag. The victory by Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) epitomizes the generational shift in power under way: it is the first time that someone who was an infant at the end of the Second World War has become chancellor. And it is testament to the enduring vitality of the quip, "All politics are local," attributed to Tip O'Neill, former Democratic Party leader and Speaker of the House of Representatives. The domestic concerns that produced a 6 percent electoral shift from the CDU to the SPD were unemployment, fear of further cuts in social and health benefits, high taxes, and need for reforms in other spheres of German society.

As Schröder takes the helm, little is known of what he really thinks about foreign policy. During the election campaign, he affirmed his support for NATO, continuation of Germany's orientation toward European integration, and reconciliation with France, but time is needed to evaluate the coherence and quality of his outlook. If we assume, as seems reasonable at this time, a fundamental stability in the European environment within which Schröder will operate, there are, nonetheless, grounds for expecting shifts in German policy that could have important medium- and long-term consequences.

Schröder's acceptance of the Euro and need for European integration is a promising portent of continuity in German foreign policy, but his timetable and sense of urgency are likely to differ sharply from his predecessor's. For Kohl, Europeanization and all that it signifies for the transformation of Germany's relationship with Western Europe, especially with France, was a matter of the heart. For Schröder, the challenges inherent therein are tactical rather than principled. Hence attenuation of some aspects of Germany's attachment to integration may occur, particularly when EU demands on Germany's budgetary contributions conflict with the SPD's attempt to fulfill electoral promises made to core constituencies. In such circumstances, it may be said that the EU train to integration is on the track with a green light ahead, but is more likely than not to proceed at a much slower speed and to stop more frequently in response to local and national needs. The SPD may be expected to review the costs and implications of the sacrifices that European community building entails.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The depth of Schröder's commitment to integration will be put to an early test when Germany assumes the presidency of the EU for the first half of 1999. Even more important, perhaps, will be what we learn about how influential he really is with the power brokers in the SPD itself. Schröder's "centrism" is not universally embraced by party officials or the rank and file members. Unlike Britain's Tony Blair or France's Lionel Jospin, who are parliamentary as well as party leaders, Schröder does not control his own party, certainly not the way Kohl did the CDU when he was chancellor. Moreover, the German Social Democratic and French Socialist parties have always been stronger on the rhetoric promoting "internationalism" than on the building of viable, multinational, transnational institutions. It is the centrists and conservatives in their countries who have, for the most part, been in the forefront of Europeanization.

In the past, the core constituency of the SPD (as well as the Green Party) was opposed to a strong NATO, European integration, and diminished government regulation of the economy. Can Schröder forge party compromises on unionism and environmentalism in the interest of European integration? How fundamentally will Red-Green pressures for greater democratization, social welfare, and environmentalism in Germany conflict with the demands for strengthened EU institutions and also Germany's global competitiveness?

During the past decade, Germany has been the engine driving the historic transformation under way in Western Europe. In cooperating with EU members, Germany has consistently deferred to France's preferences. But now there are generational uncertainties, to which must be added the turmoil in the world economy and international system. Schröder's background suggests that he may be more comfortable with closer ties to Great Britain and the United States than to France. It is too soon to assess how, or indeed if, such sentiments will be translated into policy. Any emphasis on "normalcy"—a code word openly assigning prominence to "national interests" at the expense of "Europeanization" with its focus on Franco-German relations—would be a signal that the nation-state is alive and thriving, and that the creation of a "European identity" is still a distant dream. It is important for the United States and the countries of Western Europe to evaluate what Germany under Schröder will do to the essential national consensus that has dominated German foreign policy since 1949. Assessments may differ in various capitals, but there is no gainsaying the geostrategic, economic, and political reemergence of Germany at the epicenter of Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Princeton



Disarming Strangers

Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea

Leon V. Sigal

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post–Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately diffused.

"The most comprehensive treatment of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations available. . . . Sigal is at his best in describing the way governments actually come to make decisions."—Robert L. Gallucci, former U.S. Negotiator

Princeton Studies in International History and Politics: Jack L. Snyder and Richard H. Ullman, Editors

Cloth $29.95 ISBN 0-691-05797-4



Russia and Germany Reborn

Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe

Angela E. Stent

The relationship between Russia and Germany has been pivotal in some of the most fateful events of the twentieth century. This is the first book to examine the recent evolution of that relationship from both the Russian and German perspectives. Here Angela Stent combines interviews with key international figures—including Mikhail Gorbachev—with insights gleaned from newly declassified archives in East Germany and her own profound understanding of Russian-German relations.

"With well-honed insight and literary grace, Professor Stent brilliantly captures the key events and the dynamic leaders in the transformation from Cold War stalemate to a new Europe in search of itself."—Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Director, Aspen Institute, Berlin

Cloth $29.95 ISBN 0-691-05965-9 *Due December*



The Brink of Peace

The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations

Itamar Rabinovich

A major casualty of the assassin's bullet that struck down Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was a prospective peace accord between Syria and Israel. For the first time, Israel's ambassador to the U.S., and chief negotiator, tells the inside story of the failed negotiations.

"Written with gusto and clarity, this book combines scholarly depth with the unique perspective of a direct, key participant in the negotiations. . . . [A]n important contribution to the scholarship on the vital issue of peace in the Middle East."—Warren Christopher, former U.S. Secretary of State

Cloth $24.95 ISBN 0-691-05868-7

Princeton University Press

AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR CALL 800-777-4726 • HTTP://PUP.PRINCETON.EDU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essays

In Search of New Military Paradigms

by Andrew J. Bacevich

The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of the People. By Gary Hart. (New York: The Free Press, 1998. 188 pp. $23.00.)

Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster. By Brian Mitchell. (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1998. 390 pp. $24.95.)

How to Be a Cheap Hawk: The 1999 and 2000 Defense Budgets. By Michael O'Hanlon. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. 178 pp. $16.95.)

Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command. By Lewis Sorley. (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998. 364 pp. $39.95.)

In the post–Cold War era, military dominance has become a seemingly indelible part of the American national identity. Much as naval supremacy epitomized the British Empire and a powerful mass army embodied the values and aspirations of Wilhelmine Germany, military preeminence defines a large part of what we have become as a nation and people.

Americans today take it for granted that the United States should spend more on defense each year than the next several largest powers combined. They have come to expect that the United States will maintain indefinitely a defense establishment each of whose components is easily the most capable in the world. Despite the absence of any genuine threat to American security, they accept with hardly a murmur presidential decisions to dispatch U.S. forces for purposes and into regions far beyond the traditional scope of national interests. When, days after admitting publicly that he is a liar, the president of the United States appears on television to announce that he has found it necessary to attack two remote and utterly inconsequential countries, the applause is nearly unanimous. As Bill Clinton's America strides across his bridge into the twenty-first century, it does so bristling with arms, a fact that most of us, it appears, warmly endorse.

This is a striking departure from all previous eras of American history. For over two centuries prior to the present decade, with the passing of crisis,

Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of international relations at Boston University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States invariably dispersed the legions raised for a given war or emergency and the American military establishment retired forthwith to the margins of national life. However wasteful and at times ill advised, this was standard American practice, born of the suspicion of standing armies that formed part of the nation's political birthright. The sheer good fortune of being an ocean apart from any potential adversary permitted it. A limited and realistic definition of national interests sustained it. Underpinning these considerations was also the widespread belief that war and the continuous preparation for war that characterized Old World militarism should have no place in the "empire of liberty" being created in the New.

As a people enamored with military superiority, we know little about what soldiers actually do.

Yet if the departure from past practice in the 1990s is striking, more remarkable still is the fact that it has occurred in the virtual absence of controversy. On this point as on few others a broad national consensus exists: Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives seemingly agree that for the United States to remain the world's only military superpower in perpetuity serves the interests of American democracy and of the world as a whole.

That issue having been settled, Americans show remarkably little interest in exploring its implications. Overall public attentiveness to defense and national security affairs over the last decade has declined precipitously. The armed services, self-consciously viewing themselves as apart from (and perhaps superior to) the rest of American society, become matters of concern to the average citizen only sporadically. Even then, this being the 1990s, the subject more often than not relates to human frailty rather than matters of substance. As a people seemingly enamored with the idea of military superiority, we in fact know less and less about what soldiers, sailors, and airmen actually do, and what we do know tends to be titillating trivia about sexcapades in the ranks.

Far from impeding this process, leading American institutions are abetting it. In Congress, expertise on defense no longer carries the cachet or clout that it did in the days of Senators "Scoop" Jackson or Sam Nunn. The national security committees have faded into obscurity and no longer provide a forum for challenging official thinking as promulgated by the White House or the Pentagon. Much the same applies to journalism. With a few estimable exceptions such as Tom Ricks of the *Wall Street Journal*, the professional defense correspondent who makes a career of mastering and reporting military affairs has become a thing of the past. Again with a handful of exceptions, the history and political science departments of major universities have frozen out the study of war, strategy, and civil-military relations, deeming them unworthy of consideration in an age preoccupied with the trinity of race, gender, and sexual orientation. Likewise many of the major foundations that once sponsored research in areas related to national security have turned their attention elsewhere.

All of these trends are reflected in the quality and content of the writing on military matters that manages to survive. The books reviewed here offer a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sample of that writing and highlight the shortcomings of informed discourse on military affairs in this new era of American history.

How to Be a Cheap Hawk, by Michael O'Hanlon, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution, is a classic example of insider analysis that courts "policy relevance" by accepting uncritically the assumptions and agenda that currently prevail within the confines of the Beltway. The result is a monograph not entirely without merit: *How to Be a Cheap Hawk* is concise, fact-filled, and, at least within the limits of its self-prescribed charter, frequently sensible. Yet O'Hanlon's glib title, with its implied promise of resolving a fundamental dilemma, belies a focus that is excruciatingly narrow. The study is in fact a critique of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, one of a half-dozen high-profile exercises conducted over the past decade to assess the U.S. military posture. The chief accomplishment of these exercises has been to preempt possibilities for genuine reform, exacting incremental reductions in force structure in ways that have preserved the essential elements of the Cold War military. O'Hanlon's own contribution falls very much in this school.

Reflecting the conventional wisdom, O'Hanlon argues that the current U.S. defense budget of roughly $250 billion per year will not suffice to maintain the existing force at adequate levels of readiness while also modernizing that force and supporting post–Cold War contingencies. Accepting as givens both the ceiling on defense spending and the strategic imperative of intervention on a global scale, the author proposes a way to close the resource gap. The result is a modest near-term programmatic adjustment that would save $15 billion per year by scrapping the so-called Two Major Regional Contingencies strategy (think of two simultaneous Desert Storms) in favor of a formula based on "Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia." O'Hanlon uses this formula as the rationale for a variety of cost-saving initiatives: reducing the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal to START II levels even without Russian ratification of that treaty; sustaining forward-deployed naval forces by rotating crews rather than ships, thereby permitting cuts in the overall size of the fleet; bringing the marines home from Okinawa; shrinking the size of individual army units by using technology to boost their capabilities; reducing the purchases of expensive new combat aircraft; culling combat units out of the National Guard; and placing greater reliance on U.S. allies to help carry the load.

Bits and pieces of this menu deserve further consideration, but taken as a whole it does not make an especially satisfying meal. O'Hanlon ducks the big questions. He implicitly assumes a static world, minimizing the significance of China's emergence as a great power. He discounts the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation. He dismisses out of hand arguments that an ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs driven by cybernetics is transforming warfare. As a response to burgeoning difficulties with recruitment, retention, and morale, he deems it sufficient simply to offer the troops a fat pay raise. Absent from his argument altogether is any awareness of how the nature of American democracy might inform the content of American military policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The last point applies as well to *Women in the Military*, Brian Mitchell's impassioned brief against the feminization of the armed services. According to Mitchell, a former infantryman and author of an earlier book on the same subject, that process if unchecked threatens to leave "the American military no more disciplined, no more efficient, no more fearsome, no more military than the United States Postal Service" (p. xvii). For Mitchell, the solution is simple: get rid of the women, except perhaps for service well behind the lines in a few medical specialties. Turn back the clock to the days when the military was an exclusively male enclave of the strong, the brave, the selfless, and the patriotic.

According to Mitchell, recent military successes notwithstanding, Americans would be ill advised to take the effectiveness of U.S. forces for granted. He reminds his readers that unit cohesion, esprit de corps, discipline, and morale derive, at least in part, from a military culture and professional ethos that sustain soldierly values. He warns, correctly, that those who casually use the military as a laboratory for social experimentation or as a venue for promoting pet political causes are tampering with the nation's security. He argues convincingly that the huge increase in the proportion of women in the U.S. military—from 1.5 percent of the force in 1972 to 14 percent today, serving in a far broader range of specialties—has proceeded with scant regard for such considerations. In short, the implications of this change—particularly as it relates to women in combat—have by no means received the thoughtful, dispassionate attention that they deserve.

Regrettably, *Women in the Military* does little to correct that oversight. It is an overwrought, frequently shrill, mean-spirited rant that, in the end, does little to further the cause of informed discussion. The author's contempt for anyone not sharing his own dogmatic views and especially for any woman who presumes to think that she might serve her country is palpable. He attributes any action sympathetic to women, whether taken by a president, a flag officer, or a member of Congress, to cowardice or cynicism. To acknowledge that women just might contribute something useful to the nation's defense is to kowtow to radical feminism. In Mitchell's telling, a service chief who finds a place for women in his service is "gutless." He castigates such officers for being "unable or unwilling to defend their men, their service, or themselves" (p. 249).

Such intemperance leads the author to advance arguments that are downright silly. Thus, he ascribes the replacement of the venerable M1911 .45 automatic pistol with a lighter 9mm Beretta to the army's "need to accommodate smaller, weaker soldiers" (p. 146). (The actual motive was an interest in fielding a pistol accurate at ranges beyond twenty-five feet.) Mitchell argues that the services have made high school diplomas into a virtual prerequisite for enlistment "because women are more likely than men to have them" (p. 182). (In fact, successfully finishing high school offers the best indicator of whether any would-be enlistee, male or female, will succeed in military service.)

Are the armed forces in the era of Tailhook and Aberdeen and Sergeant Major Gene McKinney seemingly obsessed with sex? Mitchell attributes sexual misconduct by military men to the presence of women in uniform, somehow

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forgetting that, even before Betty Friedan and Patricia Schroeder, chastity and sexual reticence did not figure prominently among the martial virtues. Is discipline among male soldiers not what it ought to be? "The lack of discipline among men is itself the fault of a feminized force" (p. 150), Mitchell complains, conveniently ignoring data showing that by measures such as AWOL and court martial rates the present-day military is better behaved than was the all-male force of any earlier era.

The point is not to pretend that injecting large female contingents into each of the services is irrelevant to the question about how effectively those services will fight: on the contrary. But to define the challenges to combat effectiveness solely in terms of women is to oversimplify and distort matters considerably.

To define challenges to effectiveness solely in terms of women distorts matters considerably.

To the extent that the issue is one of inculcating soldiers with the warrior spirit, then feminism is by no means alone among the forces hostile to that spirit. The contemporary women's movement is after all merely one aspect of a much broader social and intellectual revolution. Arguably, the chief product of that revolution has been to legitimize a culture of radical individualism that is antithetical to traditional soldierly values. That revolution has transformed the attitudes and expectations of American men no less than of American women. Mitchell himself knows this: contriving a lame excuse for the outrageous conduct of the naval aviators attending the infamous Tailhook Convention of 1991, he observes that "no one seriously expected them to be 'officers and gentlemen' anymore. The word *gentleman* had lost all meaning; the concept no longer existed" (pp. 258–59). Indeed—but as that quotation suggests, Mitchell's real gripe is less with women than with a culture that has become coarse, dissolute, and self-indulgent. Consumed with animus for feminists and their agenda and nostalgic for old pistols and bygone days, he blinds himself to that fact.

Nostalgia of a different sort infuses *The Minuteman*, by Gary Hart, and undermines what might otherwise have been a valuable book. Hart, of course, is the former campaign manager for George McGovern, former Democratic senator, and one-time presidential aspirant who sank his own candidacy by frolicking with a woman not his wife. While serving in the Senate, Hart developed a reputation as a thoughtful and reform-minded critic of the official line coming out of the Pentagon. In his new book, he attempts to revive that role.

Among American defense experts today, the notion that the All-Volunteer Force created after the demise of the draft has been an unqualified success is an article of faith. Hart registers a dissent, chiding American citizens for entrusting their security to what earlier generations would have viewed with suspicion as a "standing army."

Harkening back to ancient tradition, Hart argues that in any healthy democracy an armed citizenry—a militia—should constitute the first line of defense. As an army composed of the people, a militia serves as a check against *militarism and imperialism. It guarantees popular attention to world affairs,*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

making it impossible for a foreign policy elite on its own to decide momentous questions of war and peace. It inoculates the country against the rise of an isolated and politically dangerous warrior class. Moreover, as Hart takes pains to emphasize, military service is inherently a good thing, "the fulfillment of citizenship and an honored privilege" (p. 81).

Alas, the author himself did not partake in this particular honor. Readers with a taste for irony will enjoy his tortured explanation of "passing through my draft years between the Korean and Vietnam wars" (p. xii) without ever managing to don a uniform. School, family, and career, it seems, combined to thwart his military aspirations. Now, however, he joins the swelling ranks of non-veteran Baby Boomers who "genuinely regret" not finding a way "to balance these other goals with active-duty military service" (p. xiii).

Intent on sparing future generations his disappointment, Hart proposes henceforth to make military service universal. He advocates having a revitalized and greatly expanded volunteer militia—in modern parlance, the National Guard and reserves—supplant active duty forces as the principal instrument of national military power. Hart would eliminate between one-half and two-thirds of the existing active force, tasking the remnant that survives with training the much-enlarged militia and responding to occasional crises as a global 911 force.

The problems with this scheme are legion. Chief among them is the fact that a mass citizen army is ill suited to the strategic requirements of a nation that, like it or not, has shouldered the responsibilities of global hegemony. The military correlative of hegemony is a force distinguished by four attributes. It should capitalize on the comparative advantage enjoyed by the imperial core (in the case of the United States, advanced technology). It should be prepared to fight on a moment's notice. It should possess the capability of deploying instantly to distant corners of the empire where the immediate stakes may appear obscure. And it should be willing to stay there forever, if need be.

These are not the attributes traditionally associated with militias. Indeed, given the cost of modern weaponry, a mass army based on an obligation of universal service and a high-tech force are fundamentally at odds with one another. A nation can have one but not both, as even the Israelis are discovering.

Furthermore, the combat readiness of reserve formations with their limited training opportunities tends to be problematic. Before being ready to fight, reserve units, with some few exceptions, must undergo a mobilization process that can stretch to weeks or months. Anticipating this criticism, Hart blames the active duty military for historically subverting Guard and reserve readiness. Indeed, relations between regulars and reservists, each camp pursuing its own political agenda, are frequently uneasy. But attributing shortcomings in reserve readiness to such tensions ignores structural factors of far greater consequence.

Finally, notwithstanding the participation of reservists in bloodless adventures such as Bosnia and Haiti, American history is replete with examples suggesting that the willingness of citizen-soldiers to garrison nasty outposts has strict limits. Whatever the virtues of the Minuteman, and they are considerable, he is always in a hurry to return home.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In alerting Americans to the perils inherent in absolving themselves of responsibility for their own defense, Gary Hart performs a useful service. Yet his proposal to shield the country from those dangers by reviving "an army of the people" is naive and impractical, while posing hazards of its own. Let the people be discomfited by the costs and the risks entailed in being a military superpower. That uneasiness and the wariness it inspires may yet help the United States manage the contradictions inherent in its dual identity as both democracy and empire.

General Harold K. Johnson, the subject of Lewis Sorley's biography *Honorable Warrior*, would have bridled at the very notion of an American empire. Sorley, author of an admiring biography of General Creighton Abrams, portrays Johnson as a brave and skillful soldier, a gifted and visionary leader, and above all as a man of integrity and character. It is on the latter score, in particular, that Sorley commends Johnson to our attention.

Based on Sorley's account, there can be no doubt that Johnson was a combat soldier of considerable ability and courage. Commissioned out of West Point in 1933, Johnson fought gallantly at Bataan and heroically endured more than three years of captivity in Japanese prison camps. In 1950, he returned to combat in Korea, commanding a regiment with genuine distinction.

Sorley's effort to depict Johnson the senior officer as someone possessed of imagination or originality is less persuasive. After Korea, Johnson never again held an operational command. Promoted to general officer, he progressed during the 1950s and early 1960s through a series of increasingly important staff assignments. But the dominant impression that emerges during this period is of energy and doggedness rather than brilliance. Johnson almost never socialized, seldom took leave, routinely stayed late at the office and worked weekends, always lugging home a briefcase stuffed with papers. As a staff officer, he never strayed too far from the conventions of the day but impressed superiors and subordinates alike by his sheer capacity for work. He was not flamboyant, but he was sound.

Those qualities caught the eye of Johnson's civilian masters who in 1964 appointed him army chief of staff. Vietnam dominated his tenure in office. His principal accomplishment as chief of staff was to provide General William Westmoreland with the wherewithal to fight the war. That monumental effort was for naught. At home, the parameters established by President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for conducting the war made military victory almost impossible to achieve. In Saigon, Westmoreland pursued a strategy of attrition that plunged U.S. forces into a futile and debilitating stalemate. By the time General Johnson retired in 1968, the war had come to be viewed as unwinnable, the country was awash with bitterness and cynicism, and Johnson's army was sliding ineluctably into a bleak period of decay and demoralization.

Throughout this period, in public, Johnson voiced steadfast support for administration policy and for Westmoreland. According to Sorley, however, General Johnson understood from the war's earliest days that the policies of the administration and the field commander were fundamentally flawed and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would lead to disaster. Behind the scenes, therefore, he advanced a few modest proposals for change, urging the president to call up the reserves and prodding Westy to emphasize pacification rather than the Big Unit war. These efforts had no discernible impact.

Along the way, Johnson agonized about whether or not he should resign in protest. In the end, of course, he soldiered on, a decision for which he never forgave himself. "I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out," he would later reflect. "I am now going to my grave with that lapse of moral courage on my back" (p. 304).

Inexplicably, in a lapse of authorial judgment that undermines the very premise of his book, Sorley takes it upon himself to absolve Johnson. Sorley insists that the general was too hard on himself and that "he had no choice" but to support the war. Indeed, he celebrates Johnson as a paragon of integrity and invites the reader to join him in admiring Johnson's singular grasp of "the ethics of command." Why then disregard Johnson's own judgment regarding the pivotal ethical dilemma that he himself confronted?

Sorley credits Johnson with knowing from the outset that Vietnam would end in a debacle, one due largely to the mismanagement of the war by the president, McNamara, and Westmoreland. If so, given the magnitude of the stakes, his willing and continuing complicity in such an enterprise did indeed constitute professional failure. Johnson's assessment of his own conduct is correct. Indeed, it is Johnson's capacity to *recognize* that failure and his refusal to let himself off the hook that transform him from a conventional soldier into a noteworthy and even admirable figure. To his enduring credit, Johnson at least retained the decency to confront his own conscience.

That the military professionals who do the dirty work of the world's only superpower will continue to confront equally perplexing matters of conscience seems all too likely. Whether a community of defense specialists preoccupied with technocratic issues, a culture that is itself morally adrift, and a public increasingly oblivious to military affairs will produce soldiers who possess the necessary moral acuity is another matter altogether.

The Reagan Legacy Up for Grabs

by Mark T. Clark

The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. By Beth A. Fischer. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1997. 176 pp. $27.50.)

Mark T. Clark is professor and chair of political science and director of the National Security Studies program at California State University, San Bernardino.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Reagan and the World. Edited by Eric J. Schmertz, Natalie Datlof, and Alexej Ugrinsky. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997. 552 pp. $85.00.)

The Falklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentina's Bomb. By Richard C. Thornton. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1998. 304 pp. $26.95.)

On The Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War. By Jay Winik. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 672 pp. $30.00.)

Ten years after the end of Ronald Reagan's presidency is a short time to wait for an accurate and balanced assessment of his foreign policy legacy—probably too short. Important documents that would shed light on his decisions remain classified and too many of the memoirs are of the "kick-and-tell" variety. More importantly, some of Reagan's earliest critics, such as Strobe Talbott, George Kennan, and Raymond Garthoff, have already revised what he accomplished, tarnishing or diminishing his successes. These critics would have us believe that he was not an effective president: his management style was too "hands-off," his economics drove deficits through the roof, and his foreign policy was reckless. If anything, he was lucky. Soon after his inauguration, Iran handed over the American hostages. He survived an assassination attempt. Soviet leaders kept dying until at last a moderate came to power. And apart from Iran-Contra, no serious foreign policy failure plagued his administration. Even "minor" failures like the marine barracks bombing in Lebanon were offset by successes—the invasion of Grenada, for example. Thus, he remained as popular when he left office as when he entered it.

Those images are changing, if ever so slightly. All four of the recently published books reviewed here portray Reagan as far more "hands-on" than revisionists allege. While Reagan had an executive style of management, on important issues he directed, or redirected, policy himself. Just as President Dwight Eisenhower was later discovered to have practiced a "hidden hand" presidency, Reagan was apparently far more involved in key foreign policy decisions than is generally known. Two of the works assess his overall foreign policy, while the other two focus on narrower parts of it, but for different reasons they still fall short of providing a complete picture of his legacy.

Neoconservatives as Heroes

Jay Winik's *On the Brink*, the first of two general assessments, is a sweeping story of the Reagan administration's victory in the Cold War, which the author considers comparable to the victories in both world wars. This extremely well-written and engaging book centers on the professional lives of four neoconservatives in the Reagan administration: Richard Perle, for the dominant role he played in the Department of Defense in arms control, nuclear strategy, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty interpretation dispute; Jeane Kirkpatrick, for her aggressive assertion of America's interests in the United Nations; Max Kampelman, for his leadership in carrying the Reagan strategy to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union in diplomatic negotiations; and Elliot Abrams, for his service in developing the Kirkpatrick doctrine in Latin America.

The story begins in the office of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson in the 1970s. Like many "Jackson Democrats," Perle worked diligently against the détente policies of the Nixon administration and the McGovern wing of the Democratic Party. Kirkpatrick, Kampelman, and Abrams, all Jackson Democrats, are brought into the narrative when, as a group, they confront President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Though their advice—and service—had been ignored previously, they hoped the president would finally pursue a tougher foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. But Carter rejected them again, and at the same time informed them that he was counting on their support in the election. It was then that many Jackson Democrats defected to the Republicans. Winik goes on to recount numerous personal stories of these neocons in the major foreign policy events of the Reagan years. Most notable are Richard Perle's "zero option" proposal for Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INFs) in Europe and subsequent arms control battles, as well as his role in the ABM Treaty interpretation dispute; Kirkpatrick's famous essay, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," which influenced U.S. policy in the Third World and her activism in the United Nations; Kampelman's work in securing Soviet acceptance of the U.S. definition of human rights in Helsinki and later, his skill at leading U.S. arms control delegations with the Soviets; and finally, Abrams's efforts to garner support for the Nicaraguan Contras, and his subsequent eclipse from power.

Central to the story, though, is Reagan himself. By restoring U.S. power and prestige internationally, increasing defense expenditures, and reasserting American interests in international forums, he informed the Soviets that détente was dead. But more specifically, Reagan instinctively shaped the outcomes of several decisive events that forced the Soviets to give up the Cold War. He accepted Perle's zero option proposal for INFs, an innovative arms control position that required both sides to eliminate such intermediate missile forces, and stubbornly resisted Soviet pressure to cancel missile deployment in Europe unilaterally. The Soviets blinked. Then, Reagan repeatedly rejected Soviet demands to halt development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. They blinked again. Finally, at Reykjavik, Iceland, Reagan negotiated Gorbachev into a corner, from which the Soviet leader concluded that he could not win the Cold War. The last decisive blink. Reagan not only held his own in negotiations with Gorbachev, he dominated them. Winik records how, time and again, the president shocked even his closest associates by his detailed knowledge of the issues, even under the extreme pressure of superpower summitry.

The book's manifold merits, however, cannot obscure the fact that its point of view is biased in favor of the four Jackson Democrats. Republicans are first mentioned after about a hundred pages, and then only because they recruit the four for service in the Reagan administration. George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger play supporting roles and, with one minor exception, anyone who opposes the four heroes is cast as a bad guy. Richard Burt, Perle's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

counterpart at the State Department, is his first nemesis. The "two Richards" fight for supremacy in arms control negotiations throughout the Reagan administration. Later, Senator Sam Nunn bitterly opposes Perle on the ABM Treaty interpretation dispute. Alexander Haig disdains Kirkpatrick, clearly frustrated with her cabinet-level status. Kampelman remains relatively unopposed throughout, but Abrams has practically the entire Democratic Party against him.

Among the "heroes'" adversaries, only one receives a more nuanced treatment from Winik. Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is portrayed as almost a Jackson Democrat caught up in the politics of a party that forces him to move further to the left on defense issues than he prefers. Thus, even when Aspin and Perle knock heads, it is a civil disagreement and not nearly so hostile as Aspin's confrontations with other members of the administration. But this the author may be forgiven: he is himself a Jackson Democrat who once worked for Aspin on the House Armed Services Committee before entering academia.

Reminiscences Mixed with Vitriol

President Reagan and the World is a complex, meandering collection of research papers and discussants' comments from a conference at Hofstra University, held sometime before April 1993. The book gives little or no introduction to the purpose or date of the conference, leaving that essential information to be deduced from various comments in the papers. Apparently, Hofstra has hosted several such conferences before, which are intended to provide an academic forum for analyzing the legacy of presidents. Whereas previous conferences occurred about a decade after a presidency was over, this one was conducted merely four years after Reagan left office. And herein lies one of the book's principal weaknesses: too many of the ostensibly scholarly papers smack of the vitriol against Reagan that characterized political debate, especially from the opposition, in the 1980s.

Even the eminent scholar Stephen Ambrose employs such rhetorical excess. In an overview of Reagan's foreign policy, he makes a number of uncharacteristically illogical and groundless generalizations, asserting for example that "the $3 trillion debt Reagan ran up to pay for Star Wars (SDI)" might be his legacy a hundred years from now (p. 6). He does not mention that the entire military budget, of which the SDI program consumed less than 2 percent per year beginning in Fiscal Year 1984, began declining in Fiscal Year 1985, or that total spending for SDI under Reagan never exceeded $40 billion. Elsewhere, Ambrose suggests that the Reagan administration encouraged Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982, whereas the Reagan administration was in fact *surprised* by it. And finally he avers that the "foreign policy of the Reagan administration had many downs and a few ups. The downs were more numerous . . ." (p. 6). Nowhere does Ambrose discuss Reagan's many successes in winning the Cold War, in effect allowing a few fallen trees to diminish the grandeur of an entire forest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A second weakness of the book is its organization, divided as it is into two sections called, respectively, International Perspectives and Assessments. But the first section is less an assemblage of international perspectives than a series of essays loosely organized around diverse aspects of foreign policy, and the treatment it gives the issues is not balanced. Most topics have two or three articles, but Iran-Contra gets four and the Middle East only one. Moreover, the sheer number of articles in the first section (twenty-one) are not balanced against the personal assessments (three) of the second, written by Maureen Reagan, Jack Kemp, and Jeane Kirkpatrick. While the numerical difference may seem trivial, the more significant disjunction lies between the quality of the research papers, their occasionally caustic tone notwithstanding, and the personal addresses by Reagan's family and friends. The implication is that these authors could be forgiven for offering heart-felt warmth for a man they were close to, but that serious scholars tell a much different story.

Too many of the papers smack of the vitriol that characterized political debate in the 1980s.

To be sure, some of the papers do contribute valuable insights into both the strengths and weaknesses in Reagan's foreign policy legacy. Whittle Johnston's "Reagan and America's Democratic Mission," and Kenneth Adelman's "United States and Soviet Relations: Reagan's Real Role in Winning the Cold War," for instance, provide a convincing picture of a president who is much more than a bumbling, knee-jerk, hard-line ideologue. He comes across as a thoughtful conservative who distinguished himself from his predecessors by actually developing a grand strategy towards the Soviet Union, in effect updating the Truman administration's 1950 strategic blueprint, NSC 68, for the 1980s. To make his strategy work, Reagan had to overcome domestic opposition from those who felt it need not be done, those who said it could not be done, and those who believed it should not be done.

The Iran-Contra chapters address an exclusive audience, namely, those who already know a great deal about that convoluted intrigue. Most of the authors are hostile toward the Reagan administration, but a lone dissenter, the British professor David Mervin, argues that presidents have the legal authority to engage in unilateral actions to protect the national interest, as the *president* defines it. From the ideas of Locke and Jefferson to the precedents set by Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, Mervin presents a strong case for this presidential prerogative, and shows why Congress is ill equipped to be a partner in foreign affairs.

A number of the chapters seem irrelevant to advancing knowledge about Reagan's foreign policy. One chapter on how Reagan reached the INF accord seems to be more about the choice of theoretical models—even though the president fits into none of them. Another, "Ronald Reagan and the Illusion of Victory in the Cold War," makes no sense at all. The author contends that Reagan's policies did not cause the Soviet collapse. Instead, *both* sides lost because of the high cost of the arms race, although the United States has yet to confront the expensive "economic and industrial recovery and social therapy"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(p. 10) that was the supposed legacy of that military competition. In a subsequent discussion, even Henry Trofimenko, who worked as an academic for the Soviet Union, takes issue with both of those chapters.

Unfortunately, therefore, the few good sections get lost in a book that on the whole is incoherent and of little value as a scholarly study of Reagan's foreign policy legacy. It seems destined to collect dust on the shelves of the few libraries that will not balk at its $85 cover price.

Falklands Intrigue

Richard Thornton's work, *The Falklands Sting*, tackles a smaller slice of Reagan's legacy, but is a potentially useful study of the origins and diplomacy of the 1982 Falklands War. In contrast to the many military studies of that war, this work examines both the foreign and domestic policies of the countries involved. And while most academic works focus on the victor, Britain, few spend much time with Argentina, and fewer still with the U.S. role in the event. To its credit, this volume addresses all three, although the uneven weight it gives them is rather surprising. Ultimately, however, its credibility is undermined by an emphasis on unfounded tales of conspiratorial power plays.

Thornton, an historian at George Washington University, begins with an overview of the political situation in the three countries immediately prior to the conflict. Margaret Thatcher brought her unique agenda to Britain when she came to power in 1979: domestically, a commitment to return Britain to a free market economy and, in foreign policy, containment of the Soviet Union. However, by late 1980, with the economy in a shambles, Thatcher was under severe pressure to relent. Unremitting criticism helped to produce a split in her Conservative Party between the "wets" and the "Thatcherites." The latter wanted the prime minister to hold fast to her economic policies, resist the Soviet Union, and reassert a special relationship with the United States. The "wets" (a term that was coined by Thatcher, and stuck) wanted to reverse the course of her economic plans and engage Britain fully in the European Union. The "wets" would try to unseat her during the Falklands War.

A military junta came to power in Buenos Aires in 1976. It tried to build Argentina up militarily, solve some of the country's more difficult foreign policy problems, and silence domestic dissent. Yet at the end of 1978, all of its significant foreign policy problems remained, including Brazil's nuclear program and the dispute with Britain over the Falklands, or Malvinas, as Argentines call them. The junta sought to punctuate its military buildup with a secret program to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Intrigue among members of the junta, however, sowed the seeds for the Falklands War.

Meanwhile, Reagan came to office in 1981 with a strong agenda as well. In addition to restoring U.S. military power and reasserting a dominant role for the United States in the world, Reagan sought to renew containment of the Soviet Union. In this, Reagan would come to depend on Britain as the linchpin for his Soviet policy, but Thatcher was weakly holding on to the reins

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of power and the "wets" wouldn't support his strategy. Reagan also inherited two other long-term U.S. goals that would play a role in the Falklands War: reintroducing civilian rule in military regimes and promoting nuclear non-proliferation.

The author presents a highly deterministic argument. Given the need to guarantee British support for containment, restore civilian rule to Argentina, and either delay or halt that country's nuclear weapons program, the Reagan administration set up the "'Falklands Sting'—the scheme to overthrow the junta by leading it into disastrous conflict with Britain over the Falkland Islands" (p. xix). Unfortunately, this provocative thesis simply does not hold up—nowhere in the text is it adequately supported. The bulk of the work examines the junta's intrigues and changing plans to restore the Falklands to Argentine sovereignty by various means, including the use of force. Less attention is paid to Britain's interest in the islands or to Thatcher's struggles with the "wets" for control over foreign policy. Strangely, considering the book's title, the least amount of attention is given to whether Reagan deliberately tried to trick the junta into a disastrous collision with Britain, and much of that discussion is pure conjecture.

More interesting—but equally fantastic—is a mischievous subplot that has Reagan and Thatcher working hard to overcome their respective foreign policy representatives. During the crisis both Reagan's secretary of state, Alexander Haig, and Thatcher's foreign minister, Francis Pym, tried to negotiate a settlement with the junta that would transfer sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina and keep the junta in power—all of which were in direct opposition to Thatcher's wishes. The author alleges that both Haig and Pym, for different reasons, were at odds politically with their respective heads of state: Haig, because he preferred a tough détente, and Pym, because he was a "wet," and was likely to replace Thatcher were she to fall from power. Perhaps most outlandish is the author's claim that Haig and Pym colluded to produce an agreement that would cause Thatcher's downfall, were somehow found out, and as a result were both sacked. Without slowing down to provide or assess evidence other than comments by William Safire, Thornton portrays Haig as an almost preposterously conniving man who sought to undermine Reagan's containment policy, bring down Thatcher's government with an unacceptable negotiated solution, and contest Jeane Kirkpatrick's influence in Reagan's cabinet.

These allegations about Haig's role aside, Thornton depicts Reagan as a decisive leader. In everything he did, from supporting Thatcher to initiating negotiations with the junta to supporting Britain militarily during the Falklands War and finally to sacking Haig, Reagan made all the critical decisions in U.S. policy during this first test of his presidency.

Psychology and Foreign Policy

Beth Fischer, in *The Reagan Reversal*, addresses another narrow issue in the legacy of Reagan's foreign policy. She analyzes why, somewhere between October 31, 1983, and January 16, 1984, Reagan changed his approach to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union. How could the hard-line, uncompromising, anti-Soviet Reagan of 1981–83 become so much more conciliatory, eager to engage in summits without conditions, and willing to conclude arms control agreements? Why his move toward a rapprochement? Until now, this question has rarely been addressed directly.

Fischer, a political science professor, examines the adequacy of models based on four contemporary theories of international relations to account for the policy change. A neo-realist explanation would look for the causes of Reagan's shift in changes in the international balance of power. An approach that begins with domestic politics would rely on changes in public opinion, especially during an election year. A model based on a theory of bureaucratic politics would emphasize the role of small groups of influential policymakers. Finally, leadership analysis would make the case that the change was driven by the president himself. Fischer stipulates that a good explanation must state clearly the catalyst for the policy shift, account for its timing, and explain the nature of the shift. She cogently, but in the end not quite convincingly, argues that only the leader-driven model passes all three tests.

Reagan, according to this book, had deeply held beliefs about the immorality of nuclear weapons and the strategic doctrines developed from them, especially mutually assured destruction (MAD), and also disdained traditional arms control, which only limited the growth of nuclear arsenals but did not reduce them. But given all this, he remained confrontational with the Soviets throughout his first three years, especially with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. What happened? Borrowing from cognitive psychology, Fischer examines three "priming effects" that predisposed Reagan to change his policy. All three occurred in the fall of 1983. On September 1, a Soviet fighter shot down Korean Airline Flight 007 en route to Korea, killing all 269 passengers. It was a catastrophic failure of Soviet command and control, one that undermined the White House's confidence in the Soviets' ability to control their nuclear forces. Then, on October 10, Reagan watched a private screening of ABC's movie, *The Day After*, in which the town of Lawrence, Kansas, is destroyed in a nuclear exchange. It "left me greatly depressed," Fischer quotes Reagan in his memoirs (p. 120). Finally, a few days later the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended the Pentagon's first briefing of Reagan on the Single Integrated Operational Plan for the targeting of American nuclear weapons. Reagan felt "chastened" (p. 121) and likened its emotional impact to that of the film he had just seen.

These experiences thus primed the president for the catalyst that followed: a NATO-wide command and control exercise known as Able Archer '83, held from November 2 to 11, which the Soviets mistook for a war preparation.[1] Under Yuri Andropov, the KGB had developed a computer program to detect Western war preparations, code named VRYAN, an acronym for Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack. Based on VRYAN's calculations of the exercise, the Soviets raised

[1] This exercise is discussed in greater detail in Peter Pry, *War Scare: Nuclear Countdown After the Soviet Fall* (Atlanta, Ga.: Turner Publishing, 1997). See also the review of that book by Mark T. Clark, "Emerging Security Threats," in *Orbis*, Winter 1998, pp. 121–30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the alert status of their nuclear forces on November 9. Fischer suggests that the Soviet reaction seemed so serious "that Reagan reversed his confrontational course out of concern for the threat of an unwanted nuclear war with the Soviet Union" (p. 102). One week after Able Archer '83 concluded, Reagan convened a small group within the National Security Planning Group to take control of relations with the Soviet Union. Then, in a major address on January 16, 1984, Reagan announced that he would seek a summit with Soviet leaders without preconditions.

Reagan was *not* just lucky. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union was the fruit of his initiatives.

Three concerns, however, cast doubt upon Fischer's explanation. First, she completely ignores the larger military context of Able Archer '83. It included the simulated *raising* of U.S. nuclear force alert levels in Europe, and was the final system check prior to deployment in Europe later that month of INFs, including Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. Secondly, the CIA completely missed the Soviet nuclear alert, and earlier had failed to take VRYAN seriously in any of its Special National Intelligence Estimates.[2]

Most importantly, while Fischer acknowledges that Reagan officials "initially responded in disbelief to Moscow's reaction to the war game" (p. 131), she fails to consider the implications of that statement. The intelligence community, three leading figures of Reagan's cabinet (Weinberger, Shultz, and McFarlane), and conservative supporters in Congress all believed Soviet statements to be propaganda, thus making genuine fear on Reagan's part seem unlikely.

In fact, the successful deployment of INFs was the real catalyst for Reagan's change, and it was a change in *tactics* toward the Soviet Union rather than in his beliefs about nuclear weapons. After all, as a result of deployment, European countries had to endure one of the Soviet Union's most tenacious and hostile propaganda campaigns—a larger political context that Fischer also ignores. The Soviets also threatened to, and eventually did, walk out of strategic arms negotiations when the missiles were deployed. Despite the Soviet reaction, NATO leaders rightly believed that deployment of INFs was crucial to the alliance. Furthermore, with the missiles in place, Reagan believed he could negotiate from a position of strength. But he could not negotiate at all unless the Soviets returned to the table, so he appeared conciliatory—and with the missiles deployed, he could afford to do so.

At the very least, Fischer's analysis demonstrates that Reagan's liberal critics are wrong when they attribute the end of the Cold War to the rise of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan was *not* just lucky. By showing how Reagan changed the U.S. approach to the Soviet Union almost fifteen months before Gorbachev became general secretary, she rightly argues that the successes of the late 1980s and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union were the fruits of Reagan's initiatives.

[2] See Pry's work and Ben B. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare," *An Intelligence Monograph* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, September 1997).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These new studies shed light on some corners of Reagan's legacy in foreign policy. But they are only a minor corrective to the revisionist picture of Reagan's leadership. The political debate over his presidency still inhibits objective scholarship on his legacy, and his efforts to win the Cold War will be assessed and reassessed for years. Not until we move further away from the political issues that defined the 1980s will a more balanced and complete picture emerge.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JAI PRESS INC.

Political Power and Social Theory

Edited by **Diane Davis**, *Department of Sociology, New School for Social Research*

Volume 12, 1998, 288 pp. $78.50/£49.95
ISBN 0-7623-0270-4

CONTENTS: Editor's Introduction, *Diane E. Davis.* PART I. GLOBALIZATION. The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Capitalism: The Case of the Tobacco Industry, *Leslie Sklair.* The Rise of Transnational Social Formations: Mexican and Dominican State Responses to Transnational Migration, *Luis Eduardo Guarnizo.* PART II. LABOR AND THE STATE. The Paradoxes of Power: the Unintended Consequences of Military Rule for Chilean Working-Class Mobilization, *Joel Stillerman.* The Discourse of Technical Competence: Strategies of Authority and Power in Industrializing Brazil, *Barbara Weinstein.* Drowning in Laws but Starving (for Justice?): Brazilian Labor Law and the Workers' Quest to Realize the Imaginary, *John D. French.* PART III. SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ETHNICITY. The Politics of Civil Society and Ethnicity: Reflections on an African Dilemma, *Mahmood Mamdani.* Comparative Reflections on the African Dilemma: The Interdependent Democratization of States and Civil Societies, *Jonathan A. Fox.* Post-Colonial Politics and Power, *Gay W. Seidman.* Civil Society and the Forms of Governmental Power: Extensions to Mamdani's Arguments, *Partha Chatterjee.* A Rejoinder, *Mahmood Mamdani.*

Also Available:
Volumes 1-11 (1980-1997) $78.50/£49.95 each

100 Prospect Street, P. O. Box 811, Stamford, CT 06904-0811
Tel: (203) 323-9606 Fax: (203) 357-8446

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Wisdom of Robert Strausz-Hupé

On Statecraft

We are more ready to condone deviousness and ruthlessness when the stakes are high than when they are low. States always play for high stakes.

On History

When we measure the famed men and women of history by their achievements, we are likely to mistake their true worth. To judge them rightly, we need to know what they hoped for and feared while they rushed, stumbled, or let themselves be dragged onto the stage of history. History reverses the classical drama: It places the mask upon the actor's face after the performance.

On War

In war, nothing is certain but the unexpected. The options are innumerable, though none is open to those who do not return from the battlefield.

On Democracy and Leadership

The pretense of candor is to the practice of deception what the cape is to the sword.

In the great affairs of state, the choices are always few and narrow. Yet, in democratic politics, the "outs" must woo the voter with the promise of radical departures from the policies of the "ins." Hence, the victory of even the most honorable "outs" over the "ins" is won by a measure of deceit. This is why democracy endures by the grace of the people's magnanimity—or short attention span.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685) Date of filing: September 30, 1998. Title of Publication: *Orbis*. Publication No.: 00304387. Frequency of Issue: Quarterly. Annual Subscription Price: $85.00–$250.00. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication: 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610 Philadelphia, PA 19102. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters of General Business Offices of the Publisher: 100 Prospect Street, P.O. Box 811, Stamford CT 06901. Editor: Walter A. McDougall, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102. Owner: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities: None. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes has not changed during preceding 12 months. Extent and Nature of Circulation: A. Total No. Copies (Net Press Run): Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 3000. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 2750. B. Paid Circulation: 1. Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors and Counter Sales: Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 100. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 100. 2. Mail Subscriptions: Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 1675. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 1700. C. Total Paid Circulation: Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 1775. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 1800. D. Free Distribution By Mail, Carrier, or Other Means/Samples, Complimentary, and Other Free Copies: Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 760. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 510 E. Total Distribution (Sum of C and D): Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 2535. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 2310. F. Copies Not Distributed: 1. Office Use, Left Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled After Printing: Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 215. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 210. 2. Return From News Agents: Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 250. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 230. G. Total (Sum of E, F1 and 2—should equal net press run shown in A): Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months, 3000. Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date, 2750. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

Harry A. Richlin
Business Manager

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis (ISSN 0030–4387) is published quarterly by:

JAI Press Inc., 100 Prospect Street, P.O. Box 811, Stamford, Connecticut 06904-0811.

Editorial Offices: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Submission of Articles. The editors invite submissions of articles (preferably no more than seven thousand words, reference notes included) bearing upon contemporary international issues important to the United States. Preference will be given to articles including evaluations of different policy options. Authors are encouraged to request manuscript specifications and a style sheet from the editor before beginning to write.

Books and Publications for Review. Materials should be sent to the Book Review Editor, *Orbis,* 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Subscriptions. $85.00 per year for individuals, Canada and Foreign $105.00, Airmail $125.00; $250.00 per year for institutions, Canada and Foreign $270.00, Airmail $290.00. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to JAI Press Inc., 100 Prospect Street, P.O. Box 811, Stamford, Connecticut 06904-0811. *Postmaster:* Send address changes to: Subscription Dept., 100 Prospect Street, P.O. Box 811, Stamford, Connecticut 06904-0811. (Europe and United Kingdom) 38 Tavistock Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 7PB, England. All subscriptions must be prepaid and are for the 1999 calendar year only. Periodicals postage paid at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and additional offices. Newsstand distribution is by Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, New Jersey 07110.

Advertising and Permissions. Address all correspondence regarding advertising or permission to photocopy articles to JAI Press Inc.

Microfilm. Beginning with Volume 37, *Orbis* is available on microfiche from JAI Press. Each volume is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. Volumes 1–36 of *Orbis* are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106; call toll free 1-800-521-0600. Volumes 1–36 of *Orbis* are also available on microfiche from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Beginning with Volume 37, back issues are available from JAI Press. Back issues of *Orbis,* Volumes 1–36, are available from Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the editors of *Orbis.* Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Copyright © 1999 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
except where otherwise noted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis
A Journal of World Affairs
(ISSN: 0030-4387)

Periodicals
Postage Paid at
Ann Arbor MI
and Additional Offices

JAI PRESS INC.
100 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 811
Stamford, Connecticut 06904-0811
(*Address Service Requested*)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED